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One of the most controversial contemporary criminal policy is-
sues is whether serious or chronic young offenders should be tried
and sentenced as juveniles or adults. Defining the boundary be-
tween juvenile and criminal courts depends upon the answers to a
host of inter-related questions: Who are serious juvenile offenders?
On the basis of what characteristics are they identified? Who
should decide which system will deal with them and why? Does it
make any difference, either symbolically or in terms of public
safety, whether states try and sentence some youths as juveniles or
adults? The diversity of legislative strategies to resolve these di-
lemmas reflect the practical and theoretical complexity of the
problem. 1
A waiver decision entails a sentencing policy choice between
punishment in adult criminal court and rehabilitation in juvenile
court. 2 Such a decision requires a choice between sanctions based
1. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Leg-
islative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CiuM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 471,
505-07 (1987) [hereinafter Legislative Changes in Waiver] (summarizing and ana-
lyzing waiver legislation); DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING
JUVENILES TO CRnM[NAL COURTS 53-56 (1991) (discussing federal and state juvenile
justice legislation).
2. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Ju-
venile Court, 69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 269 (1984) [hereinafter Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice]; see generally Barry C. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prose-
cution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 515, 516 (1978) [hereinafter Reference of Juvenile Offenders) (recognizing the
transfer mechanism as the "gateway" between juvenile and adult criminal courts);
DONNA M. HAmPARAN ET AL., MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENmE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND
TRAINING: YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS: BETWEEN Two WORLDS (1982) [hereinafter BE-
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on characteristics of the offender or of the offense. One fundamen-
tal dispute, for example, is whether "just deserts" and the serious-
ness of the offense should determine the forum, or whether the "real
needs" or "amenability" of the offender should prescribe the appro-
priate disposition.3 States' transfer legislation reflects and suppos-
edly resolves the juvenile-criminal substantive policy tensions
which underlie much of the current sentencing policy debates.
Legislatures, courts, and scholars have analyzed alternative
mechanisms for transferring serious young offenders to criminal
courts for prosecution as adults.4 Recent increases in youth vio-
lence provoke increasingly spasmodic legislative reactions to "get
tough" or to find the "right" solution. Every state has adopted one
or more statutory strategies to transfer some chronic juvenile of-
fenders to criminal courts. The alternatives include judicial waiver
TWEEN Two WORLDS] (examining how youth are referred to adult courts under vari-
ous state statutes); MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING:
READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 169-377 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter
READINGS IN PUBLIC PoLICY] (series of articles on the prosecution of juveniles in
adult court); Symposium on Serious Juvenile Crime, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETIcs &
PUB. POLY 257-624 (1991) (series of articles on juvenile justice and waiver responses
to serious youth crime).
Courts repeatedly emphasize that the waiver decision is appropriately regarded
as a sentencing decision. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)
("'critically important' action..."); In re Hartung, 304 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 1981)
("A reference hearing is a dispositional type hearing which is forward looking. . ."); In
re S.R.J., 293 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Minn. 1980) ("A reference hearing is a dispositional
hearing.... ."); In re T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137, 139-41 (Minn. 1980); In re D.M., 373
N.W.2d 845, 851 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
3. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Determinants of Judi-
cial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
314 (1990) (investigating and analyzing the issues of transfer criteria and noting the
disparity in the transfer decision); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the
Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME
& DELINQ. 259,276 (1987) (focusing on rational, concrete factors rather than nonspe-
cific standards); Legislative Changes in Waiver, supra note 1, at 472-73 ("The waiver
of a serious offender into the adult system on the basis of... [the] offense rather
than an individualized evaluation of the youth's 'amenability to treatment' or 'dan-
gerousness' is both an indicator of and a contributor to the substantive as well as
procedural criminalization of the juvenile court.").
4. See, e.g., supra note 2; Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and
the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the 'Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 MINN. L. REv.
167, 172-88 (1981) [hereinafter Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal"] (analyzing
judicial and legislative waiver mechanisms); Barry C. Feld, Delinquent Careers and
Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195, 197
(1983) [hereinafter Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy] (recognizing judicial
and legislative waiver mechanisms); Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard
Cases in American Juvenile Justice: In Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETmcs & PUB. POL'Y 267 (1991) (reviewing waiver alternatives such as
increasing juvenile court sanctions, decreasing age requirements, and legislative
changes in transfer standards); Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of
Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 93, 100-02 (1990) (surveying vari-
ous intervention programs including the Violent Juvenile Offender Program).
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of juvenile court jurisdiction, legislative exclusion of offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction, and prosecutorial choice of forum be-
tween concurrent jurisdictions.5 Each of these statutory strategies
allocates to a different branch of government-judicial, legislative,
and executive-the decision of whether a youth is a criminal or a
delinquent.
The most prevalent practice in virtually all jurisdictions is ju-
dicial waiver. 6 A juvenile court judge may waive juvenile court ju-
risdiction on a discretionary basis after a hearing to determine
whether a youth is "amenable to treatment" or poses a threat to
public safety. Judicial case-by-case clinical assessment of a youth's
rehabilitative potential and dangerousness reflects the individual-
ized sentencing discretion characteristic of juvenile courts.7
Another common transfer mechanism is legislative waiver or
offense exclusion. This approach emphasizes the seriousness of the
offense committed and reflects the retributive values of the criminal
law.8 Because legislatures created the juvenile court, they possess
considerable latitude to define its jurisdiction and to exclude youths
from juvenile court based on their age and the seriousness of the
offenses committed.
5. See, e.g., Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 523 n.22; BETWEEN
Two WORLDS, supra note 2, at 96-97 (national data summarizing state use of alter-
natives); MELISSA SICKMUND, HOW JUVENILES GET TO CRIMINAL COURT (1994) (statu-
tory analysis of waiver mechanisms); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE
JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED IN CRImnNAL COURT AND CASE DisposrriONs 8-9, 64-
88 (Aug. 1995) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (summarizing juvenile court transfer leg-
islation); Eric Frisch & Craig Hemmings, Juvenile Waiver in the United States 1979-
1995: A Comparison and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes, 46 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 17
(1995) (summarizing juvenile court transfer legislation).
6. In every state except Nebraska and New York, juvenile court judges may
waive jurisdiction over some young offenders following a hearing. in addition, many
states either allow prosecutors to "direct file" against youths in adult criminal court
or exclude youths above certain ages and charged with certain offenses from juvenile
court jurisdiction. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICEmUND, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Ju-
VENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcTus: A NATIONAL REPORT, PREVIEW 16-19 (1995) (48
states and the District of Columbia use judicial waiver, at least in part; 13 states
have some provisions for prosecutorial waiver; 26 states exclude some offense from
juvenile court jurisdiction). See, e.g., SICKMUND, supra note 5; GAO REPORT, supra
note 5; Frisch & Hemming, supra note 5.
7. See Legislative Changes in Waiver, supra note 1 (statutory survey and analy-
sis of juvenile court waiver legislation).
8. See, e.g., Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 556-71; Delinquent
Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 4, at 202-05; Legislative Changes in
Waiver, supra note 1, at 494-99. States typically exclude youths from juvenile court
jurisdiction on the basis of age and offense. For example, in New York, youths 13
years of age and older and charged with mu'rdey or other serious crimes against the
person are tried in criminal court. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 30.00, 70.05 (McKinney
1987); N.Y. Cram. PRoc. LAW § 1.20(42) (McKinney 1992). Whereas in Utah, only
youths 16 years of age and older and charged with aggravated murder are automati-
cally tried in criminal court. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-17(1) (1992).
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A third method utilized to remove some young offenders from
the juvenile justice system is prosecutorial waiver or concurrent ju-
risdiction.9 With this strategy, both juvenile and criminal courts
share concurrent jurisdiction over certain offenses, and a prosecu-
tor's decision to charge a youth in juvenile or criminal court deter-
mines the forum. 10
Defining the boundary between juvenile and criminal court de-
pends, in part, on whether one adopts a juvenile or criminal court
"point of view." If the criminal law's emphasis on punishment
prevails, then the seriousness of the present offense or the of-
fender's prior record controls the transfer decision. In such a case,
transfer decisions lend themselves to relatively mechanical deci-
sional rules or presumptive sentencing guidelines. Alternatively, if
the juvenile court's emphasis on rehabilitation predominates, then
individualized assessments of an offender's "amenability to treat-
ment," "dangerousness," and future welfare control the sentencing
decision and courts require more open-ended, indeterminate, and
discretionary processes."-
9. With prosecutorial waiver, both juvenile and criminal courts share concur-
rent jurisdiction over certain ages and offenses, typically serious, violent, or repeat
crimes. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (Michie 1993) (any child 14 or older
charged with capital, first, or second degree murder); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-6-203, -237
(1994) (any child 14 or older charged with a violent felony). Prosecutorial transfer is
viewed as a routine "executive" charging decision that does not require judicial re-
view. See generally Francis B. McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court
Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 629 (1994) (arguing for prosecutorial waiver); Donna M. Bishop et al.,
Prosecutorial Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable Reform, 35 CRIE & DELINQ. 179
(1989) (examining prosecutorial waiver practice in Florida); Donna M. Bishop &
Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Anal-
ysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NoTRE Dosx J.L. ETmcs & PuB. Pol'N 291 (1991)
(analyzing prosecutorial waiver statutes); Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra
note 2, at 521 n.20 (discussing prosecutorial waiver mechanisms, its variations, and
its shortcomings); BETWEEN Two WoRLDs, supra note 2, at 6 (discussing concurrent
jurisdiction provisions); Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles
in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
439, 456-70 (1985) (discussing prosecutorial waiver power and discretion).
10. This waiver mechanism may be characterized as a form of offense-based deci-
sion-making to the extent that a prosecutor's discretion to charge the case in crimi-
nal courts divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction. See McCarthy, supra note 9, at
656; Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 9.
11. See NORvAL MoRnis, Tvm FUTURE OF ImpRmsoNmENT 13-20 (1974); HERBERT
L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF T1E CRUMINAL SANCTION 54-55 (1968); ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 11-26 (1976); ANDREW vON
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMEs: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SEN-
TENCING OF CRujMUNALS 149-59 (1985). Analyses of juvenile court sentencing prac-
tices also contrast juvenile dispositions which are offender-oriented, indeterminate
and nonproportional with those which are offense-based, determinate, and propor-
tional. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punish-
ment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. Rxv. 821, 847-91 (1988).
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Each method of deciding whether a youth is a criminal or a
delinquent has supporters and detractors. Proponents of judicial
waiver emphasize its consistency with juvenile court sentencing
philosophy, and contend that individualized judgments provide an
appropriate balance of flexibility and severity. 12 In contrast, critics
object that juvenile court judges lack valid or reliable clinical tools
with which to assess amenability to treatment or to predict danger-
ousness, and that the standardless discretion judges exercise re-
sults in abuses and inequalities.13 Other research suggests that
judicial waiver decisions simply replicate and ratify earlier
prosecutorial screening decisions. 14
Proponents of legislative waiver endorse "just deserts" retribu-
tive sentencing policies, assert that offense exclusion fosters greater
consistency, uniformity, and equality among similarly-situated of-
fenders, and advocate sanctions based on relatively objective char-
acteristics such as seriousness of the offense, culpability, or
criminal history. 15 However, critics question whether a legislature
can remove discretion from the waiver decision without imposing
excessive rigidity, or substantially increasing the number of inap-
propriate youths transferred to criminal court.16
Proponents of concurrent-jurisdiction prosecutorial waiver
claim that prosecutors can function as more neutral, balanced and
12. See, e.g., Zimring, supra note 4, at 268 (arguing that "discretionary waiver
... is superior to alternative methods of handling juvenile justice's hardest" cases);
Fagan, supra note 4, at 114-19 (advocating that waiver can adequately address vio-
lent juvenile offenders).
13. Professor Barry Feld criticizes the subjectivity of judicial waiver practices,
questions the validity of individualized, clinical diagnoses or predictions, and objects
to delegating sentencing policy to the discretion of social service personnel and
judges. See, e.g., Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 529-56 (juvenile
court judges lack valid or reliable clinical tools with which to make accurate amena-
bility diagnoses or dangerousness predictions); Legislative Changes in Waiver, supra
note 1, at 489; Barry C. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teen-Aged
Axe-Murderers, Judicial Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 LAw & INEQ. J. 1 (1990)
[hereinafter Bad Law Makes Hard Cases] (standardless discretion results in incon-
sistent decisions and justice by geography); Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 3 (not-
ing inconsistency in transfer decisions); Fagan et al., supra note 3 (racial disparities
in waiver decisions).
14. Robert 0. Dawson, An Empirical Study of Kent Style Juvenile Transfers to
Criminal Court, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 975, 1052 (1992) (practical role of court is "lim-
ited to finding required facts and reviewing prosecutorial" screening and charging
discretion).
15. See, e.g., Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 4; Reference of
Juvenile Offenders, supra note 2.
16. Zimring, supra note 4, at 273-75; Franklin E. Zimring, Notes Toward a Ju-
risprudence of Waiver, in MMOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND
TRAINING: READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 193, 199-200 (1981); SNYDER & SICKMUNm,
supra note 6, at 18 (reporting that '[s]tatutory exclusion [on the basis of age and




objective gatekeepers than either "soft" juvenile court judges or "get
tough" legislators. 17 Critics of prosecutorial waiver strategies con-
tend that prosecutors' exercise of discretion is just as subjective and
idiosyncratic as that of judges', and further lacks the redeeming vir-
tue of either a judicial record or appellate review. 18
As the policy debate rages, legislatures increasingly exclude
certain combinations of present offense and prior records from j'uve-
nile court jurisdiction, emphasize offenses as presumptive disposi-
tional criteria in judicial waiver proceedings, or delegate to
prosecutors the power to decide.19 Although transferring juveniles
to criminal court is the most consequential sentencing decision ju-
venile courts make, there is remarkably little research on the deter-
minants of waiver, the comparative sentences that young offenders
received in juvenile or criminal courts, or their subsequent criminal
careers. 20 In short, despite continual legislative tinkering, there is
surprisingly little information to guide policy makers about appro-
priate age thresholds for criminal responsibility, offender or offense
characteristics that affect decisions, or the public safety conse-
quences of adopting one policy alternative over another.
This Article analyzes judicial waiver policies and processes.
In Part I, we analyze the legal framework and prior research on
judicial waiver practices, summarize recent legislative changes in
Minnesota's judicial waiver statutes, and examine the implications
of youth crime, violence, and race on waiver policy. In Part II, we
present extensive data from an urban setting, Hennepin County
(Minneapolis and its surrounding suburbs), Minnesota, and analyze
judicial application of the legislative criteria for adulthood. Our
data analyses identify the offender and offense variables that af-
fected 330 judicial transfer decisions between 1986 and 1992. In
addition to analyzing the factors that influence transfer decisions,
we also explore the judicial waiver process itself. We assess the
timing of the process, the role of clinical assessments, and the ways
in which judicial practices affect transfer decisions. Finally, we ex-
amine the subsequent juvenile or criminal court processing, sen-
17. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 9, at 664-65.
18. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 9, at 299-300.
19. Compare Legislative Changes in Waiver, supra note 1, at 489 with CHAMPION
& MAYS, supra note 1 and SicKwuND, supra note 5 (documenting changes in waiver
legislation between 1986 and 1994). See also Frisch & Hemmings, supra note 5;
GAO REPORT, supra note 5.
20. See, e.g., Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 3, at 327 (noting that little empiri-
cal research existed which examined the determinants of judicial waiver); HowARD
N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTMS: A Focus ON VIOLENCE 28 (May 1995) [hereinafter Focus ON VIOLENCE]
("Given recent increases in juvenile violence, more research is needed on the impact
of transferring juveniles to criminal court."):
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tencing, and recidivism of youths against whom prosecutors filed
waiver motions. Throughout our analyses, we assess the ways in
which a youth's race and offense interact in the waiver process. In
our conclusion in Part III, we consider the policy implications of our
research findings, and hypothesize the likely consequences of Min-
nesota's recent revisions of its certification legislation.
Formulating a waiver sentencing policy entails an inevitable
trade-off between emphasizing the seriousness of the present of-
fense and the prior record or persistence of offending. While a few
youths may commit a very serious offense without any prior delin-
quency involvement, most serious offenders are also chronic wrong-
doers.2 1 Although a very serious initial offense may warrant an
immediate retributive response, a more utilitarian waiver policy at-
tempts to identify persistent offenders for enhanced sanctions be-
cause they ultimately commit most of the serious crime.22 Whether
a youth is tried as a delinquent or a criminal "entails an explicit
value choice about the quantity and quality of youthful deviance
that will be tolerated within the juvenile system before a more pu-
nitive adult response is mandated."2 3
This study makes two significant contributions to our under-
standing of judicial waiver policy and practice. First, the quality of
our data and the scope of our analyses provide a comprehensive as-
sessment of the determinants and consequences of judicial waiver
decisions. The research findings provide important information for
legislatures about the roles of age, present offense, prior record, and
court process in defining the boundaries of adulthood. Secondly,
this study undertakes a thorough assessment of the role of a youth's
race in the waiver process. Although we do not find any evidence of
overt racial discrimination in waiver decisions, because of substan-
tial racial differences in patterns of offending, waiver policies that
focus on violent crimes inevitably have a racially disparate impact
on minority youths.
Our analyses reveal that during the period of our study, the
Hennepin County juvenile court' employed an implicit waiver policy
that emphasized persistence rather than seriousness. The court fo-
cused on youths' prior records as an indicator of career criminality
and transferred older, chronic offenders with somewhat less empha-
21. See MARVIN WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972)
(chronic offenders account for most of the serious delinquency); PAUL TRACY ET AL.,
DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN Two BIrTH COHORTS (1990) (chronic offenders account for
most of the serious delinquency).
22. WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 21, at 88 (finding that recidivists committed
84.2% of offenses); Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 571; 2 CuMnIAL
CAREERS AND "CAREER CRnInNALS" 349-50 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986).
23. Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 572.
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sis on the seriousness of the current offense. By contrast, the 1994
amendments of the Minnesota waiver statute placed greater em-
phasis on the seriousness of the present offense. The legislative
changes reflect a legitimate retributivist sentencing policy which
underscores the seriousness of the present offense rather than the
informal incapacitative policy reflected in the court's past emphases
on age and prior record. However, because of racial differences in
the rates of violent offenses committed by white and African-Ameri-
can juveniles, we anticipate that the Minnesota legislative decision
to emphasize the seriousness of the present offense rather than the
cumulative record of chronic offending will have a distinctive and
racially disparate impact on future waiver decisions.
I. Juvenile Courts, Judicial Waiver, and Individualized
Sentencing Decisions
A Judicial Waiver
Ideological changes in strategies of social control 24 and in the
cultural conceptions of children25 at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury led to the creation of the juvenile court. The juvenile court
24. Criminal justice reformers attributed criminal behavior to deterministic
forces rather than to deliberately chosen misconduct. Positivism superseded the
classic formulations of crime as the product of free will, reduced offenders' responsi-
bility for their misdeeds, and redirected efforts to treat offenders rather than to pun-
ish them. See DAVID MArZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr 5 (1964); DAVID J. ROTHMAN,
CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE 50-51 (1980); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS
22 (1978); ANTHoNy M. PLATr, THE CHmD SAVERS: TH INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
46-74 (2d ed. 1977).
Positivistic criminology analogized treatment of offenders to the medical profes-
sion, and drew on newly emerging social sciences such as psychology and sociology to
inform their "rehabilitative" endeavors. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, DECLINE OF THE REHA-
BILIrATIVE IDEAL 5-15 (1981). Identifying the causes of and prescribing the cures for
crime and delinquency required an individualized, discretionary approach rather
than uniform processes or standardized criteria. Several criminal justice reforms at
the turn of the century-probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and juvenile
courts-reflected these indeterminate, flexible rehabilitative strategies. Francis A.
Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in TnE BORDERLAND OF CRAMINAL
JUSICE 25-27 (1964); Ro zfAN, supra at 43.
25. See generally Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstruct-
ing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1082 (1991) (changing cultural conception of childhood); JOSEPH F. KErr, RrrEs OF
PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT 114-16 (1977) (economic
and demographic changes affected family structure and function); CARL N. DEGLER,
AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRES-
ENT 178-209 (1980) (suggesting that demographic changes were caused in part by
changes in women's self-perceptions); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS
WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 6-10 (1977) (discussing the rapidly changing economic
system in America at the end of the 19th century that brought about the "crisis of
the family"); PLATT, supra note 24, at 75-83 (describing the social class basis of mod-
ern conception of children and imposition of cultural norms by upper and middle
classes on poor and immigrants).
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synthesized the new social construction of childhood with the new
approaches to social control in a specialized, bureaucratic agency
staffed by experts and designed to serve the needs of the child of-
fender.26 Progressive "child savers" substituted the criminal law's
traditional punitive strategy with a scientific and preventative ap-
proach, and used indeterminate, non-proportional discretionary
dispositional processes to rehabilitate young offenders. 27
From its inception, however, the juvenile court could relin-
quish its jurisdiction and subject some young offenders to prosecu-
tion in adult criminal courts.28 The ability of juvenile courts to
26. Many social programs created by Progressive reformers shared the newer
cultural conception of childhood and advanced a "child-saving" agenda: juvenile
court legislation, child labor laws, child welfare laws, and compulsory school attend-
ance laws. See generally KETT, supra note 25, at 226-27; ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE
SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 169 (1967) (noting that the child was a "central
theme" in the progressive agenda regarding health, education, labor, legal and penal
reform); JUVENILE JUSTICE: TE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS (La-
Mar T. Empey ed., 1979) (juvenile court legislation); SUSAN TIFIN, IN WHOSE BEST
INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1982) (social welfare
legislation); WALTER I. TRATPNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITrEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA (1970)
(child-labor legislation); LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
SCHOOL: PROGRESSIviSM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876-1957, at 127-28 (1961) (com-
pulsory education legislation). Additionally, several standard accounts of the crea-
tion of the juvenile court exist. See, e.g., RYERSON, supra note 24, at 16-34;
ROTHMAN, supra note 24, at 205-36; PLATT, supra note 24, at 55-61.
27. The juvenile court separated children from adult criminal offenders and pro-
vided them with a separate, non-criminal welfare system. According to juvenile
court theory, an expert judge would develop an individualized treatment plan to
meet the child's "real needs" based on information provided by social service person-
nel and probation officers. Juvenile court judges enjoyed virtually unlimited discre-
tion to make dispositions in the child's "best interests." Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile
Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187-1220 (1970);
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 109 (1909); PLATr, supra
note 24, at 137-45.
Because juvenile courts used therapeutic methods to achieve benevolent goals,
they rejected the procedural trappings of criminal prosecutions. Indeterminate and
non-proportional dispositions could continue for the duration of minority. Juvenile
courts employed a euphemistic vocabulary and separate facilities to avoid the stigma
associated with criminal prosecutions. See ROTHMAN, supra note 24, at 217-18; RY-
ERSON, supra note 24, at 35-40; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRME 92-93 (1967). They excluded juries, lawyers, technical rules of evidence, and
formal procedures because juvenile court proceedings focused on the child's back-
ground and welfare rather than the details of a specific crime. See generally ROTH-
MAN, supra note 24, at 215-17 (juvenile courts were considered non-adversarial and
mainly concerned with the juvenile's background, rendering juries and attorneys un-
necessary); RYERSON, supra note 24, at 58-63 (unlike the adult criminal court, the
juvenile court was based on parens patriae, not due process).
28. As one author noted:
Legislation in many states permitted juvenile court judges to transfer
any given case to an adult court, an allowance that they occasionally
took advantage of when the charge was especially serious. The Cook
County juvenile court, for example, asked grand juries to weigh the
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transfer certain serious young offenders to criminal courts provided
a "safety valve" option that helped to insulate the juvenile courts
from political and public criticisms that they "coddled" youths
charged with highly visible or violent crimes.
Although judicial waiver reflected juvenile courts' individual-
ized sentencing strategy, two United States Supreme Court deci-
sions provided the procedural framework for the transfer decision.
In Kent v. United States,29 the Court formalized waiver hearings
and required states to provide procedural safeguards, such as no-
tice and the right to counsel.3 0 Subsequently, in Breed v. Jones,31
the Court required states to decide whether to try a youth in juve-
nile or criminal court before proceeding on the merits of the
charge. 3 2
Although Kent and Breed formalized waiver proceedings, the
substantive criteria for waiver decisions pose greater difficulties.
Most judicial waiver statutes authorize discretionary waiver based
on a juvenile court's assessment of a youth's "amenability to treat-
ment" or "dangerousness," as revealed by the offender's age, the se-
riousness of the present offense and prior record, and clinical
evaluations and treatment prognoses. 33 Some states legislatively
merits of a regular indictment in about fifteen cases a year-a figure
which represented no more than one percent of its cases but did include
the most notorious. Typically these boys were older (sixteen, not
twelve) and were arrested for "deeds of violence, daring holdups, carry-
ing guns, thefts of considerable amounts, and rape."
ROTHMAN, supra note 24, at 285.
29. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
30. "[Tlhere is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremen-
dous consequences without cereniony-without hearing, without effective assistance
of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554. In Kent, the Supreme Court
concluded that juvenile courts provided youths with certain advantages, such as in-
formal proceedings and confidential records, and that divestiture of those protections
was a "critically important" decision that required a hearing, assistance of counsel,
access to social investigations and other records, and written findings that appellate
courts could review Kent. Id. at 554-57. See Monrad Paulsen, Kent v. United
States: The Constitutional Contest of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SuP. CT. Rv. 167, 182-83
(criticizing Kent's requirements as intrusive upon a juvenile court's exercise of
discretion).
31. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
32. Id. at 541. In Breed, the Court applied the double jeopardy provisions of the
Constitution to delinquency adjudications, and prohibited adult criminal re-prosecu-
tion of a youth after a prior conviction in juvenile court. Id. The Court described the
functional equivalence between delinquency and criminal proceedings-" 'anxiety
and insecurity,'" a "heavy personal strain,'" and the burdens of defending in the
more formal juvenile system-and concluded that little distinguished the two modes
of prosecution. Id. at 530-31 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187
(1955); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1979)).
33. See Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 3, at 324 (finding that legislatures in
most states have expanded the use of transfer by reducing age eligibility and ex-
panding offense categories); Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 4,
at 198 (arguing that most waiver decisions are based on "amenability to treatment or
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or judicially adopted the substantive criteria that the Supreme
Court appended to its Kent decision to provide courts with addi-
tional guidance. 34
Assessing whether a youth is amenable to treatment or poses
a threat to others implicates a number of difficult sentencing policy
issues. Are there demonstrably effective treatment programs for
chronic or serious young offenders?35 Can courts predict danger-
dangerousness"); Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 526 (discussing
the main factors on which most waiver decisions are based); Legislative Changes in
Waiver, supra note 1, at 490 (discussing the substantive bases of judicial waiver
decisions); Fagan et al., supra note 3 (discussing race as a factor in transfer deci-
sions). See, e.g., MNN. STAT. § 260.125 (1994).
34. Although the Supreme Court decided Kent on procedural grounds, in an ap-
pendix to its opinion, the Court indicated some of the substantive criteria that a
juvenile court might consider:
An offense falling within the statutory limitations . . . will be
waived if it has prosecutive merit and if it is heinous or of an aggra-
vated character, or-even though less serious-if it represents a pat-
tern of repeated offenses which indicate that the juvenile may be
beyond rehabilitation under Juvenile Court procedures, or if the public
needs the protection afforded by such action.
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in
deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses
will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, vi-
olent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons
especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is ev-
idence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an
indictment ....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in
one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense
are adults....
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined
by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emo-
tional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previ-
ous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement
agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of
probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the like-
lihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found
to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures,
services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
Kent, 383 U.S. app. at 566-67.
35. Compare Steven P. Lab & John T. Whitehead, An Analysis of Juvenile Cor-
rectional Treatment, 34 CRu,%E & DEULNQ. 60 (1989) (half the evaluation studies re-
port no or negative effects of treatmentl and John T. Whitehead & Steven P. Lab, A
Meta-Analysis of Juvenile Correctional Treatment, 26 J. RES. CRVM & DELINQ. 267
(1989) (correctional intervention has depressingly little impact oa recidivism rates)
and Steven P. Lab & John T. Whitehead, From "Nothing Works" to "The Appropriate
Works".• The Latest Stop on the Search for the Secular Grail, 28 CRIMINoLOGY 405
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ousness either clinically or statistically with an acceptable degree of
accuracy?36 Are there valid and reliable diagnostic tools with
which a clinician or juvenile court can differentiate among youths'
treatment potential or dangerousness to classify accurately any
given individual offender? 37
Judicial waiver statutes couched in terms of amenability to
treatment or dangerousness give juvenile courts virtually unlimited
discretion.38 Lists of substantive factors, such as those appended in
Kent, often reinforce rather than constrain judicial discretion.39
Because of the subjective nature of waiver criteria, the absence of
guidelines to structure the decision, and the lack of concrete indica-
tors by which to classify youths, a variety of inequalities and dis-
(1990) (methodological criticisms of meta-analyses that purport to show correctional
treatment effectiveness) with D. A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment
Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRnm-
NOLOGY 369 (1990) (correctional treatment can be effective when delivered to appro-
priate clients in appropriate settings) and Ted Palmer, The Effectiveness of
Intervention: Recent Trends and Current Issues 37 CRIME & DELINQ. 330 (1991). See
generally Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile
Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REv. 965, 1075-82 (1995) [hereinafter Violent
Youth and Public Policy] (reviewing the empirical literature of the effectiveness of
"treatment" in juvenile correctional institutions).
36. Stephen D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Violence Prediction Methods:
Statistical and Clinical Strategies, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 303, 311-14 (1988); Refer-
ence of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 540-46; Norval Morris & Marc Miller,
Predictions of Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME & JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEw OF RE-
SEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1985).
37. See, e.g., Don M. Gottfredson & Stephen D. Gottfredson, Stakes and Risks in
the Prediction of Violent Criminal Behavior, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 247, 258 (1988)
(arguing that current offense seriousness and weighing "stakes" and "risks" can pre-
dict future criminal acts); Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 529-46
(discussing issues raised by assessments of dangerousness and amenability to treat-
ment); Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", supra note 4, at 174-84 (noting the
problematic nature of subjective judicial waiver and the Minnesota legislative re-
sponse); Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 4, at 198-202; Legisla-
tive Changes in Waiver, supra note 1, at 489; Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra
note 35, at 1006-08; DON GOTrFREDSON & MICHAEL ToNRY, PREDICTION AND CLASSI-
FICATION 9 (1987) (analyzing statistical, methodological, and policy implications of
prediction in legal decision-making).
38. Professor Frank Zimring characterizes waiver as "the capital punishment of
juvenile justice'" and analogizes judicial discretion to the standardless capital pun-
ishment statutes condemned by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). Zimring, supra note 16, at 193.
39. Judges can selectively emphasize one set of attributes or another to rational-
ize any decision. Critics note that "[ciollectively, 'lists' of this length rarely serve to
limit discretion or regularize procedure. By giving emphasis to one or two of the
guidelines, a judge can usually justify a decision either way." TWENTETH CENTURY
FUND, TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TowARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CON-
FRONTING YoUTH Cmim 56 (1978) [hereinafter CONFRONTING YoUrH CRIMEl. ZiMr-
ing notes that "the substantive standards are highly subjective, and the large
number of factors that may be taken into consideration provides ample opportunity
for selection and emphasis in discretionary decisions that shape the outcome of indi-
vidual cases." Zimring, supra note 16, at 195.
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parities may occur. Juvenile courts interpret and apply
discretionary waiver statutes inconsistently from county to county
and court to court within a single jurisdiction.4O National analyses
of states' waiver practices document the arbitrary, capricious, and
discriminatory consequences of discretionary transfer decisions.41
A juvenile's race also may affect waiver decisions, with minority
youths at greater risk of transfer.4 2 Not surprisingly, research re-
40. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 61-78 (Nov. 1976) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE MINN.
SUPREME COURT] (waiver is used for three different purposes in different parts of the
state); Leonard Edwards, The Case for Abolishing Fitness Hearings in Juvenile
Court, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 595, 611-12 (1977) (county by county disparity); BE-
TWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 2, at 150-98 (county by county disparity within
states); JAMES P. HEUSER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUvENnES ARRESTED FOR SERIOUS
FELONY CRmS IN OREGON AND "REMANDED" TO ADULT CRIMINAL COURTS: A STATISTI-
CAL STUDY 30 (1985) (county by county variation in Oregon-"it appears that some
counties may be over- or under-represented in terms of the proportion of cases per
unit of risk population."); Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 13, at 41-46 (ur-
ban, suburban, and rural disparities in characteristics of youths waived to criminal
court).
The location of a waiver hearing or differences in a juvenile court's organiza-
tional and philosophical characteristics influence waiver decisions as much as does a
youth's dangerousness or intractability. M. A. Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric, Orga-
nizational Realities: Remand of Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 53,
64-70 (1986) (organizational considerations affect waiver practices as courts symbol-
ically transfer some youths in order to preserve jurisdiction over most youth and
deflect public and political criticisms of the entire system).
41. BETWEEN Two WoRLDS, supra note 2, at 102-07. Among the states that rely
on judicial waiver for the transfer decision, the rates of waiver vary from a high of
13.5 to a low of.07 per 10,000 youths at risk; youths in Oregon have nearly 200 times
the probability of being waived for trial as adults as do youths in Montana. Id. at
102-03. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 5 (documenting extensive state variability
in waiver).
See also Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 3, at 345-47 (analyzing waiver deci-
sions of violent youths in four urban jurisdictions and revealing that no consistent or
uniform criteria guided the courts' transfer decisions). They reported that "[n]either
multivariate analysis nor simple explorations identified strong or consistent deter-
minants of the judicial transfer decision. Except for a relationship between exten-
sive prior offense history and the transfer decision, none of the identified variables
could significantly describe differences between youths who were or were not trans-
ferred." Id. at 345.
42. See GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 59. In the four states where it was possi-
ble to perform detailed analyses of waiver rates, it was found that courts waived
African-Americans more often than whites for violent, property, and drug offenses.
Id. See also note 137 and accompanying text.
See also Joel Eigen, The Determinants and Impact of Jurisdictional Transfer in
Philadelphia, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 333, 339-40 (John C. Hall et al. eds.,
1981) (finding that black youths who murder white victims are significantly more at
risk for waiver); Robert Keiter, Criminal or Delinquent?: A Study of Juvenile Cases
Transferred to the Criminal Court, 19 CRIMs & DELINQ. 528 (1973) (examining the
manner and effect of the Cook County juvenile court attorney's exercise of statutory
discretion in transferring juveniles to adult court); BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra
note 2, at 104-05 (reporting on a 1978 study finding that, nationally, 39% of all
youths transferred were minority and that in 11 states, minority youths constituted
the majority of juveniles waived; however, the study was unable to control for the
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ports that a youth's age in relation to the jurisdictional age limit of
the juvenile court strongly affects waiver decisions; judges transfer
older juveniles whose offenses requires a longer sentence than that
available in the juvenile court.43
Transfer decisions entail two interrelated sentencing policy is-
sues. First, individualized judicial waiver decisions within juvenile
courts implicate the inherent tensions between discretion and the
rule of law. Second, these decisions also involve the relationship
between juvenile and criminal court sentencing practices. Formu-
lating consistent social control responses to serious or chronic of-
fenders requires coordinated responses to youths who make the
transition between the two systems. Unfortunately, arbitrary legis-
lative age-lines or idiosyncratic judicial decisions that determine ju-
venile "treatment" or adult "punishment" have no criminological
relevance other than their legal consequences.
Because of differences in juvenile and criminal court sentenc-
ing policies, the two justice systems often may work at cross-pur-
poses and may frustrate rather than harmoize social contr1l
responses to serious crime as young offenders move between the
two systems. 44 A strong relationship exists between age and crimi-
nal activity.45 Chronic offenders begin their criminal careers in
their early to mid-teens, attain their peak levels of criminal activity
in late adolesence or early adulthood, and then gradually reduce
seriousness of the present offense and prior record); Fagan et al., supra note 3, at
276 (positing that, although no direct evidence of sentencing discrimination exist,
"the effects of race are indirect, but visible nonetheless.").
43. Fagan et al., supra note 3, at 273 (age at offense as an indicator of the time
remaining within juvenile court jurisdiction strongly affects judicial transfer deci-
sions); GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 58 ("juveniles age 16 or older were more likely
to have their cases waived than juveniles under age 16 years for all three offense
types ... ).
44. Barbara Boland & James Q. Wilson, Age, Crime, and Punishment, 51 Pun.
INrEREST 22, 22-23 (1978); Peter W. Greenwood, Differences in Criminal Behavior
and Court Responses Among Juvenile and Youth Adult Defendants, in 7 CRIME &
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 151, 152 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris
eds., 1986); Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 4, at 205.
45. See 1 CRAIINmAL CAREERS AND "CAREER CRnmNALs" 23 (Alfred Blumstein et al.
eds., 1986); WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 21, at 65-87; Joan Petersilia, Criminal
Career Research: A Review of Recent Evidence, in 2 CRIME & JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 321, 321-22 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry eds., 1980). See
also David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, in 7 CRudE & JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 189, 189 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986) (analyzing age-
specific crime rates and noting that crime rates peak in mid- to late-teenage years
and then decline); Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation
of Crime, 89 AM. J. Soc. 552 (1983) (finding that age has a direct causal influence on
crime); David F. Greenberg, Delinquency and the Age Structure of Society, in CRRM-
NOLOGY REVIEW YEARBOOK 586 (Sheldon Messinger & Egon Bittner eds., 1979)(dis-
cussing delinquency theory and age distribution of crime).
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their rates of criminal involvement.46 The jurisdictional bifurca-
tion between juvenile and criminal courts fosters discontinuities in
the responses to young career criminals who make the transition
from one system to the other. For example, criminal courts may
sentence more leniently chronic younger offenders when their rate
of criminal activity is increasing or is at its peak, but sentence more
severely older offenders whose criminal activity is declining be-
cause of their cumulative prior record.47 In particular, chronic
young property offenders typically receive more lenient sentences
when they appear in criminal court as first-time adult offenders
than they might have received in juvenile court.48
46. Petersilia, supra note 45, at 358; 1 CRMPNmAL CAREERS AND "CAREER
CRmnNmALs," supra note 45, at 23; Greenwood, supra note 44, at 163.
47. See generally Barbara Boland, Fighting Crime: The Problem of Adolescents
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRnwNOLOGY 94 (1980) (noting that young offenders committed
most crimes but were not severely punished until older); Boland & Wilson, supra,
note 44 (stating that a]though an individual's crime rate decreases with age, the
punishment increases); PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., AGE, CRIusE AND SANCTIONS: THE
TRANSITION FROM JUVENILE TO ADuLT COURT (1980) (finding that incarceration in-
creases with a defendant's prior criminal record, which increases with age; thus,
criminals in early stages of their career are less likely to be incarcerated); Delin-
quent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 4, at 205 (asserting that offenders'
crime rates for many kinds of offenses peak in mid- to late adolescence).
48. See, e.g., PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY
FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 12-14 (1984) (finding that youthful offenders faced
substantially lower chances of being incarcerated than older offenders; youthful vio-
lent offenders received lighter sentences than older violent offenders; and for approx-
imately two years after becoming adults, youths were beneficiaries of lenient
sentencing policies in criminal courts); CONFRONTING YOUTH CRUmA, supra note 39,
at 63 (youthfulness is a mitigating factor in criminal court sentencing).
Hamparian reported that criminal courts subsequently fined or placed on proba-
tion the majority of juveniles judicially transferred, and that even among those con-
fined, 40% received maximum sentences of one year or less. BETWEEN TWO WORLDS,
supra note 2, at 106-09. In part, these relatively lenient dispositions reflect the fact
that less than one-third of the youths waived judicially were convicted of offenses
against the person and that the largest proportion were property offenders, primar-
ily burglars.
Heuser evaluated the adult sentences received by waived juvenile felony defend-
ants in Oregon and reported that most were property offenders rather than violent
offenders. HEUSER, supra note 40, at 21-22. Heuser found that 16.7% involved vio-
lent crime charges and 83.3% involved property crime charges. Id. As a conse-
quence, only 55% of the youths convicted of felonies were incarcerated and the rest
received probation. Id. at 23. The confinement rate is inflated somewhat because
criminal courts judges almost invariably incarcerated youths convicted of violent of-
fenses. "The incarceration rate is much higher for violent crimes (75.0%) and much
lower for property crimes (51.5%)." Id. Moreover, even of those youths incarcerated
as adults, nearly two-thirds received jail terms of one year or less and served an
average of about eight months. Id. at 26-27. Juveniles with extensive prior records
convicted of felonies in juvenile courts could receive comparable dispositions.
Gillespie and Norman analyzed youths waived in Utah between 1967 and 1980,
and found that the judges transferred most youth for property crimes rather than
violent offenses, and that the criminal court judges did not imprison the majority of
juveniles convicted as adults. L. Kay Gillespie & Michael Norman, Does Certifica-
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A rational sentencing policy requires a consistent response to
persistent and serious offenders on both sides of the line that differ-
entiates juvenile from adult offenders. Criminal courts often do not
sanction chronic young offenders as severely as adults because of
the lack of congruence between juvenile court waiver criteria and
adult court sentencing practices, qualitative differences in the na-
ture of juveniles' offenses compared with adult offenses, 4 9 and the
lack of integration of juvenile and adult criminal records.50 Once a
legislature formulates a consistent sentencing policy, it can specify
more precisely the criteria to systematize juvenile court waiver de-
cisions with criminal court sanctions.5 1 The gradual evolution of
tion Mean Prison: Some Preliminary Findings from Utah, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Fall
1984, at 30-32.
Bortner's evaluation of judicial waiver practices reported that criminal court
judges sentenced less than one-third of the transferred juveniles convicted in adult
proceedings to prison, and quickly returned significant numbers to the community.
Bortner, supra note 40, at 56-57. She attributed these anomalous outcomes to the
youths' "first time offender status in the adult system, the relatively nainor nature of
their offenses, and the brevity of their offense histories compared to adult offenders."
Id.
49. E.g., M. Joan McDermott & Michael J. Hindelang, ANALysL9 OF NATIONAL
CRnAE VIcTnnzAriON SURVEY DATA TO STUDY SEIuous DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR: MON-
OGRAPH ONE, JuvENLE CRmINAL. BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS TRENDS AND
PATTERNS 21-54 (1981) (reporting that younger offenders are less likely than adults
to be armed with guns, inflict as much injury, or steal as much property, and these
age-related offense patterns affect eventual sentences).
50. In many jurisdictions, criminal court judges use the seriousness of the pres-
ent offense and the prior adult criminal history to make sentencing decisions. Joan
Petersilia, Juvenile Record Use in Adult Court Proceedings: A Survey of Prosecutors,
72 J. CRnm. L. & CRnNoLoGY 1746, 1761-62 (1981). Criminal court judges do not
rely as extensively upon an offender's juvenile history because of bureaucratic obsta-
cles to obtaining them, such as confidentiality of juvenile court records, the func-
tional and physical separation of court services staffs, and lack of a computerized,
integrated system to track offenders' complete criminal histories. See GREENWOOD
m L., supra note 47, at 59-61; Greenwood, suprm note 44, at 173. A study of the
effects of juvenile offense histories on adult sentencing practices reported that "local
sentencing policies have much niore of an impact on how young adults are treated,
than any modest variations in the availability of juvenile records." GREENWOOD ET
AL., supra note 48, at 36.
Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines have long included some older juveniles' fel-
ony convictions in young adult offenders' criminal history scores and recent legisla-
tive changes have greatly increased their significance. MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES II.B.4 cmts. II.B.401-05. Compare Dismantling the "Rehabilitative
Ideal", supra note 4, at 233-37 (stating that guidelines limit the use of juvenile con-
victions to enhance the sentences of young adult offenders) with Violent Youth and
Public Policy, supra note 35, at 1057-67 (stating that the 1994 legislative amend-
ments greatly expanded the use of juvenile felony convictions in criminal history
score to enhance sentences of young adult offenders).
51. In jurisdictions where the waiver legislation targets serious young offenders
on the basis of the seriousness of their present offenses or their prior records, youths
are more likely to receive substantial adult sentences than in states that rely upon
more discretionary judicial sorting. Thomas and Bilchik's study of waived youths'
dispositions in Florida, a concurrent jurisdiction/direct file state, reported that the
majority of youths tried as adults were older males with prior delinquency adjudica-
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Minnesota's transfer legislation represents one state's efforts to for-
mulate a coherent jurisprudential response to serious young
offenders.
B. The Evolution of Judicial Waiver in Minnesota: The
"Law on the Books" and the "Law in Action"
For more than two decades, Minnesota's waiver statute has
embodied two interrelated difficulties: the idiosyncratic nature of
individualized transfer decisions and the disjunction between juve-
nile waiver decisions and criminal court sentencing practices.
5 2
Unstructured judicial discretion caused both problems.53 Before
1980, Minnesota's waiver law provided minimal guidance to juve-
nile court judges trying to decide whether to transfer a youth for
adult criminal prosecution. The statute required juvenile courts to
predict a youth's "dangerousness" or to clinically determine
tions and multiple present felony charges, typically property offenses. Thomas &
Bilchik, supra note 9, at 470-74. Unlike Hamparian's findings, however, criminal
courts sentenced approximately two-thirds of these Florida juveniles to substantial
terms of imprisonment. Compare id. at 473 -74 with BETWEEN Two WoRLDs, supra
note 2, at 112-17.
Rudman et al. studied the processing and dispositions of "violent juvenile offend-
ers"-defined as youths with a present violent offense and a prior felony adjudica-
tion-tried and sentenced as juveniles or as adults in several jurisdictions. Cary
Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment, 32 CRIMnE &
DELINQ. 75 (1986). Criminal courts incarcerated about 75% of the youths targeted as
violent and convicted in criminal courts, and imposed sentences up to five times
longer than those youths retained in juvenile court. Id. at 91-92. They concluded
that "because the criminal justice system is not limited by the jurisdictional age con-
siderations of the juvenile justice system, violent youths convicted and sentenced in
criminal court receive considerably longer sentences, in adult secure facilities, than
their counterparts retained by the juvenile court." Id. at 89.
Heuser's study of transferred juvenile felony defendants in Oregon reported that
criminal courts incarcerated 75% of the youths convicted of violent offenses and com-
mitted them to prison for average sentences in excess of six years. HEUSER, supra
note 40, at 24, 28-29.
52. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1994). Professor Barry Feld has analyzed the
evolution of the transfer statute in a series of articles. See Reference of Juvenile
Offenders, supra note 2 (criticizing the totally discretionary statute in effect prior to
1980); Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", supra note 4 (analyzing 1980 legisla-
tive changes that created a "prima facie" case or rebuttable presumption for trans-
fer); Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 35 (analyzing 1994 amendments to
create a presumption for certification, shifting the burden of proof to youth to justify
retention in juvenile court, and using adult sentencing guidelines criteria to struc-
ture waiver decisions).
53. Minnesota's appellate courts repeatedly emphasize that trial judges enjoy
the broad discretion to make waiver sentencing decisions. See, e.g., In re KIP.H., 289
N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. 1980) ("The juvenile court is vested with broad discretion in
determining whether either of the statutory criteria exists upon which to base its
reference decision."); In re J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Minn. 1978); In re K.J.K., 357
N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) ("The court has broad discretion in determin-
ing whether a juvenile is suitable for treatment in the juvenile system, and its deci-
sion will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.").
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whether he or she is "amenable to treatment" even though little evi-
dence exists of either effective interventions for serious young of-
fenders or of clinical indicators to accurately identify those who
might respond to treatment or who would re-offend.54 Legislative
amendments in 1980 purported to structure waiver decisions by
creating a rebuttable presumption for transfer, although they did
little to constrain judicial discretion under the "totality of the cir-
cumstances."55 Subsequent legislative amendments in 1994 cre-
ated a strong presumption for transfer, shifted the burden of proof
to the youth to demonstrate affirmatively why juvenile court treat-
ment is appropriate, and changed the waiver criteria.
During the period of our study, the county attorney initiated a
reference proceeding by filing a motion for adult prosecution. 56 Fol-
54. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1978); Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note
2, at 552-56 (arguing that juvenile court judges' broad discretion was rife with pos-
sibilities for abuse and discrimination, and that judges applied statutes inconsis-
tently, waived less serious offenders to satisfy organizational interests, and
exacerbated the "lack of fit" between juvenile and adult criminal sentencing prac-
tices). See supra notes 35-42 aid accompanying text.
55. Subject to the constitutional constraints of the Kent and Breed cases, Minne-
sota's statute and Juvenile Court Rule 32 governed the process to waive juvenile
court jurisdiction and prosecute a young offender as an adult. At the time of this
study, juvenile courts could waive a youth if they found that "the child is not suitable
to treatment or that the public safety is not served" by retaining the youth in juve-
nile court. MmN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(dX2) (1992). Minn. R. P. Juv. Ct. 32.05(2) elab-
orates a nonexclusive list of the "totality of the circumstances" that a juvenile court
may consider in determining a youth's dangerousness or amenability to treatment:
(a) the seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection,
(b) the circumstances surrounding the offense,
(c) whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, pre-
meditated or willful manner,
(d) whether the offense was directed against persons or property, the
greater weight being given to an offense against persons, especially
if persoara insury resulted,
(e) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act,
(f) the absence of adequate protective and security facilities available
to the juvenile treatment system,
(g) the sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by con-
sideration of the child's home, environmental situation, emotional
attitude and pattern of living,(h) the record and previous history of the child,
(i) whether the child acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the
life or safety of another,
(j) whether the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or plan-
ning by the child, and
(k) whether there is sufficient time available before the child reaches
age nineteen (19) to provide appropriate treatment and control.
MINN. R. P. Juv. CT. 32.05(2). See also supra note 34 (Kent criteria); Dismantling
the "Rehabilitative Ideal", supra note 4.
56. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (1992). Rule 32 provides: "Proceedings to refer a
delinquency matter ... may be initiated only upon motion of the county attorney
after a delinquency petition has been filed..." MINN. R. P. Juv. CT. 32.01; see also In
re Sweats, 293 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Minn. 1980) (finding that the decision whether to
prosecute as an adult is within discretion of the prosecutor).
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lowing a finding of probable cause, a juvenile court may order a so-
cial study of the child57 and, within thirty days of the filing of the
motion, must conduct a hearing to determine whether the youth
meets the waiver criteria.5 8 The juvenile court could grant adult
reference if it concluded that the child was "not suitable for treat-
ment" or that "public safety is not served" by retention in juvenile
court.59
1. "Prima Facie Case" or Rebuttable Presumption for
Certification
In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court confronted some of the
procedural and substantive problems inherent in the highly discre-
tionary judicial waiver process in In re Dahl.60 The court held that,
while the seriousness of a juvenile's offense obviously was "among
the relevant factors to be considered,"6 1 it insisted that "[tihe record
must contain direct evidence that the juvenile endangers the public
safety for the statutory reference standard to be satisfied."62 The
court expressed serious concerns about the adequacy of the transfer
legislation, clearly indicating to the legislature that the waiver cri-
57. The rule provides: "If probable cause has been shown, pursuant to Rule 19.03
or Rule 32.05, Subd. 1, the court, on its own motion or on the motion of the child's
counsel or the county attorney, may order a social, psychiatric or psychological study
concerning the child who is the subject of the reference." MnmNr. R. P. Juv. CT. 32.03.
The rule also provides that the social report is to be paid for "at public expense,"
shall be filed 48 hours before the scheduled hearing, and must be made available to
both parties. Id.
58. MNN. R. P. Juv. CT. 32.01.
59. MNN. R. P. Juv. CT. 32.05(2); see MiNN. STAT. § 260.125(2)(d) (Supp. 1983).
For general discussions of the waiver procedure in Minnesota, see Dismantling the
"Rehabilitative Ideal", supra note 4 and Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note
2.
60. 278 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1979). The court commented, "[Ilt is clearly apparent
that [Dahl) is not the typical delinquent seen by the Juvenile Court. This offense
[first degree murder]... appears to be an isolated delinquent act..." Id. at 317-18
(third alteration in original).
In State v. Hogan, 212 N.W.2d 664 (1973), the Minnesota Supreme Court indi-
cated that the presence of several criteria, including consideration of the offense al-
legedly committed, allowed the lower court to certify a youth on public safety
grounds. The supreme court subsequently incorporated the Hogan and Kent criteria
into Minn. R. P. Juv. Ct. 32.05(2). See also In re J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Minn.
1978) ("Although the nature of the offense is certainly a factor to be considered in
this determination and may serve as a basis for statutory reference... this court has
not held that reference is mandatory when a serious crime is involved.").
61. Dahl, 278 N.W.2d at 321 (emphasis in original) (citing State v. Hogan, 212
N.W.2d 664, 669-70 (1973)).
62. Id. (emphasis added). The Dahl court concluded that the juvenile court could
not waive jurisdiction on the basis of age and the seriousness of the offense alone
without additional direct evidence of"unamenability" or "dangerousness." Id.
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teria needed modification and greater specificity,63 and concluded
that "a re-evaluation of the existing certification process may be in
order."64
In 1980, the Minnesota legislature responded to the Dahl deci-
sion, revised the juvenile code, and amended the certification stat-
ute and procedures.6 5 The legislature retained, without change,
the basic waiver criteria of nonamenability to treatment or danger-
ousness,6 6 and placed the burden of proof on the prosecution to es-
tablish by "clear and convincing evidence" that juvenile court
jurisdiction should be waived.6 7 However, the amended legislation
added a third subdivision to the certification statute68 which ena-
63. Id. at 318. Despite its concern about the adequacy of the standards, in 1983,
the Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated rules of procedure for juvenile courts
that included a list of factors that courts should consider in making waiver decisions.
See MINN. R. P. Juv. CT. 32.05(2) (factors listed supra note 55). These factors were
drawn from Hogan, 212 N.W.2d at 669-70, and Kent, 383 U.S. app. 566-67.
When the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted Rule 32, Professor Barry Feld
strongly criticized it for failing to address the deficiencies of which it clearly was
aviare as evidenced in DahE
The catalogue of miscellaneous factors promulgated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court provides neither a "central guiding principle" nor much
practical guidance of juvenile court judges struggling with this difficult
sentencing decision. Instead, Rule 32's emphasis on vague, discretion-
ary, and ultimately unquantifiable factors simply compounds all the
preexisting problems of the process and submits the most important
dispositional decision in the juvenile court to the subjective reaction of
each individual juvenile court judge.
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 2, at 272.
64. Dahl, 278 N.W.2d at 319. The Dahl court observed that "the standards for
referral adopted by present legislation are not very effective in making this impor-
tant determination.' Id. at 318. The court went on to note that
[d]ue to these difficulties in making the waiver decision, many juvenile
court judges have tended to be overcautious, resulting in the referral of
delinquent children for criminal prosecution on the erroneous, albeit
good faith, belief that the juveniles pose a danger to the public.
Id. at 319.
65. See generally Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", supra note 4, at 192-
239 (analyzing 1980 legislative changes in certification).
66. The statute provides that:
[Tihe juvenile court may order a reference only if...
(d) The court finds that
(1) there is probable cause... to believe the child committed the
offense alleged by delinquency petition and
(2) the prosecuting authority has demonstrated by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the child is not suitable to treatment or
that the public safety is not served under the provisions of laws
relating to juvenile courts.
MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2Xd) (1988) (emphasis added).
67. MIN. STAT. § 260.125(2Xd) (1988); Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal",
supra note 4, at 205-07.
68. The legislature adopted an offense matrix that established a prima facie case
for certification under the amenability and dangerousness provisions when various
combinations of a youth's present offense and/or prior record were present. Under
the amended statute, the prosecution can establish a prima facie case of both
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bled prosecutors to establish a "prima facie" case of nonamenability
and dangerousness when a youth committed a serious crime and
had an extensive prior record.6 9 For example, a prosecutor could
establish a prima facie case for certification by charging a sixteen-
year-old, who possesses a specified prior record, with certain types
of serious offenses.70 The data analyzed in this study was gathered
during the period when the "prima facie" case waiver legislation
applied.
Despite the legislative attempt to use offense criteria to ra-
tionalize waiver decisions, the 1980 amendments did not signifi-
cantly reduce judicial discretion. 7 1 Because evidence of a youth's
amenability to treatment and lack of dangerousness could rebut the
prosecution's prima facie case, 72 courts continued to decide most
nonamenability and dangerousness simply by proving that the juvenile is at least
sixteen years of age, that the present crime charged is a serious offense, and that the
combination of the present crime charged and the prior record brings the case within
one of the subdivision's clauses. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1988); see generally Dis-
mantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", supra note 4, at 194-95, 195 n.96. But see 1994
Minn. Laws 576 (legislation repeals § 260.125(3)).
69. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1988); see Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal",
supra note 4, at 207-14.
70. See JUVENLE JusTicx TASK FORCE, FiNAL REPORT (1994).
A prima facie case for certification is established if the juvenile, was at
least 16 years of age at the time of the offense, and is alleged to have
committed:
1) First degree murder, or
2) an aggravated felony against a person involving particular cru-
elty, a high degree of sophistication or planing [sic], or use of a
firearm, or
3) one of several other felonies listed in the statute, combined with
a particular type of prior offense history specified in the statute.
The presence of any of these circumstances creates a presumption that
the public safety is not served or that the juvenile is not amenable to
treatment within the juvenile court system.
Id. at 24.
71. See Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", supra note 4, at 209-10. Profes-
sor Feld explained that
a prima facie case... [creates] a rebuttable presumption that shifts the
burden of producing substantial, controverting evidence to the party op-
posing the prima facie case.... If substantial, countervailing evidence
is presented, then the matter is to be determined by the trier of fact on
the basis of the entire record and not by reference to the prima facie
case.... Functionally, then, the procedural operation of a prima facie
case is equivalent to a presumption in civil actions...
Id. Several subsequent Minnesota court decisions endorsed this analysis. See, e.g.,
In re J.F.K., 316 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Minn. 1982) (holding that where state established
a prima facie case which defense rebutted with substantial evidence, court must de-
cide waiver issue on basis of the entire record, not simply by reference to the prima
facie case); In re Givens, 307 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. 1981) (finding that an unrebut-
ted prima facie case authorizes reference on both grounds of nonamenability and
dangerousness); In re K.J.K., 357 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that where a prima facie case is not established, the court must consider the totality
of the circumstances).
72. See MrNN. R. P. Juv. CT. 32.04(2).
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waiver cases on a discretionary basis under the "totality of the cir-
cumstances."73 As a consequence, our data analyses provide a good
opportunity to examine the exercise of judicial discretion in waiver
decisions.
Several evaluations of Minnesota's waiver process, prior to
and following the 1980 legislative "prima facie" case amendments,
described judicial waiver decisions as highly idiosyncratic, geo-
graphically variable, and inconsistent with criminal court sentenc-
ing practices.74 Shortly after the legislature amended the transfer
statutes in 1980, the Minnesota Supreme Court Study Commission
reconfirmed its findings of judicial variability.75 A study of waiver
73. See Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal , supra note 4, at 213-14, 239-40.
Feld argued that under the discretionary provisions and the logic of Dahl, proof of a
serious offense alone should not justify waiver. Id. at 212. Again, appellate opinions
confirmed that analysis and concluded that once a juvenile rebuts the prima facie
case with "significant evidence," the prosecution bears the burden of proof under the
"totality of the circumstances." See, e.g., In re S.R.L., 400 N.W.2d. 382, 384 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) ("In evaluating evidence under the clear and convincing standard, the
court must consider the totality of the circumstances"); In re J.F.K., 316 N.W.2d at
564 (same).
74. In 1975-76, the Minnesota Supreme Court's Study Commission found that
juvenile courts' discretion frequently yielded pronounced differences in certification
outcomes in urban and rural counties throughout Minnesota. See REPORT TO THE
MIN. SUPREME COURT, supra note 40, at 61-78; see also Reference of Juvenile Of-
fenders, supra note 2, at 552 (summarizing the findings of the Supreme Court's
Study Commission). The Commission found that urban courts transferred serious
offenders and older, less serious but chronic juveniles, while rural courts waived
youths to impose fines or short sentences on minor offenders. REPORT TO = MINN.
SUPREME COURT, supra note 40, at 61-78. The Study Commission's analyses showed
that urban offenders considered for certification generally had committed more seri-
ous offenses and had more extensive prior records than did their rural counterparts.
See id. at 71, tables 13-14, 16, 73. In addition to more recorded offenses, certified
urban youths had records extending over a longer period of time and more appear-
ances on delinquency petitions than did rural youths. Id. at 73, tables 16-17. De-
spite urban youths' substantially more serious present offenses and longer and more
extensive prior records, rural judges certified more youths for adult prosecution. See
id. at 74.
The Study Commission also noted that discretionary waiver may produce racial
disparities. For example, the Study Commission found that while "15.1% of the of-
fenses referred to Hennepin Juvenile Court in 1975 were committed by black youths,
almost three times that percentage (44.8) of the cases considered for certification in
Hennepin County in 1975-75 [sic] involved black juveniles." Id. at 68. The Study
Commission attributed the geographic and racial disparities to the inherent ambigu-
ity in the prevailing statutory waiver criteria. Id. at 21, 77.
75. The Study Commission analyzed data from 1979, 1980, and 1981 to evaluate
the impact of the legislative changes. SUPREME COURT JuvENELE JUSTICE STUDY
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE MINN. SUPREME COURT, CHANGING BouNDARiEs OF THE Ju-
VEn.E COURT: PRACTICE AND PoLicy IN MINN. 3 (Mar. 1982) [hereinafter CHANGING
Bou-nmazs]. According to the Study Commission, the prima facie case offense crite-
ria did not significantly effect waiver administration: very few rural juveniles met
the criteria, urban prosecutors did not file reference motions against many juveniles
who did meet the criteria, and two-thirds of the youths whom juvenile courts re-
ferred to adult criminal courts did not meet the criteria. Id. at 20-21.
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practices in 1986 reported that juvenile courts transferred most
youths for property offenses rather than for crimes against the per-
son,76 that urban-rural geographic disparities continued, 7 7 and
that little distinguished transferred youths from those who re-
mained in juvenile court.7 8
In 1992, the Minnesota legislature created an Advisory Task
Force on the Juvenile Justice System to examine the certification
An evaluation of the Minnesota waiver process found that less than one-half of
the youths for whom prosecutors sought waiver met the prima facie offense criteria
and only about one-third of the youths actually referred for adult prosecution met
them. Lee Ann Osbun & Peter Rode, Prosecuting Juveniles As Adults: The Quest for
"Objective" Decisions, 22 CRIMuNoLoGY 187, 194-95 (1984). As Osbun and Rode
noted, however, "[flollowing enactment of the revised statute, there was a slight in-
crease in the proportion of transferred cases that did satisfy the [offense] criteria-
from 22.2% before enactment to 34.5% after enactment." Id. at 195. Furthermore,
the adoption of prima facie offense criteria for waiver seems to have had little impact
on the numbers or kinds of youths criminally prosecuted in Minnesota. Id. at 197-
98. Osbun and Rode attributed the ineffectiveness of the legislatively promulgated
"objective guidelines" to their failure to identify "serious" offenders better than those
identified on a discretionary basis. As a result, they concluded that "[diespite its
defects and potential for abuse, the traditional discretionary process used by prose-
cutors and juvenile court judges to make waiver decisions appears to be more suc-
cessful than the objective criteria alone in identifying the more serious juvenile
offenders." Id. at 199-200.
76. See Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 13. In this study, Professor Feld
compared the present offense, prior records, and treatment histories of juveniles
waived to criminal court with all delinquents who remained in juvenile courts in
Minnesota. Feld reported that "more than two-thirds (69.9%) of certified juveniles
were charged with felony offenses, predominantly felony offenses against property.
In all, slightly more than one-quarter [28.9%] of all certified juveniles were charged
with serious offenses against the person while the largest single category of certified
juveniles were charged with felony property offenses." Id. at 30-31. See also infra
notes 82-83 and accompanying text (most judicially waived juveniles charged with
property offenses).
77. Rural judges more often waived youngsters with less serious present of-
fenses, prior records, or previous treatment exposures than did their urban counter-
parts. Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 13, at 43. "Thus, a distinctive
geographic pattern emerges in which rural youths charged with less serious offenses
are at greater risk for transfer than are their similarly-situated urban peers." Id.
Intra-state geographic variations in waiver statutes are not unique to Minne-
sota. See, e.g,. Edwards, supra note 40, at 610-13 (county by county disparity in
California); HEUSER, supra note 40, at 30 (county by county variations in Oregon-
"it appears that some counties may be over- or under-represented in terms of the
proportion of cases per unit of risk population."); BETWEEN Two WoRLDs, supra note
2, at 147-98 (county by county disparity within states in Northeast Region, North
Central Region, Southeast Region, South Central Region, and West Region).
78. Multivariate analyses could explain very little of the variance (only 3.1%) in
the differences between waived youths and the remaining juvenile offenders. Bad
Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 13, at 40. Previous institutional confinement,
current detention status, a youth's age, the seriousness of the present offense, and




process and recommend changes in the waiver statutes. 79 The Ju-
venile Justice Task Force conducted studies of waiver practices 8O
and the sentences imposed upon waived juveniles who were con-
victed of felonies in adult court.S1 Consistent with the waiver data,
adult criminal courts sentenced the majority of juveniles (62% in
1991) convicted as adults for property offenses rather than violent
crimes.8 2 Because prosecutors screened and juvenile courts waived
relatively few juveniles, criminal courts convicted the small, waived
population for more serious offenses than they did for all adult
felons.8 3 However, the waived juvenile group still experienced a
lower rate of imprisonment than did comparable adult offenders.84
79. See Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 35 (analyzing the process of
law reform and the legislation enacted pursuant to the Task Force's
recommendations).
80. The Task Force discovered that despite public fears of youth violence, prose-
cutors charged the majority of juveniles certified to stand trial as adults in Minne-
sota in 1992 with property offenses. See Sharon Krmpotich, Graphic Summary of
Reference Hearings in Juvenile Court (Apr. 23, 1993) (on file with author). In 1992,
101 juveniles were certified for trial as adults. Id. Of those transferred youths, pros-
ecutors charged more than half (52%) with property crimes, about one-third (35%)
with crimes against the person and the remainder (13%) with miscellaneous offenses
from weapons offenses to disturbing the peace to traffic violations. Id.
81. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GurnELNs COMM'N, SENTENCING PRAcTIcES:
JUVENME OFFENDERS SENTENCED FOR FELONmS IN ADULT COURT (Feb. 1993). The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission collects data on the sentences that
juveniles waived and convicted of felony offenses receive in criminal courts. The
Guidelines Commission data does not report the sentences of juveniles convicted as
adults for misdemeanors nor those convicted of Murder in the First Degree which
carries a mandatory life sentence.
Between 1981 and 1991, about 1.5% of all felony offenders sentenced in adult
courts consisted of waived juveniles. Id. at 1. Over the decade, the proportion of
waived juveniles sentenced as adult felons increased 26%, from 85 in 1981 to 107 in
1991. Id. Because of prosecutorial and judicial screening, the relatively few waived
juveniles comprised a somewhat more seriously criminal group than all adult felons,
although judges sentenced the majority of waived juveniles for property offenses
(62% in 1991). Id. at 2. For example, in 1991, courts sentenced 35% of waived
juveniles for crimes against the person as compared with 25% of all adult offenders.
Id. Reflecting the escalating youth violence, "Between 1981 and 1991, the number of
juveniles sentenced in adult court for persons offenses increased by 37%; the in-
crease for property offenders was 18%," and the largest increases occurred in the
proportion of waived juveniles sentenced for homicide and sex offenses. Id. Because
the juveniles convicted as adults, as a group, committed higher severity level of-
fenses than did all adult offenders, they received somewhat longer sentences, an av-
erage of 53.4 months for waived juveniles compared with 45.1 months for all adults.
Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 4.
83. For example, in 1991, 35% of juveniles as compared with 25% of all adult
offenders were convicted of crimes against the person. Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 3. Because the majority of juveniles convicted in adult court commit-
ted property offenses and had a lower criminal history score than did adult defend-
ants, their overall rate of imprisonment remained somewhat lower than that of adult




Several evaluations of judicial waiver practices spanning more
than a decade reported that prosecutors charged and juvenile
courts waived the majority of juveniles for property crimes rather
than violent crimes, and that urban-rural geographic disparities oc-
curred in the administration of the process throughout Minnesota.
Moreover, because most waived juveniles committed property of-
fenses and had less extensive criminal history scores than their
adult counterparts, they often received shorter sentences in crimi-
nal courts than did adults, or than they could have received in juve-
nile court. In short, the cumulative research documents both the
idiosyncratic subjectivity of judicial discretion and the "lack of fit"
between waiver decisions and criminal court sentencing practices.
2. 1994 Legislative Changes in Minnesota's Certification
Statute: Sentencing Guidelines, Presumptive Imprisonment,
and Presumptive Certification
The 1994 statutory amendments represent an important inno-
vation in juvenile waiver policy.8 5 The waiver policy changes re-
flect a shift in emphasis from the persistence of a youth's offending
to the seriousness of the offense, and integrates more closely juve-
nile court waiver and criminal court sentencing practices. The 1994
amendments used the "modified just deserts" framework of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines to structure the most important
sentencing decisions of juvenile courts.8 6 Under the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines, conviction of certain violent crimes creates
a presumption that the offender should be committed to prison.87
The new waiver statute uses the Sentencing Guidelines' Severity
Level VII-X and felony firearms offenses to identify those juveniles
who should be presumptively certified and those youths who, if re-
tained as juveniles, should be subject to enhanced sanctions within
Of the cases sentenced in 1991 for which the guidelines recommended
prison, the court departed and placed the offender on probation in 58%
of the cases involving juveniles and in 34% of the cases involving
adults.... [T]he reasons cited by the courts for departing from recom-
mended prison sentences for juveniles included: the age of the offender,
the offender's amenability to treatment, and the recommendation or
agreement of the prosecution.
Id.
85. See Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 35, at 1005-1121 (analyzing
changes in Minnesota waiver legislation).
86. See Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 35, at 1024-37 (analyzing
legislative changes and the relationship between sentencing guidelines and certifica-
tion jurisprudence).
87. MiN. SENTENCING GUMELINES § V (Offense Severity Reference Table) (in-
cluding in Severity Level VII-X offenses, among others: second and third degree mur-




juvenile courts. By using the Sentencing Guidelines' presumptive
offenses to define who the serious juvenile offenders are, the new
statute incorporates a consistent legal definition of "serious crimes"
in both the juvenile and adult systems.
For juveniles aged fourteen to seventeen and charged with any
felony offense,8S the prosecutor may file a motion to certify and
must prove by "clear and co xwncing evidence" that protection of
"public safety" requires the juvenile's transfer to criminal court.S9
However, for youths sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of
offense and charged with a Level VII-X crime or a firearm offense,
there is a presumption that the juvenile should be transferred to
criminal court.90 Unlike the previous "prima fade" case approach,
which created only a rebuttable presumption for waiver and left the
ultimate burden on the prosecutor to justify the decision under the
88. MNN. STAT. § 260.125(1) (Supp. 1995) (allowing certification only if charged
with "an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult").
89. See Mnum. STAT. § 260.125(2) providing that:
A. juvenile court may order a certification to district court only if-
(2) a motion for certification has been filed by the prosecuting au-
thority;...
(5) the courts find that there is probable cause... ; and
(6) the court finds either:
(i) that the presumption of certification created by subdivision
2a applies and the child has not rebutted the presumption
by clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that re-
taining the proceeding in the juvenile court serves public
safety; or
(ii) that the presumption of certification does not apply and the
prosecuting authority has demonstrated by clear and con-
vincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the juve-
nile court does not serve public safety. If the court finds that
the prosecutor has not demonstrated by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that retaining the proceeding in juvenile court
does not serve public safety, the court shall retain the pro-
ceeding in juvenile court.
MiNN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
90. The statute states:
It is presumed that a proceeding involving an offense committed by a
child will be certified to district court if:
(1) the child was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the offense; and
(2) the delinquency petition alleges that the child committed an of-
fense that would result in a presumptive commitment to prison
under the sentencing guidelines and applicable statutes, or that
the child committed any felony offense while using, whether by
brandishing, displaying, threatening with, or otherwise employ-
ing a firearm. If the court determines that probable cause ex-
ists to believe the child committed the alleged offense, the
burden is on the child to rebut this presumption by demonstrat-
ing by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceed-
ing in the juvenile court serves public safety. If the court finds
that the child has not rebutted the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence, the court shall certify the child to district
court.
MmnN. STAT. § 260.125(2a) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
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"totality of the circumstances," the new law shifts the burden of
proof to the juvenile.91 Older juveniles charged with serious of-
fenses must prove by "clear and convincing" evidence that they
should remain in juvenile court consistent with "public safety."92 If
the juvenile fails to carry that burden, then waiver is non-discre-
tionary.93 Basing the presumption of waiver on the seriousness of
the offense and shifting the burden of proof should increase signifi-
cantly the numbers of youths certified to criminal court.94
91. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2Xa) (Supp. 1995). Allocating burdens of proof reflects
ways to minimize and control specific types of errors. Thus, if a mistake is to be
made, under a judicial waiver statute, "the preferred error... is to keep a juvenile in
the juvenile court if there is doubt concerning which court is appropriate," whereas
when a legislature excludes offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, "[tihe favored
error... is to keep a juvenile charged with such an offense in the criminal court..."
McCarthy, supra note 9, at 659. See also Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal",
supra note 4, at 215 ("Placing the burden of persuasion on a youth.., would empha-
size the policies of social defense and public safety in light of the uncertainty of the
issues being determined.... The legislative policies that justify creating a rebuttable
presumption also justify placing the burden of persuasion on the juvenile rather
than the state.").
92. MiNN. STAT. § 260.125(2b) (Supp. 1995).
In determining whether the public safety is served by certifying a child
to district court, the court shall consider the following factors:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of community
protection, including the existence of any aggravating factors
recognized by the sentencing guidelines, the use of a firearm,
and the impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged offense,
including the level of the child's participation in planning and
carrying out the offense and the existence of any mitigating fac-
tors recognized by the sentencing guidelines;
(3) the child's prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child's programming history, including the child's past will-
ingness to participate meaningfully in available programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available in
the juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child. In considering
these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the serious-
ness of the alleged offense and the child's prior record of delin-
quency than to the other factors listed in this subdivision.
Id. (emphasis added).
93. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2aX2) (Supp. 1995) requires that "the court shall cer-
tify the child." (emphasis added).
94. In 1976, California pioneered the presumption-burden-shifting waiver strat-
egy. If the prosecution alleged certain enumerated offenses, the statute presumed
the court would transfer the youth unless he or she affirmatively established amena-
bility to treatment within the juvenile court. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1995). Subsequent statutory amendments greatly expanded the
catalogue of offenses which create the presumption of adulthood. See Legislative
Changes in Waiver, supra note 1, at 508-09 (discussing the California waiver strat-
egy and its effects).
Specifying offense criteria and shifting the burden of proof dramatically in-
creased the number of youths tried, convicted, and sentenced as adults after being
charged with one of the enumerated offenses. "Los Angeles County experienced a
318% increase in certification hearings and a 234% increase in certifications" be-
tween 1976 and 1977. KATI-RiNE S. TEILMANN & MALcOLM W. KLSIN, SUMMARY OF
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The statutory amendments embody a fundamental shift in
waiver jurisprudence, repudiate subjective clinical inquiries into
"amenability to treatment," and give primacy to more objective
"public safety" criteria.95 The "public safety" approach mirrors the
Sentencing Guidelines' emphases on the seriousness of the present
offense and prior record.96 The new law also assigns controlling
weight to the present offense and prior delinquency record in mak-
ing waiver decisions.97 Finally, the new juvenile code excludes
from juvenile court jurisdiction youths sixteen years of age or older
who are indicted for first degree murder.98
The 1994 juvenile code amendments also create an intermedi-
ate youthful offender status- Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Pros-
ecutions (EJJ)-which expands the sentencing options available in
juvenile court until age twenty-one rather than age nineteen, as for
ordinary delinquents.99 The EJJ provision uses the Sentencing
INTERIM FINDINGs OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA'S 1977 JUVE-
NILE JusTICE LEGISLATION 30 (1977). Moreover, criminal courts convicted youths cer-
tified to stand trial as adults as of n as those tried in Juvenile tort, and
incarcerated them more frequently than their juvenile counterparts. Id. at 31-32.
95. MwN. STAT. § 260.125(2b) (statutory definition of "public safety" criteria).
96. See supra note 92.
97. Id. See Reference of Jvenile Offenders, supra note 2, at 528-29 (criticizing
legislation that fails to rank-order or assign relative weights to the various factors
courts consider when making waiver decisions); Criminalizing Juvenile Justice,
supra note 2, at 271-72 (criticizing lists of unweighted, disjunctive factors).
98. MiNN. STAT. §§ 260.015(5)(b), .111(la), .125(6) (Supp. 1995). See generally
Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 35, at 1051-56 (analyzing legislative
rationale to exclude first degree murder from juvenile court jurisdiction).
99. MIN. STAT. § 260.126 (Supp. 1995). See Violent Youth and Public Policy,
supra note 35, at 1038-51 (analyzing rationale and legislation increasing juvenile
courts' sentencing options). With extended jurisdiction, the juvenile court's sentenc-
ing authority continues until age 21, rather than terminating at age nineteen, as is
the case for delinquency. Mumn. STAT. % 260.126(1); 260.1.81. When a prosecutar
initially files a delinquency petition alleging a felony offense, the petition also must
indicate whether the prosecutor seeks extended juvenile jurisdiction. MINN. STAT.
§ 260.131(4).
Several methods exist for a youth to enter the extended jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court, including an unsuccessful attempt to certify the juvenile. See MINN. STAT.
§ 260.126(1). In an "ordinary" certification hearing involving a youth 14 to 17 years
of age charged with a felony, if the court does not certify the youth, then the judge
has discretion whether to designate the subsequent juvenile proceeding as an ex-
tended jurisdiction prosecution or as an ordinary delinquency proceeding. MiNN.
STAT. § 260.126(1X1). In presumptive certification proceedings involving youths 16
or 17 years old charged with an offense for which the sentencing guidelines presume
commitment to prison, if the court does not certify the youth, then the court must
designate the subsequent juvenile proceeding as an extended jurisdiction prosecu-
tion. MmN. STAT. § 260.126(1)(2). For youths 16 or 17 years of age charged with a
presumptive certification - presumptive commitment to prison felony offense, a
prosecutor may designate the case as an extended jurisdiction prosecution without
any further judicial review. Id. Because the only alternative disposition available to
a judge following a presumptive certification hearing is to designate the case as an
EJJ proceeding, allowing the prosecutor directly to designate the case as an EJJ
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Guidelines' offense criteria to determine which youths enter this ex-
tended, blended juvenile-criminal jurisdictional status. Youths
tried in juvenile court as EJJs receive all adult criminal procedural
safeguards, including the right to a jury trial.10 0 The right to a trial
by jury is an essential component of this new "juvenile" quasi-adult
status, because following a plea or finding of guilt, the juvenile
court will impose both a juvenile disposition and an adult criminal
sentence, the execution of which is stayed pending compliance with
the juvenile disposition.lOl The adult criminal sentence is executed
only if an EJJ youth fails to satisfy the conditions of juvenile proba-
tion. Further bridging the two systems, the 1994 amendments ex-
pand the use of juvenile and EJJ convictions in the Sentencing
Guidelines' criminal history score to enhance the sentences of
youths convicted as adult offenders and to systematize control of
chronic offenders in both systems.10 2 The use of juvenile convic-
tions to enhance subsequent adult criminal sentences arguably re-
quires providing all adult criminal procedural safeguards.103
Finally, because of the increased significance of all juvenile convic-
proceeding provides an efficient alternative. MiNN. STAT. § 260.125(5). Finally, a
prosecutor may request a juvenile court to designate a youth as an EJJ instead of
filing a certification motion against a non-presumptive certification youth. MINN.
STAT. § 260.126(1)(3). At the EJJ hearing, the prosecution must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that "public safety" warrants designating the proceeding as an
extended jurisdiction prosecution using the same "public safety" criteria specified in
the certification legislation. MmN. STAT. § 260.125(2b).
100. See MwNe. STAT. § 260.126(3) ("A child who is the subject of an extended ju-
risdiction juvenile prosecution has the right to a trial by jury and to the effective
assistance of counsel . . .") (emphasis added). See also MaN. STAT. § 260.155 (1)(a)
("a child who is prosecuted as an extended jurisdiction juvenile has the right to a jury
trial on the issue of guilt") (emphasis added).
101. See MIN. STAT. § 260.126(4). Adult criminal procedural safeguards are a
constitutional prerequisite to imposing a valid adult sentence.
102. The legislation includes all extended jurisdiction juvenile convictions in the
sentencing guidelines' criminal history score in the same manner as those for other
adult offenders. See MIN. STAT. § 260.211(1)(a) (Supp. 1995) ("An extended juris-
diction juvenile conviction shall be treated in the same manner as an adult felony
criminal conviction for purposes of the sentencing guidelines."). The new law also
requires juvenile courts to retain EJJ records for as long as they would retain those
of adult offenders. MIN. STAT. § 260.161(1)(b) (Supp. 1995).
103. See, e.g., David Dormont, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences,
75 MmN. L. REv. 1769, 1793-94 (1991) ("[Clourts should not interpret McKeiver to
justify using juvenile convictions with reduced procedural protections for punitive
purposes at the adult level. Interpreted in this manner, McKeiver would not allow
courts to enhance an adult's sentence based on juvenile sentences obtained during
proceedings governed by the lower 'fundamental fairness' standard."). See also
United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting)
(Sentencing Commission strayed beyond permissible boundaries of interpretation in
treating juvenile sentences and periods of confinement like adult sentences and peri-




tions, the new law provides juveniles with increased procedural
safeguards, especially access to defense counsel.1o4
The new Minnesota juvenile code uses the Sentencing Guide-
lines' definition of serious crimes to make certification easier and
more consistent, to rationalize and integrate juvenile and criminal
court sentencing practices, to emphasize more objective "public
safety" factors over subjective "treatment" considerations, and to
enhance the sentencing authority of juvenile courts. The 1994
amendments create a presumption to certify older juveniles
charged with serious offenses. Youths charged with these violent
crimes against the person are both more likely to be waived and to
be imprisoned if convicted as adults. These changes emphasize pri-
marily the seriousness of a youth's present violent offense.
By contrast, prior research indicates that Minnesota juvenile
courts typically waived chronic young property offenders.105 Be-
cause the Sentencing Guidelines presume that property offenders
do not receive sentences of imprisonment, criminal courts did not
sentence most of those chronic young offenders waived to criminal
court to prison. Thus, chronic property offenders fell into the "pun-
ishment gap," the breach in intervention caused by the lack of fit
between waiver criteria and criminal sentencing practices. Presum-
ably, judges will now use the Extended Jurisdiction provisions
available in juvenile court to sentence to enhanced terms as
juveniles many of those chronic property offenders that they previ-
ously waived. The statutory changes reflect a shift in emphasis
from a juvenile's persistence of offending to the seriousness of the
present offense. As the next section suggests, because of racial dif-
ferences in patterns of offending, the legislative policy change from
persistence to seriousness will likely have a disproportional impact
on minority juveniles.
C. Youth Crime, Violence, and Race: Implications of
Persistence versus Seriousness as Waiver Criteria
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) publishes annual
summaries of national data on crimes known or reported to police
and arrests of offenders. The FBI's Serious Crime Index includes
both property and violent offenses, and provides the most widely
104. MzN. STA.T. § 260.155(lb) (1994). See Violent Youth and Public Policy,
supra note 35, at 1097-1121 (analyzing the relationship between expanding sentenc-
ing authority and the need for greater procedural safeguards, especially delivery of
legal services).
105. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
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cited indicator of crime trends. 1o6 The bulk of all serious crime in-
volves property offenses rather than violent crimes and, during the
1980s, the juvenile rate of property crimes was stable or only slowly
increased.107 By contrast, although violent crimes comprise a much
smaller component of the overall serious crime index, the rates of
juvenile violence, especially homicide, have surged dramatically
since the mid-1980s.1OS While nationally, property crime by
juveniles increased 11% between 1983 and 1992, violent crime in-
creased by 57%.109 Moreover, police arrested a disproportionately
large number of minority youths, especially African-Americans, for
crimes of violence.'XO In a special section on juveniles and violence
in 1991, the FBI reported:
In 1990, the Nation experienced its highest juvenile violent
crime arrest rate, 430 per 100,000 juveniles .... The 1990 rate
was 27 percent higher than the 1980 rate.... Of particular note
is the upward trend that started in 1988 for both white and
black youths ... In 1990, the juvenile violent crime arrest rate
reached 1,429 per 100,000 black juveniles, five times that for
white youths."'
The most alarming recent change in juvenile crime is the in-
crease in murder rates that has accompanied the proliferation of
guns among youths.112 The FBI report indicated:
106. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNrrED STATES: 1991 (1992) thereinafter UNIoRM CRIME REPORTS 1991]. Based on
reports from victims and investigations of crimes, local law enforcement agencies
provide data to centralized state agencies who then transmit the data to the FBI. Id.
at 1-3. The FBI's Serious Crime Index includes four violent crimes: murder and
non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Id.
The Serious Crime Index also includes four property crimes: burglary, larceny-theft,
motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id.
107. See Howard N. Snyder, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PRE-
VENTION FACT SHEET #13, 1992 JUVENILE ARRESTS (May 1994) [hereinafter 1992 Ju-
VENILE ARRESTS] (reporting that the 1992 FBI Uniform Crime Report data indicate
that juveniles accounted for 18% of all arrests for violent crime, and 33% of all prop-
erty crimes. Juvenile property crime arrests increased by 8% between 1988 and
1992, and by 11% between 1983 and 1992). See also HowARD N. SNIDER & MELISSA
SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 116-19 (1995)
[hereinafter JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS] (analyzing crime trend data and re-
porting relative stability in juvenile property crime rates).
108. See JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VicTms, supra note 107, at 110-13.
109. 1992 JUVENILE ARRESTS, supra note 107, at 2. See also Focus ON VIOLENCE,
supra note 20, at 6.
110. See Focus ON VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 21-22 (noting racial disparities in
weapons violations and homicide arrest rates); JuVEmI OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS,
supra note 107, at 91 (discussing minority overrepresentation in arrests for crimes of
violence).
111. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1991, supra note 106, at 279. See also JuVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS, supra note 107, at 104-07 (analyzing the rise in juvenile
violence arrest rates).
112. Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 85 J.
CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1995) (analyzing changing patterns of age-
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The Nation experienced an upsurge in the juvenile murder
arrest rate for blacks during the 1980s ... [and] [tihis upward
trend had a profound impact on the overall juvenile murder
arrest rate .... Specifically, between 1980 and 1990, the arrest
rate for this [black] group increased 145 percent, while the rate
for whites rose 48 percent .... When considering the difference
in the arrest rate for black and white juveniles, the black rate
was 7.5 times that of whites in 1990. From a historical perspec-
tive, 1965 to 1990, the overall murder arrest rate for juveniles
increased 332 percent, from 2.8 to 12.1. Another item of con-
cern is that during the past decade, there has been a 79-percent
increase in the number of juveniles who commit murders with
guns. In 1990, nearly 3 of 4 juvenile murder offenders used
guns to perpetrate their crimes. 113
Although adults continue to account for most arrests for violent
crimes, 1 14 the proliferation of firearms and the corresponding dra-
matic rise in homicide by mid- to late-adolescents, the dispropor-
tionate overrepresentation of minority youths as perpetrators and
victims of violence,]1- and increasing arrests of younger juveniles
for violent crimes certainly justify public concerns.1 1 6
specific homicide rates in conjunction with the proliferation of guns and the illegal
drug industry). See also Focus ON VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 18-20 (finding recent
increases in homicide rates as a result of increased firearms use); JUVENILE OFFEND-
ERS AND VIcTnqs, supra note 107, at 108 (discussing the surge in juvenile arrests for
weapons violations).
113. UNImoRm CRiuM RFPors 1991, supra note 106, at 279.
114. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES: 1992, at 227 (1993) [hereinafter UNiFORM CRME REPORTS 1992] (re-
porting that juvenile homicide arrests accounted for about 14.5 percent of all murder
arrests, or about one of seven murder arrests, and that police arrested 2,829
juveniles for murder while they arrested 16,662 adults over 18 years of age). Even
these arrest rates may somewhat overstate juveniles' violent criminal involvement,
since youths, more than adults, tend to commit their crimes in groups, and one crim-
inal event may produce several juvenile arrests. See Franklin Zimring, Kids,
Groups, and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-known Secret, 72 J. CRim. L. &
CRIMINoLoGY 867, 874 (1981).
115. See Focus oN VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 16 (noting that black youths had
significantly greater violent victimization rates than white youths); JUVENILE OF-
FENDERS AND VicTIms, supra note 107, at 47 (finding in a 1991 study that 41% of all
juvenile offenders were African-American).
116. UNiFoRm CRME REPORTs 1992, supra note 114, at 227; BARBARA ALLEN-HA-
GEN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JusTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION FACT SHEET
#19, JUVENILES AND VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDING AND VICTIMZATION 1 (Nov.
1994) ("Between 1988 and 1992, the number of Violent Crime Index arrests of
juveniles increased by 47%-more than twice the increase for persons 18 years of
age or older. Most alarming, juvenile arrests for murder increased by 51%, com-
pared to 9% for adults."). See also Peter W. Greenwood, Juvenile Crime and Juve-
nile Justice, in CRmm 91, 96 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersiia eds., 1994) (noting
that "[i]n 1980, juveniles accounted for just 10 percent of all arrests for homicide. By
1990, juveniles accounted for 13.6 percent of all homicide arrests. Between 1984 and
1992, the number of juveniles arrested for homicide, who were under the age of fif-
teen, increased by 50 percent.").
1995]
Law and Inequality
Because racial minorities, especially African-Americans, com-
mit a disproportionate amount of violent crime, facially neutral ju-
venile and criminal justice policies which focus on crimes against
the person will have a disparate impact. Recent demographic
changes in Minnesota's racial composition affect both violent crime
rates and political reactions to youth crime.11 7 Minnesota has a rel-
atively low proportion of racial minorities.18 However, the state
experienced the fourth highest rate of minority population growth
in the nation during the 1980s.11 9 African-Americans are Minne-
sota's largest minority group,120 and most reside in Minneapolis
and St. Paul.121 Minnesota's changing racial composition is also re-
flected in the proportion of children in poverty, which increased
more than 20% during the 1980s. 122 The largest growth in the
number of poor children occurred in the Twin Cities, where Minne-
117. See Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 35, at 978-82 (contending
that increases in racial minorities and violent crime provided impetus for 1994 juve-
nile code changes). Minority youths in Minnesota commit a disproportionate
amount of violent crime, a racial pattern that figures prominently in public percep-
tions and political responses to youth crime. Because of population differences,
white juveniles in Minnesota comprise the majority of all youths arrested for violent
offenses. In 1991, for example, police arrested white juveniles for 738 violent crimes,
as compared with 512 black juveniles. MINNESOTA BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPREHEN-
SION, Table 14 (1991). Given the differences in relative populations, however, black
juveniles' disproportionate over-representation in arrests for violent crimes mirrored
the national differences in rates. For example, police arrested 12 black juveniles for
murder in 1991 as compared with 4 white youths. Id.
118. MINNESOTA STATE DEMOGRAPHER, POPULATION NOTES, MniirESOrA MINORIrY
POPULATIONS GROW RAPIDLY BETWEEN 1980 AND 1990, at 1 (Sept. 1991) (comparing
Minnesota's minority population of 6.3% with 24.4% of the United States, giving it
the seventh smallest minority population in the nation).
119. Id. at 3. The minority population in Minnesota grew 71.7%, as compared
with the nonhispanic white population, which rose only 4.7%, about the same as the
national average (4.4%). Id.
120. Id. at 7. The 1990 census counted 94,944 African-American Minnesotans.
While African-Americans are Minnesota's largest minority group, they constitute
only'2.2% of the population, well below the national average of 12.1%. Id. As a
result of natural increase and net migration, the African-American population in-
creased 78% during the decade of the 1980s. Id. at 6.
121. Id. at 7. Seventy-two percent of African-Americans reside in Minneapolis or
St. Paul, and an additional 23% are in the Twin Cities' suburbs. Only 6% reside
outside the seven county metropolitan area and most live either in Duluth or Roch-
ester. Id. The Twin Cities' minority population increased from 12.5 to 21.3%. Id.
See also MARCY R. PODKOPAC7, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE BUREAU OF ComMUNITY
CORRECTIONS 1 (1993) (discussing the increase in Hennepin County's minority popu-
lation from 1980 to 1990).
122. See Martha McMurry, Child Poverty in Minnesota, Population Notes (Minne-
sota State Planning, St. Paul, Minn.) Feb. 1994.
Minnesota children were more likely to be poor in 1989 than in 1979,
and poor children's characteristics changed dramatically during the
decade. Children in poverty are increasingly likely to be nonwhite, liv-
ing in the Twin Cities and living in a single-parent family.. . Minne-
sota's minority children are very economically disadvantaged relative
to white children. Not only do they have extremely high poverty rates,
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sota's minority populations are concentrated.123 Because younger
children are at greater risk of living in poverty than older chil-
dren,124 the more numerous younger generation is exposed to more
adverse social circumstances which contribute to greater probabili-
ties of criminal involvement. Professor Alfred Blumstein recently
cautioned:
ITihere are many factors currently in place that should make
the crime problem become increasingly serious over the coming
decade .... The effect of the changing demographic composition
will increase crime rates as the population in the 15-19 age
range (the one with the highest age-specific offending rates) will
but they are much more likely to be poor than minority children in the
rest of the United States.
Id. at 1. See also MINNESOTA PLANNING, CHImn POVERTY IN MINNESOTA: TRENDS AND
IssuEs (Mar. 1994).
Three demographic changes contributed to the dramatic increase in Minnesota's
children in poverty: a growing proportion of nonwhite children, an increasing pro-
portion of children living in single-mother families, and a greater probability that
children in minority and single-parent households will be poor. Id. at 1. About 57%
of poor families with children are headed by a single mother. Id. at 7. See generally
NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNcu,, LOSING GENERATIONS: ADOLESCENTS IN HIGH-RISK
SETINGS 41-56 (1993) [hereinafter LOSING GENERATIONS] (summarizing research on
demographic changes in family structure, its relationship to poverty, and the risks
that poverty and single-parent households pose for adolescent development). The
National Research Council concludes that:
Changes in family income and changes in family structure over the past
two decades have made it more difficult for many parents to provide
their children with the security and stability that are most conducive to
physical and emotional health, success in school, and the avoidance of
health- and life-compromising behaviors that jeopardize the successful
transition to adulthood. Single parents and families living at or below
the poverty level face the greatest challenges.
Id. at 55.
123. McMurry, supra note 122, at 4. "More than 70 percent of the increase over
the decade in the number of poor childre nl came frtm the higher number 4 Pmr
children in Minneapolis and St. Paul, with most of the rest attributable to growing
numbers in Twin Cites suburbs .... In the two central cities combined, the child
poverty rate went up from 16.3 percent in 1979 to 28.5 percent in 1989." Id.
Although the poverty rate for white children in Minnesota is relatively low com-
pared with the rest of the nation, the poverty rates for Minnesota's minority chil-
dren, the fastest growing segments of the youth population, are among the highest in
the nation. Of Minnesota's African-American children, nearly half (49.4%, rank sev-
enth in the nation) live in poverty, as do more than half (54.8%, fourth in the nation)
of its Native American children, and more than one-third (37.1%, rank third in na-
tion) of its Asian children. Id. at 3. In Hennepin County, the proportion of the non-
white population which is in poverty is 35.6%, compared with 6.2% of the white pop-
ulation. PoDKopAcz, supra note 121, at 1.
124. McMurry, supra note 122, at 8. "In 1989, 14.8 percent of Minnesota children
under age 5 were poor. The poverty rate declined to 10.6 percent for 12- to 17-year-
olds." Id. The absence of affordable day-care contributes to the greater concentra-
tion of poverty among the youngest children. See, e.g., DUNcAN LinDSEY, THE WEL-
FARE OF CHILDREN (1993). Once young children enter school, vhich effectively




be growing over at least the next decade, especially in the [ra-
cial] groups with the highest offending rates.12 5
Child poverty and racial minority status are linked to involve-
ment in crime, especially violent crimes against the person. 126 As
the FBI Uniform Crime Reports indicate, minority youths are five
times more likely than white youths to be arrested for crimes of
violence, and seven and a half times more likely to be arrested for
homicide. 127
Changes in Minnesota's racial composition, a growing concen-
tration of poor and minority children in urban settings, and dispro-
portionate involvement of minority youth in violent crime, sustain
public and political perceptions of a threatening structural "under-
class."12 8 Professors Robert Sampson and John Laub contend that
these structural and contextual indicators of racial and social ine-
quality affect official crime control policies.129 They argue that
political leaders will respond to public anxiety and use the juvenile
justice system to increase the social control of the threatening and
125. Alfred Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 12
(1993). See also JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcTIMs, supra note 107, at 111 (estimat-
ing that violent juvenile crime arrests will double over the next fifteen years based
on projected population growth and controlling for racial differences in population
and age-specific arrest rates).
126. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY M. DENTON, AMERicAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF AN URBAN UNDERCLASS (1993); LOSING GENERA-
TIONS, supra note 122, at 152-53.
127. UNIFORM CRntE REPORTS 1991, supra note 106, at 279. See also UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEB3OK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993, at 447 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994)
(indicating that black youths are more than five times as likely to be arrested for
violent crimes as white youth); JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcTIMs, supra note 107, at
57 (finding that homicide rates for black juveniles was 7.5 times higher than the rate
for white juveniles); WOLFGANG ET AL., supra note 21, at 247 ("the more serious
forms of bodily harm are committed by nonwhites"); TRACY ET AL., supra note 21, at
277 (stating that the violent offense rate for nonwhites is nearly six times the rate
for whites); ELLIOTT CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE 144-71
(1985) (documenting positive correlations between race and violent crime); Michael
Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes, 43 AM. Soc.
REv. 93, 103-04 (1978) (finding that blacks disproportionately commit rape, robbery,
and assault).
128. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 126 (arguing that residential segregation
is structurally responsible for the "mutually reinforcing and self-feeding spirals of
decline" in black neighborhoods); WLLuAm J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:
THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (analyzing the numer-
ous factors contributing to social dislocation in the urban ghetto as well as ineffective
public policy responses); THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Pe-
terson eds., 1991) (collecting essays on the economic condition of the underclass, the
causes and consequences of concentrated poverty, and public policy responses).
129. Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Structural Variations in Juvenile Court




offensive "underclass" population.130 Seen in this light, the 1994
changes in Minnesota's juvenile waiver and criminal sentencing
policies constitute a predictable response to changing racial compo-
sition, increasing poverty and urban concentration of minority
young people, disproportional minority involvement in serious
youth violence, and demographic projections of more poor and mi-
nority urban youths in the decade to come.11
D. Judicial Discretion, Waiver, and Race
Empirical evaluations of juvenile court sentencing practices
consistently indicate that, after controlling for the effects of present
offense and prior record, judicial discretion often results in racial
disparities in delinquency dispositions. 13 2 Moreover, juvenile jus-
tice administration involves multiple judgments; screening deci-
sions at earlier stages of the process may amplify racial effects as
youths proceed through the system. 13 3 For example, juvenile court
personnel are more likely to hold African-American youths than
white youths in pretrial detention, and detained youths receive
more severe sentences than those at liberty pending adjudication
and disposition.'34 Recent juvenile justice policy initiatives at-
130. Id. at 293. In an earlier study, Professor Feld analyzed a number of the
structural features-racial composition, poverty, female-headed household, and
crime rates-that Sampson and Laub hypothesized would affect the severity of juve-
nile justice administration. Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban,
and Rural Variations in Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRuM. L. & CRMINOiL-
OGY 156, 166-169 (1991) [hereinafter Justice by Geography].
131. Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 35, at 982.
132. See generally MINORIrIaS IN JuvENmE JUSTICE (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard et
al. eds., 1995); Carl E. Pope & William H. Feyerherm, Minority Status and Juvenile
Justice Processing: An Assessment of the Research Literature (Part 1), 22 CRnI. JUST.
ABSTRACrs 327 (1990) (finding that a greater degree of latitude in juvenile judicial
decision-making acts to disadvantage minority youth); Carl E. Pope & William H.
Feyerherm, Minority Status and Juvenile Justice Processing: An Assessment of the
Research Literature (Part II), 22 CUM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 527 (1990) (providing re-
search guidelines to address the problem of race-based juvenile justice decision-mak-
ing); CARL E. POPE & WILLIAM FEYERHERM, MINORrIES AND THE JUVENME JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1992); Edmund F. McGarrell, Trends in Racial Disproportionality in Juve-
nile Court Processing: 1985-1989, 39 CsnE & DELiNQ. 29 (1993); BARRY KRISBEG &
JAMEs AusTIN, REINVENTIG JUVENME JUSTICE 122-34 (1993); Jeffrey Fagan et al.,
Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile Justice Process, 33 CRIE & DE-
LiNQ. 224 (1987) (reporting racial disparities in juvenile justice processing); Belinda
McCarthy & Brent L. Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in the Juve-
nile Justice Process: The Impact of Administrative Factors and Screening Decisions
on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINqoLoGy 41 (1986) (finding that race and
social class significantly affect juvenile court dispositions).
1?3. See, e.g., Fagan et al., supra note 132, at 229; McCarthy & Smith, supra note
132, at 58-61; Donna M. Bishop & Charles Frazier, The Influence of Race in Juvenile
Justice Processing, 25 J. RES. CRImE & DELINQ. 242 (1988).
134. See, e.g., M. A. Bortner & Wornie L. Reed, The Preeminence of Process: An
Example of Refocused Juvenile Justice Research, 66 Soc. Sci. Q. 413, 420-21 (1985);
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tempt to account for and reduce the consistent findings of racial dis-
parities in juvenile justice administration. 13 5
A waiver decision represents the final step of all of the cumu-
lative discretionary decisions in a juvenile delinquent's court ca-
reer. Research suggests that judicial discretion in waiver decisions
may also produce racial disparities.136 For example, a recent report
by the General Accounting Office found:
[Bilacks were more likely than whites to have their cases
waived for violent, property, and drug offenses. For violent of-
fenses, the differential rates are fairly consistent across states,
with black juveniles having waiver rates from 1.8 times to 3.1
times higher than whites. The differences varied more widely
for drug offenses... . Pennsylvania black juveniles were more
than twice as likely to have their cases waived than whites.
There were some large differences, however; for example, for
juveniles charged with drug offenses, Arizona's waiver rates for
whites were twice those of California; while for blacks, Ari-
zona's rates were 55 times those of California. 1 37
Similarly, an earlier national study reported that in a number of
states, minority juveniles constituted the majority of youths
waived.13s However, neither of those studies controlled simultane-
ously for the effects of age, seriousness of present offense, and
length of the prior record, all of which are highly relevant to judicial
waiver decisions. Although other studies suggest some effects of a
youth's race on waiver decisions,13 9 the most methodologically so-
phisticated prior study reported no direct evidence of racial discrim-
Barry C. Feld, The Right To Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Assessment of
When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIm. L. & CRUnIroLOGY
1185, 1261-74, 1311-17 (1989) [hereinafter Right to Counsel] (finding that urban mi-
nority juveniles are disproportionately at risk for pre-trial detention and subsequent
home removal after controlling for influence of legal variables such as present of-
fense and prior record); Charles E. Frazier & John K. Cochran, Detention of
Juveniles: Its Effects on Subsequent Juvenile Court Processing Decisions, 17 YouTH
& Soc'y 286, 299 (1986).
135. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(16) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring states
applying to the United States Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention for juvenile justice formula grants to review the causes of
minority overrepresentation and incarceration in juvenile justice system); National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Minority Youth in the Juvenile Justice
System: A Judicial Response, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., 1990, at 13-32; MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS iN =H JuDIcIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT
(May 1993) [hereinafter RACIAL BIAS, FiNAL REPORT].
136. See supra note 42 (studies analyzing the role of race in waiver decisions).
137. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 59.
138. BETWEEN Two WoRLDs, supra note 2, at 104-05 (finding that nationally, 39%
of all youths transferred in 1978 were black; in 11 states, minority youths consti-
tuted the majority of juveniles waived).
139. See, e.g., Eigen, supra note 42, at 339-40 (reporting that black youths who
murder white victims are significantly more at risk for waiver); Keiter, supra note
42, at 537 (analyzing transferred youth revealed "subtle discrimination").
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ination, but concluded that "the effects of race are indirect, but
visible nonetheless."140
When the Minnesota Supreme Court's Racial Bias Task Force
undertook an analysis of racial disparities in waiver administra-
tion, it confronted the same data deficiencies that limited the ability
of other researchers to assess the impact of a youth's race on waiver
decisions.141 Justice Alan Page's dissent in In re M.E.P. l42 echoed
the Racial Bias Task Force's concerns about racial disparities in
waiver administration. In M.E.P., the juvenile court denied the
state's reference motion alleging first-degree murder against a six-
teen-year-old white juvenile with no prior record.143 Justice Page
found the case factually indistinguishable from that of a black
youth, M.R.G., whom another juvenile court waived for criminal
prosecution as an adult.144 Despite Justice Page's well-founded
concerns about racial bias, so long as the appellate standard to
overturn waiver decisions is the trial judge's "abuse of discre-
tion,"'145 even a pattern of racial disparities remains almost imper-
vious to reversal.
II. Empirical Analyses of Judicial Waiver Practices
Despite public and political concern about serious youth crime,
remarkably little empirical data exists about this small group of of-
fenders or about the administration of the process to prosecute
them as adults. We undertook this analysis to provide criminal jus-
tice researchers and juvenile justice practitioners and policy mak-
ers-prosecutors, judges, probation and parole officers, public
140. Fagan et al., supra note 3, at 276.
141. See RAcIAL BIAS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 135, at 99.
From 1987 through 1991 there were 183 juveniles with identifiable race
who were certified as adults .... Eighty-five (46.4%) of them were peo-
ple of color and 98 (53.6%) were white. Given the relatively small
number of cases and the complexity of the certification decision, it is not
possible to say that these numbers prove a pattern of racial bias in this
area, but the disproportionate ratio raises a red flag and cries out for
closer scrutiny.
Id. Because counties collected racial data incompletely, the small sample size and
the inability to control for offense type and delinquency history precluded statistical
analyses of the effects of race on waiver decisions. Id. at app. D.
142. In re M.E.P, 528 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 1995).
143. See In re M.E.P., 523 N.W.2d 913 (1994), aff'd, 528 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 1995).
144. 528 N.W.2d at 243 ("The only significant distinction between M.E.P. and
M.R.G. is that M.E.P. is white and M.R.G. is black .... I believe that M.R.G. was
properly referred to district court. The nature of the acts committed by M.E.P. are
essentially the same and support a similar conclusion.").
145. See In re D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1988). See also Bad Law Makes Hard
Cases, supra note 13, at 77-89 (criticizing the Minnesota Supreme Court for substi-
tuting its factual assessment for that of the juvenile court judge in a controversial
waiver decision without finding that the trial judge abused his discretion).
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defenders, and legislators-with an objective assessment of the de-
terminants of waiver decisions..146 We especially wanted to analyze
the effects of race on waiver administration. Anecdotal evidence,
such as that expressed by Justice Page in M.E.P., suggests that ju-
venile courts certify minority youth, particularly African-Ameri-
cans, more frequently, more quickly, and with less extensive
scrutiny than non-minority youth. Because the individualized dis-
cretionary nature of juvenile justice decision-making readily lends
itself to racial disparities, we designed our study to provide an ob-
jective empirical assessment of those anecdotal beliefs.
The judicial waiver process employed in Minnesota is the most
common transfer strategy used in the United States. 147 Because
most other jurisdictions use similar waiver criteria and procedures,
the data we collected and analyzed may have broad applicability to
waiver practices in other states. Moreover, because we collected
our data in Minnesota's most populous county with the highest pro-
portion of serious crime and minority juveniles, our research find-
ings will have important implications for juvenile and criminal
justice policies in other jurisdictions facing similar levels of serious
crime. Importantly, the quality of our data enable us to overcome
many of the deficiencies of previous studies which have been lim-
ited by small sample sizes, inadequate operationalization of critical
variables such as the present offense, and an inability to construct
fully either the record of prior offenses or the subsequent sentences
and recidivism.
A. Data Sources and Methods
We analyzed waiver practices in Hennepin County (Minneapo-
lis and its surrounding suburbs), Minnesota, between 1986 and
1992, when the certification statute created a "prima facie" case or
rebuttable presumption for waiver. The prosecutor's decision to file
a reference motion for the first time against youth between 1986
and 1992 defined our sample. 148 We documented the factors associ-
146. See MARCY R. PODKOPACZ, HENNEPIN Co. DEP'T OF CoMMUNrry CoRRECTIoNs,
JuVENmE REFERENCE STUDY (Aug. 1994). The current analysis is based largely on
this study which was conducted during 1993-94.
147. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
148. One potential limitation of this study is that it may suffer from a population
selection bias. Selection bias is present when observations are selected in a manner
that is not independent of the outcome variable, in this case certification. These
biases potentially pose a threat to the external and internal validity of our findings.
In this study, selection bias results from the prosecutor's selection of the popula-
tion we studied. The county attorney decides against which offenders to fie motions
for reference for adult prosecution. We do not have information about the other
youths against whom the prosecutor did not file a reference motion or what factors
influenced that charging decision. We do not know how those juveniles against
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ated with the filing of an initial reference motion: the type of pres-
ent offense, the prior record, and past treatment efforts. We
analyzed court data to determine when and why judges refer some
juveniles to adult court, and retain others in the juvenile system.
In addition, we examined the administrative processes by which
courts make this critical sentencing decision and documented the
evaluative services provided by the probation department and court
psychologists. Following the decision to waive or retain jurisdic-
tion, we tracked these youth through the juvenile or adult justice
systems to assess how the respective courts sentenced them. Fi-
nally, after the courts sentenced these young offenders, we analyzed
their subsequent criminal activity or recidivism.
Offender Characteristics: We collected information regarding
each juvenile's education, employment, status offenses, truancy,
arrest and detention, bench warrants, prior probation, prior parole,
type of past court involvement, race, age, gender, and gang involve-
ment. We also collected family information, including the person
with whom the juvenile lived, the juvenile's length of residence in
Hennepin County, the extent to which the father was involved in
the juvenile's upbringing, family criminality, abuse patterns (sex-
ual, physical and neglect), the juvenile and family members' chemi-
cal abuse or psychological problems, and prior non-delinquency
related out-of-home placements. In addition, the data coders docu-
mented any other significant life event recorded in the files which
occurred prior to the filing of the reference motion. We analyzed
this information to ascertain whether and how offenders' social cir-
whom the prosecutors did not file a reference motion differ from those against whom
they did, or whether or how many of them the juvenile courts would have certified if
the prosecutors had filed reference motions.
We balance this potential drawback against the contribution this study makes
to the literature. We collected extensive data on every juvenile who faced this "final"
decision over a seven year period. We did not exclude any types of crimes from our
sample, as have other studies. E.g., Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 3. We carefully
confined our analyses only to the first reference motion filed against a youth, and
analyzed subsequent reference motions as instances of recidivism, an issue virtually
ignored in previous research. We also improved substantially the data elements
from past studies. For example, this is the first certification study to include proba-
tion officers' and psychologists' recommendations, and juvenile court judges as in-
dependent court process variables affecting the outcomes of reference motions.
Our future research will explore prosecutorial discretion in the filing of a refer-
ence motion. In a preliminary examination, for example, we found that the prosecu-
tors charged over 300 juveniles with presumptive offenses in 1992 alone, yet filed
reference motions against less than ten percent of these offenders. We will attempt
to ascertain what, if any, legal or social characteristics distinguish these two groups
of serious young offenders. See, e.g., Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 13, at
40 (comparing certified juveniles with all delinquents and concluding that "no single
factor or group of factors explains why or how certified juveniles are selected from
the larger universe of juveniles.").
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cumstances affected the court's decision to retain them as juveniles
or certify them as adult offenders.
Offense Characteristics: We collected extensive data about the
present offense alleged in the reference motion. We focused on the
offense(s) charged and whether the juvenile used a weapon while
committing the crime, and, if so, the type of weapon. We noted if co-
defendants participated, and whether the co-defendants were
juveniles or adults. Finally, in crimes against the person, we deter-
mined the characteristics of the victim(s).
In addition, we collected data on all delinquency charges in a
youth's records resulting in adjudications or dismissals. We sorted
offenses other than the present offense into prior adjudication his-
tory, 149 and subsequent recidivism. If the court's files indicated the
juvenile had lived in another part of Minnesota or another state, or
that criminal information existed in any other jurisdictions, we at-
tempted to collect this delinquency or conviction information.150
Subsequent criminality included all juvenile adjudications after the
present offense as well as all adult convictions in Hennepin County,
in other counties of Minnesota, or in states other than
Minnesota. 1 51
149. We collected data on all charges, regardless of whether they resulted in adju-
dications or dismissals. However, we only included in a youth's prior history those
offenses that resulted in a conviction. Therefore, a juvenile may be in the category of
"no priors" if he or she had no prior adjudications but did have prior charges which
were dismissed or not proven.
150. Obtaining complete juvenile prior adjudication information was difficult be-
cause of juvenile court privacy and confidentiality, and a lack of automated records.
We followed each lead even if the court had extensive current local information
about the offender. We sent two series of letters to other jurisdictions in an attempt
to locate prior delinquency/criminal information. We followed these letters by phone
calls. In a few instances, the Juvenile Court judge called those other jurisdictions to
obtain access to juvenile records.
A review of juveniles not originally from Hennepin County demonstrates the
extensive amount of outside information we obtained. County prosecutors filed ref-
erence motions against 91 juveniles (28%) whose family moved to Hennepin County
from another location. Most of these offenders' families moved to Hennepin County
a number of years prior to the present offense charged. Of the 91 juveniles within
this category, 35 (11% of the total) had moved into the County more recently (within
two years of the reference motion offense). These juveniles seemed the most likely to
have incomplete information on their delinquency history. However, of these 35
juveniles, we were unable to document the past adjudication history of only five (less
than 2% of the total). Of those juveniles who had lived in Hennepin County for more
than two years, we did not receive outside juvenile information about an additional
five juveniles, but we did have complete delinquency information within our own
jurisdiction. A non-response from an outside jurisdiction may have meant that no
delinquency file existed on the juvenile or that the jurisdiction simply did not
respond.
151. Outside of Hennepin County but within Minnesota, we obtained adult crimi-
nal information from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission. Adult
criminal information was restricted to felony level crimes (charges and convictions
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Court Processes: We also examined the juvenile court waiver
process. We studied the length of the administrative process, and
judicial and clinical resources expended on these cases. Did the
court order psychological examinations in conjunction with the
waiver hearings? Did probation staff conduct a reference study? If
psychologists or probation officers made recommendations based on
their assessments, how often did the court heed them? Did the
court conduct a full reference hearing, or make its waiver decision
as part of a quasi-plea bargain that included the anticipated juve-
nile or adult sentence as well? Did the youth or prosecutor appeal
the waiver decision? What effect does the particular judge have on
the ultimate referral decision?
Methodology: We pre-tested an extensive data collection pro-
tocol, then collected data from juvenile court files.152 Court psy-
chologists conducted a psychological examination and wrote a full
report for about half of the juveniles against whom the prosecutors
filed a reference motion. The Juvenile Probation Department com-
pleted an in-depth reference study on almost all of those juveniles
evaluated by Psychological Services. The juvenile court files con-
tained these reports as well as information on delinquency charges,
adjudications, and dispositions, and social history reports. The
crime information, the psychological report, and the reference study
provided rich sources of information for this study. In addition, we
reviewed all disposition reports, probation progress reviews, pro-
gram progress reviews, and program exit summaries for any other
information to supplement the primary sources. We also inter-
viewed the various participants in the waiver process, and observed
court proceedings and pre-hearing conferences.
As we thoroughly reviewed juveniles' court fies, we discovered
that the files contained surprisingly little standardized family or
individual information about many of these offenders. The lack of
information could mean either that the court did not deem the in-
formation relevant and did not record it, or that the information
simply was unavailable. In designing the data collection form, we
for Hennepin County and convictions only for the rest of Minnesota). Criminal activ-
ity that occurred outside of Minnesota was also restricted to felony convictions. For
juvenile offenses, we collected all charges including misdemeanors, regardless of
where they occurred. However, as noted above, we only included adjudications or
convictions in our discussions of prior adjudication history or subsequent criminal
involvement.
152. We trained five employees, loaned from the Department of Community Cor-
rections, the Hennepin County Attorney's Office, and the Hennepin County Juvenile
Court to collect the data used in this study. Data collection averaged about three




attempted to compile all pertinent information and included certain
items in our coding format even though our pre-tests indicated we
would not find them consistently. Although we expected that many
social background characteristics should have been meaningful in-
dicators for a clinical decision-maker, we found that court personnel
did not consistently collect seemingly important information about
juveniles' family circumstances, educational attainment, employ-
ment status, or the like, and that these types of information appar-
ently did not affect judges' decisions when presented. 153
B. Findings and Analyses
At first glance, the anecdotal beliefs that racial disparity ex-
isted in the handling of minority youths seem to have merit.
Although 19% of Hennepin County juveniles were members of ra-
cial minorities, minorities represented 72% of the youths against
whom prosecutors filed reference motions. However, this study fo-
cused on the court's reference decision rather than the prosecutor's
motion decision.154 Within the population defined by the prosecu-
tors' motions we analyzed how the juvenile court made its decision
to certify or retain, and whether extra-legal factors, such as race,
contributed to the court's decision.
1. Reference Motions Filed
Although the "prima facie" case waiver statute provides a type
of legal definition to guide the selection of juveniles to refer for
adult certification, prosecutors are neither required to select all
youths whose delinquencies fit the definition nor precluded from
filing motions against those who do not. Thus, the prosecutors' un-
restricted charging discretion necessarily defines the characteris-
tics of the youths included in the study, because they decide against
whom to fie reference motions. As Table 1 indicates, during the
period of our study, white juveniles comprised 81% of the ten- to
seventeen-year-old youth population in Hennepin County. 155 Afri-
153. An example of this type of limited data is education level. Most files men-
tioned the juvenile's school situation at some point but it was very difficult to sys-
tematically collect the last year of school that the juvenile had successfully
completed at the time of the reference motion or any other single type of educational
assessment. Less than 40% of the juveniles in this study had information in their
court files that allowed us to determine the last year of school they had completed.
154. We are initiating research to determine against whom and why prosecutors
file motions for adult reference. Besides answering the questions regarding dispar-
ity among minority members, this research will also assess the nature of the selec-
tion bias in the current study.
155. Census information provided courtesy of Hennepin County Office of Planning
and Development, 1990 U.S. Census, PUMS files (on file with author).
[Vol. 14:73
JUDICIAL WAIVER POLICY
can-American youths accounted for 9% of the County's youths and
other minority youths accounted for an additional 10%. However,
when we examine police apprehension of juveniles for FBI Part I
index offenses,156 a different pattern emerges. Police arrested
white youths for 55% of all serious crimes, African-American youths
for 32%, and other minority youths for the remaining 12%. Signifi-
cantly, police arrested most of the white juveniles for property
crimes, and most of the African-American juveniles for violent
crimes.157 Thus, because police cleared most property crime with
arrests of white juveniles, and most violent crimes with arrests of
African-American youths, the racial disproportionality in juvenile
justice administration and waiver begins with the type of crime at
the time of arrest.
When we analyzed the racial characteristics of youths against
whom the prosecutors filed reference motions, the race-offense rela-
tionship emerges even more starkly. Although white youths com-
prised more than half (55%) of the arrests for serious crimes, they
comprised somewhat more than one-quarter (28%) of the youths
against whom prosecutors fied reference motions.158 By compari-
son, African-American youths comprised about one-third (32%) of
the arrestees for serious crimes but constituted over half (55%) of
the reference motion sample. This racial disproportionality reflects
the prosecutors' emphasis on violent crimes in their decision to file
reference motions. But this is only a partial explanation. Although
about one-third (34%) of juveniles arrested for violent crimes were
white, white youth comprised less than one-fifth (19%) of the vio-
lent offenders against whom prosecutors filed reference motions.
While African-American youths comprised a majority (54%) of all
juvenile arrests for violent crimes, they made up nearly two-thirds
(65%) of the population against whom prosecutors filed reference
motions for felonies against the person. This racial amplification
may reflect bias, more serious violent crimes, or differences in Afri-
156. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REFORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES: 1993 (1994). Local law enforcement agencies transmit data to state
agencies and the FBI based on reports from victims of crimes or investigation. Id. at
1-3. The FBI's Serious Crime Index includes both violent and property crimes and
provides the most widely cited measure of offenses. Id. at 1. The Crime Index
records four violent crimes: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault. Id. It also reports four property crimes: burglary,
larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id. Typically, both reported crimes
and arrests are standardized as rates per 100,000 persons to control for changes in
population composition.
157. See supra note 1i. and swompanying text (FBI Unifnrm Crime Reports for
1991 regarding African-American youth violence).
158. We categorized juveniles on the basis of the most serious offense alleged in
the reference motion. If the prosecutor charged a youth with offenses against the
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can-American juveniles' prior records, such as a larger proportion of
violent offenses. By contrast, there was rough racial parity in ar-
rests and reference motions on felony property crimes.
Table 2
Changes Across Time in Offense and Offender
Characteristics
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total
Number of Motions Filed 53 41 61 46 54 40 35 330
Percent Retained 30% 22% 43% 30% 28% 55% 37% 35%
Percent Referred to Adult Court 70% 78% 57% 70% 72% 45% 63% 65%
Present Offense
Percent Prima Facie Cases 2% 0 3% 24% 37% 46% 54% 21%
Percent Presumptive Offense 53% 51% 51% 41% 54% 73% 74% 55%
Percent Person Felony 66% 61% 54% 54% 57% 80% 80% 63%
Percent Property Felony 28% 32% 33% 28% 26% 7% 11% 25%
Past Adjudication History
Average Number of Felonies 2.11 2.51 1.59 1.46 1.65 1.22 1.57 1.73
Percent One Felony or Less 40% 32% 57% 59% 57% 72% 57% 53%
Percent Two or More Felonies 60% 68% 43% 41% 43% 28% 43% 47%
Racial Background
Percent White 36% 44% 31% 33% 19% 20% 11% 28%
Percent African American 59% 34% 44% 46% 65% 70% 74% 55%
Percent Other Minority 6% 22% 25% 22% 17% 10% 14% 17%
Table 2 displays the number of first motions across each of the
years included in this study. The third row reports the percentage
of youths whom the juvenile court certified to adult criminal court
in each year. Over the seven-year period, the Hennepin County
juvenile court heard an average of forty-seven waiver cases per
year, and referred about two-thirds (65%) of them for adult prosecu-
tion. With the exception of 1988, when prosecutors filed a larger
number of reference motions, the earlier years between 1986 and
1990 exhibited a relatively stable certification rate of above 70%.
Somewhat lower rates of judicial certification prevailed in
1991 and 1992. Two factors account for the decrease in the latter
years. First, the judge who presided over the Hennepin County ju-
venile court from 1986 until 1990 rotated off the juvenile court
bench; three other judges made reference decisions in the remain-
ing years. Second, the Hennepin County Attorney's Office changed
its reference motion filing policy. 159 During the period of our study,
the prosecutor had to prove that the juvenile was not amenable to
treatment, posed a threat to public safety, or fit the "prima facie"
159. Interview with Diane Ward, Chief, Juvenile Prosecution Division, Hennepin
County Attorney's Office (1993).
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offense criteria for certification. In the latter years, the County At-
torney's Office filed a larger proportion of its reference motions
against youths who met the "prima facie" case offense criteria. In-
deed, the percentage of cases which met the serious offense criteria
increased -from less than 3% in the earlier years of our study to
nearly half of cases in the later years (e.g., 54% in 1992).
Correspondingly, the number of juveniles charged with pre-
sumptive commitment offenses increased significantly (p=.02). In
the earlier years, between 1986 and 1990, prosecutors filed refer-
ence motions against about half of the juveniles for presumptive
commitment offenses. In 1991 and 1992, nearly three-quarters of
all juveniles charged fell into the presumptive certification category
(73% and 74%, respectively).
Over the seven-year period, the typical crimes for which prose-
cutors fied reference motions were felonies against the person.
However, the proportion of reference motions filed for crimes
against the person increased from about 60% in the earlier years to
about 80% by the end of the period covered in our study. Property
felonies, which accounted for between 25 and 30% of the reference
motions filed in the earlier years, declined to only about 10% of the
reference motions filed in the later years. 160
There was an inverse relationship between filing reference
motions on the basis of a serious present offenses and the length of
the prior record. As prosecutors fied reference motions increas-
ingly based upon the seriousness of juveniles' present offenses, the
length of their prior delinquency record decreased. The number of
prior felony adjudications in the juveniles' delinquency records de-
creased over time, from 2.11 prior felonies in 1986 to 1.57 in
1992,161 a statistically significant change (p=.005).
The County Attorney's policy decision to emphasize the seri-
ousness of the present offense affected the proportion of minority
juveniles against whom prosecutors fied reference motions over the
period of our study. Even in 1986, minority juveniles comprised
nearly two-thirds (64%) of the youths against whom prosecutors
filed reference motions, and by the end of our study period, minority
juveniles comprised nearly nine out of ten (88%) of the youths
whom prosecutors sought to waive. This significant change in the
160. This decline was statistically significant (p=.005).
161. Most of these juveniles did not have prior adjudications for felony offenses
against the person and this did not change over the course of the study. However, a
statistically significant decrease occurred across the years in the amount of prior
property felony adjudications (p=.002). In addition, the number of juveniles with
prior drug felony convictions increased between 1986 and 1992, but because they
comprised a smaller part of juveniles against whom prosecutors filed reference mo-
tions, they did not change the overall recent pattern of decreasing felony records.
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racial composition of the reference population (p=.01) reflected the
greater propensity of minority youths to be arrested for and
charged with the most serious, violent crimes. As we discuss later,
the 1994 legislative changes in the certification statute to create a
presumption to waive older youths charged with presumptive com-
mitment offenses has important racial implications for which
youths will be transferred and which will enter the Extended Juris-
diction Juvenile status.
2. Characteristics of Youths Against Whom Prosecutors
Filed Reference Motions
Age: The age at which juveniles commit their first offense or
make their first court appearance may be "one of the best predictors
... of the future course of the criminal career." 162 The younger the
age at which a person begins to offend, the greater the likelihood he
or she will commit additional offenses. We used two indicators of
the onset of a delinquent career: age of first juvenile court appear-
ance 16 3 and age at first finding of delinquency1 64 We also ex-
amined the youth's age at the time of the present offense for which
the prosecutor filed the reference motion.
As Table 3 indicates, over sixty percent (60.6%) of the youths
in our sample made their first appearance in juvenile court by the
time they were thirteen years old. Juvenile courts found over half
(55.5%) of them delinquent by the time they were fourteen. The
average age for those juveniles adjudicated delinquent was 14.2
years of age. 16 5
Another important variable in the waiver process is the juve-
nile's age at the time of the present offense because it indicates the
length of time remaining to treat the youth in the juvenile system.
The minimum age to file a reference motion is fourteen years old; at
162. David P. Farrington et al., Advancing Knowledge About the Onset of Delin-
quency and Crime, in 13 ADVANCES iN CLmNCAL CHULD PSYCHOL. 283, 283 (Benjamin
B. Lahey & Alan E. Kazdin eds., 1991).
163. The youths' age at their first court appearance is not necessarily related to
delinquency. It could also be related to dependency or neglect, CHIPS (Children in
Need of Protective Services), status offenses, termination of parental rights or even
adoption issues.
164. The coders documented the date of the first finding of delinquency (i.e., a
juvenile court hearing response of admit or proven). Some juveniles may not have
this second indicator if they had no prior adjudications and the juvenile court re-
ferred them to adult court (thereby still having no delinquency finding, only a crimi-
nal finding).
165. Interestingly, 22 of the 330 youths (6.7%) did not have any prior delinquency
record nor did the juvenile coirt find them delinquent on the present offense.
Rather, the court certified most of these youths who had no prior delinquency
records (16 of the 22). Because most of those certified (15 of the 16) pled guilty or
were convicted in adult court, a juvenile court never found them delinquent.
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Table 3
Characteristics of Youths Against Whom Prosecutor Filed
Reference Motion
Number Percent
Age at First Court Appearance
Less than 12 Years Old 94 28.5%
12 or 13 Years Old 106 32.1%
14 or 15 Years Old 71 21.5%
16 or Older 59 17.9%
Age of First Delinquency Finding
No delinquency finding 22 6.7%
12 Years Old 69 20.9%
13 Years Old 52 15.8%
14 Years Old 62 18.8%
15 Years Old 43 13.0%
16 Years Old 39 11.8%
17 Years Old 43 13.0%
Age at Present Offense
14 Years Old 10 3.0%
15 Years Old 24 7.3%
16 Years Old 98 29.7%
17 Years Old 198 60.0%
Present Offense - Type of Charges
Misdemeanor 9 2.7%
Other Felony 3 .9%
Drug Felony 27 8.2%
Property Felony 82 24.8%
Person Felony 140 42.4%
Person + Other Felonies 69 20.9%
Present Offense - Number and Level of Charges
Misdemeanor 9 2.7%
1 Felony 103 31.2%
2 Felonies 80 24.2%
3 Felonies 51 15.5%
4 + Felonies 87 26.4%
Present Offense - Presumptive Offenses
Presumptive 183 55.5%
Non-Presumptive 147 44.5%
Present Offense - Weapon Use
Yes 159 48.2%
No 171 51.8%











the time we conducted this research, the juvenile court's jurisdic-
tion ended at age eighteen and its maximum dispositional authority
extended until age nineteen.166 Prosecutors filed very few refer-
ence motions against juveniles younger than sixteen years of age.
In the seven-year span of our study, prosecutors filed reference mo-
tions against only thirty-four juveniles (10%) for crimes they com-
mitted when less than sixteen years of age; twenty-four of those
youths were fifteen years old, and only ten were fourteen years old.
On the other hand, fully 60% of juveniles referred for certification
were seventeen years old.
Present Offense: Prosecutors typically filed a reference motion
against a juvenile for a single behavioral incident, although that
criminal event may produce more than one charge. In the typical
scenario, no other outstanding offenses remain unresolved, and the
juvenile appears in court on the reference motion for the present
offense. Eighty-five percent of the cases fit this category. However,
for 15% of the youths, prosecutors filed multiple reference motions
at the same time for several different behavioral incidents, or other
outstanding charges were pending when the prosecutor filed the
motion, and the court handled and disposed of all of the offenses
simultaneously. 167
Prosecutors charged nearly all the youths against whom they
filed reference motions with felony level offenses, although prior to
1991, they charged a few (2.7%) with only misdemeanors. The most
common charge filed against these juveniles alleged a felony
against the person. Nearly two-thirds of the reference motions
charged at least one crime of violence (this includes both the "per-
son felony" category (42.4%), and the "person + other felony" group
(20.9%)). Prosecutors charged about one-quarter (24.8%) of the
youths for whom they sought adult reference with felonies against
property (typically burglary or auto theft) and an additional 8%
with drug felonies. Prosecutors fied multiple counts against most
of the youths in this sample. Although about one-third (31.2%) of
the reference motions alleged only a single felony, prosecutors
charged over one quarter (26.4%) of the juveniles with four or more
felonies.
166. MINN. STAT. § 260.185 (1994).
167. Because of these atypical situations, we defined the present offense to in-
clude all offenses with identical adjudication dates as the offense listed on the first
reference motion (the delinquency decisions occurred together), or all reference mo-
tion decisions occurring on the same date as the first reference motion decision (sep-
arate reference motions handled together at the same time). This definition allowed
us to capture the full account of decisions that, for fifteen percent of the cases, often




Presumptive Offenses: Because of the 1994 changes in the
Minnesota juvenile code, we analyzed separately whether prosecu-
tors charged youths with presumptive certification offenses. Pre-
sumptive certification cases constituted over half (55.5%) of the
cases in our sample. While they charged nearly a quarter of these
juveniles (22%) with only one presumptive commitment offense, an
additional one-third (33%) of our sample faced two or more pre-
sumptive commitment charges.
Weapons: Juveniles used some type of weapon in about half
(49.2%) the offenses alleged.168 As will be seen, whether a juvenile
used a weapon to commit the present offense significantly influ-
enced the court's decision to refer the juvenile to adult court.
Victims: Most of the certification proceedings (60.9%) involved
youths charged with a crime against the person. The juvenile
court's files contained incomplete information about characteristics
of victims. For example, they noted victims' ages in only 45% of
cases,16 9 racial background in 44% of cases,170 and gender in 78% of
the primary victims.17 1 The files often noted whether any prior re-
lationship existed between the offender and victims. 17 2 Finally, we
determined the extent of the injury to the victims in only 78% of the
cases. 173
Race: African-American juveniles comprised the majority
(55.2%) of the juveniles against whom prosecutors filed motions for
adult prosecution. Other minority juveniles represented 17% of
our sample. White juveniles comprised slightly more than one-
quarter (28.2%) of the youths against whom prosecutors fied refer-
ence motions.
Gender: Prosecutors only fied twelve reference motions
against female juveniles between 1986 and 1992 (less than 4%).
They charged four of these girls with presumptive commitment of-
168. Juveniles' first choice of weapon was firearms (46%), followed by knives
(22%), blunt instruments (15%), or some other type of weapon such as a chain (17%).
169. Of those which included age information, the average victim age was twenty-
five and the median age was twenty years old.
170. Of those that included victim racial information, 42% were white, 37% were
African-American, 12% were Native American, 3% were of Hispanic background,
and 6% were Asian.
171. Sixty-four percent of those victims with gender information were males and
36% were females.
172. Of the people that these juveniles victimized, 64% were strangers, 28% were
some type of acquaintance or friend, 4% were family members, and an additional 4%
were either peace officers or correctional facility staff members.
173. These juveniles killed 24% of their victims, and shot, stabbed, beat severely,
or sexually assaulted an additional 43% of their victims. Eighteen percent of the
victims were injured or slightly injured, and 23% sustained no physical injury.
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fenses, and the remaining eight with less serious non-presumptive
offenses.
Prior Records and Dispositions: The vast majority (84.5%) of
youths had some prior delinquency history. We used three different
measures of their records. First, as an indicator of seriousness, we
determined whether the youth's prior record included a presump-
tive commitment offense. Second, we counted the nuraber of prior
felony or misdemeanor adjudications, and weighted all felonies
equally. Third, we distinguished prior offenses by the type of crime,
for example, felony offenses against the person, property felonies, or
drug felonies. Because some juveniles' prior records included both
felonies against the person and other types of felonies, we used a
separate "person + other felonies" category to assess whether courts
regarded juveniles adjudicated for person offenses differently from
those having other additional offenses. In our analyses of prior
records, we classified juveniles on the basis of their most serious
behavior.174 We used these different formulations of prior records
to test whether quantitative gauges of prior crimes alone explained
reference decisions, or whether judges employed qualitative infor-
mation about the adjudication history as well.
Table 4 describes the record of delinquency accumulated by
these juveniles prior to the present motioned offense. Fifty-one
juveniles (15.5%) in our sample had no prior adjudications. Of
those with no prior adjudications, previous allegations were dis-
missed or not proved against ten (20%) of them. We failed to locate
either prior charges or adjudications for the remaining forty-one
(12%) juveniles. For five of them, we were unable to obtain criminal
history information from the jurisdiction of their previous resi-
dence.1i5 The remaining thirty-six had no prior charges or adjudi-
cations. Another 16% had only misdemeanor convictions in their
adjudication history. By contrast, over two-thirds (69%) of these
youths had at least one felony adjudication, and 27% had three or
more felony adjudications in their past. Although the majority of
these juveniles had a felony conviction in their delinquency his-
174. For example, we classified a juvenile with one felony adjudication and multi-
ple misdemeanor adjudications in the "one felony" group.
175. As noted earlier, the lack of response from the other jurisdiction could mean
either that these youths had no prior records or that the court did not respond. Be-
cause we analyzed the data with and without these five juveniles and found no sig-
nificant differences, we included them in our sample.
1995]
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Table 4
Indicators of Motioned Juvenile's Prior Record
Number Percent
Prior Record - Past Adjudications
None 51 15.5%
Misdemeanor Only 54 16.4%
One Felony 71 21.5%
Two Felonies 65 19.7%
3 or more Felonies 89 27.0%
Prior Presumptive Adjudications
No Presumptive Offenses 282 85%
One or More Presumptive 48 15%
Prior Record - Type of Past Adjudications
None 51 15.5%
Misdemeanor Only 54 16.4%
Other Felony 3 .9%
Drug Felony 13 3.9%
Property Felony 117 35.5%
Person Felony 29 8.8%
Person + Other Felonies 63 19.1%
On Probation Prior to Present Offense
Yes 244 73.9%
No 86 26.1%
On Parole Prior to Present Offense
Yes 117 35.5%
No 213 64.5%






Five or more 63 19.1%
tory,1 7 6 courts previously adjudicated only 15% for presumptive
commitment offenses. 177
176. The juveniles in each of the felony categories may have had prior adjudica-
tions or misdemeanor activity as well, but we grouped them according to their most
serious offense history. Indeed, of those juveniles who are grouped into the property
felony category, meaning they have property felonies in their past delinquent behav-
ior but no person felonies, 27% have person misdemeanor adjudications as well as
their property felony history. A similar proportion (26%) of those juveniles with only
a misdemeanor history have person misdemeanor adjudications as well. For those in
the drug felony category, only two of the eleven offenders were also adjudicated for
person misdemeanors, and in the final category of "Other Felony," two of the three
have person misdemeanor adjudications.
177. Prosecutors charged 31% of these juveniles with presumptive offenses prior
to the present offense that led to the reference motion. However, they were able to
substantiate less than half of those charges (47%) in court with an adjudication.
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Among those with prior records, the courts had adjudicated
9% for felony offenses against the person and an additional 19%
with at least one person felony and some other type of felony as
well. Courts adjudicated more than one-third (35%) of these youths
only for property felonies and another 4% only for drug felonies in
the past. Three juveniles whose felony backgrounds that did not fit
one of the above categories comprise the "Other Felony" category.
Unlike the charges they currently face on their reference motions,
the vast majority of these juveniles' prior felony activity consisted of
property crimes.
Juvenile courts placed about three-quarters (74%) of these
juveniles on probation prior to the prosecutor filing the reference
motion for the present offenses. In addition, 36% of these juveniles
had been on parole prior to the filing of the reference motion.178
Thirty-five percent of the juveniles in this study had previously
been on both probation and parole through Hennepin County.
As a consequence of their extensive prior delinquencies, many
of these youths previously received juvenile court dispositions and
correctional placements. We counted both the number of unique
treatment programs to which courts committed these youths, and
the total number of times courts ordered an out-of-home placement,
regardless of where that placement occurred.17 9 Thirty-three per-
cent received no prior out-of-home placements-15% because they
had no prior delinquency adjudication, and the additional 18% be-
cause they received some other type of non-placement disposition
such as probation or work squad.
As Table 4 indicates, two-thirds (66.7%) of the juveniles re-
ceived at least one prior program placement, and the court placed
42% of the youths outside their home at least three times. Other
research indicates that the previous disposition explains the most
variance in a juvenile's current sentence;SO in this study as well,
prior home removal dispositions related significantly to whether or
not the juvenile court ultimately certifies a juvenile.1S1 The greater
the number of prior out-of-home placements, the greater the likeli-
Therefore, only 15% have been previously adjudicated for presumptive commitment
to prison offenses.
178. A parole status entailed a previous sentence to the Commissioner of Correc-
tions and confinement in one of the state's training schools.
179. The first indicator represents the number of different programs tried by the
juvenile system while the second represents the total number of out-of-home place-
ments. If a child was sent to County Home School-Alpha program twice and Red
Wing once-his unique program indicator would be a value of two, whereas his total
program indicator would be three.
180. Right to Counsel, supra note 134, at 1305-11.
181. This variable also adds a significant unique contribution to multivariate test-
ing for determinants of referral to adult court. When we entered it in conjunction
1995]
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hood that the juvenile court will refer the youth for adult criminal
prosecution. Lack of effectiveness or exhaustion of correctional re-
sources is certainly consistent with a legislative policy to waive
juveniles who are unamenable to treatment.
Presumptive Present Offense: As Table 5 indicates, a relation-
ship exists between a youth's age and the type of offense with which
he or she is charged. Recall that fourteen- or fifteen-year-old of-
fenders constituted only about 10% of the sample. However, prose-
cutors charged more than three-quarters (79%) of these younger
juveniles with presumptive commitment offenses. More than half
(54%) of these younger offenders faced charges of murder, compared
with only 12% of the older youths. In comparison, 53% of the six-
teen- and seventeen-year-olds fell in the presumptive commitment
category. Prosecutors filed reference motions against older youths
for less serious present offenses because their criminal history pro-
vided an additional basis for reference.
Prosecutors charged two-thirds (67%) of the African-American
juveniles and nearly as many (60%) of other minority youths with
presumptive offenses, as contrasted with less than one-third (31%)
of the white juveniles. The juveniles whom prosecutors charged
with presumptive offenses often had less extensive delinquency his-
tories than did those charged with non-presumptive offenses.
Prior to conducting this research, Hennepin County practi-
tioners anecdotally characterized juveniles facing the possibility of
certification as fitting two patterns, either serious or persistent.,8 2
Prosecutors typically filed reference motions either if the present
offense was very serious, even if the delinquency history was lim-
ited, or if the youth was a chronic offender, even if the present of-
fense was not a violent crime but simply the last straw. The data in
the final section of Table 5 confirm the existence of this bimodal
population of serious and persistent offenders. More than two-
thirds (69%) of the juveniles with one felony or less in their delin-
quency history were charged with a presumptive offense. By con-
trast, most (60%) juveniles with two or more prior felony
adjudications were charged with non-presumptive offenses. The
County Attorney's charging policies reflected an operational trade-
off between seriousness and persistence, and anticipated the 1994
statutory changes.
with delinquency history, it acted as a significant proxy far crimioal history. Table
15 provides the multivariate results.
182. Interviews with Diane Ward, Chief, Juvenile Prosecution Division, Hennepin
County Attorney's Office (1993); Interviews with the Honorable Philip Bush, Henne-









14-15 Years (N=34) 79% 21%
16-17 Years (N=296) 53% 47%
Race
White (N=93) 31% 69%
African-American (N=182) 67% 33%
Other Minority (N=55) 60% 40%
Prior Adjudications
One Felony or Less (N=176) 69% 31%
Two Felonies or More (N=154) 40% 60%
Race, Present Offense, and Prior Record: We reported above
that prosecutors charged more minority juveniles than white
youths with presumptive offenses. Table 6 further refines the rela-
tionships between juveniles' race, their present offense, and prior
records. Prosecutors filed reference motions against white juveniles
for property crimes three times as often as against African-Ameri-
can juveniles, and they charged African-American and other minor-
ity youth most often with felonies against the person. The racial
differences in the type of present offenses are statistically signifi-
cant.1 8 3 As will be seen, administration of the waiver process var-
ies with the nature of the present offense. Because of the striking
racial differences in the offenses charged, the waiver process for
white and minority juveniles varied considerably.
The pattern of racial differences which emerged for present of-
fenses existed for prior adjudications as well. Twice as many mi-
nority juveniles as white juveniles had a prior adjudication for a
felony against the person; conversely, twice as many white
juveniles as African-American youths had a prior adjudication for a
property felony. While only 15% of all the juveniles had a prior ad-
judication for a presumptive commitment offense, African-Ameri-
can youths constituted three-quarters of that group. Twenty
percent of all African-American juveniles had a presumptive com-
183. The level of significance for the racial differences in presumptive compared to
non-presumptive offenses was p=.0001 whereas the significance of the number of
person felony charges on the present offense by racial groups was p=,004 . When the
present offense is categorized according to the number of felony charges filed against
the different racial groups without taking into account the type of crimes, there were









Percent with Person Felony 43% 74% 62%
Percent with Property Felony 44% 13% 33%
Percent with Presumptive 31% 67% 60%
Prior Record
Average Number of Felonies 1.97 1.52 2.04
Percent with Person Felony 15% 34% 31%
Percent with Property Felony 50% 27% 40%
Percent with Presumptive 7% 20% 11%
Prior Out-of-Home Placements
Average Number 3.17 2.48 3.37
mitment offense in their delinquency history, compared with 11% of
other minority juveniles and 7% of the white youths.184 Although
the type of prior adjudications differed by race, the average number
of prior felony adjudications did not. Whites averaged 1.97 felonies
prior to the filing of reference motions, African-Americans averaged
1.52, and other minority juveniles averaged 2.04.
The juveniles also differed on the basis of their prior juvenile
court dispositions. African-American juveniles averaged the fewest
prior out-of-home placements (2.48), while other racial minority
juveniles received the most (3.37). These two groups differed signif-
icantly from one another on prior out-of-home placements (p=.04).
White juveniles' average number of prior placements (3.17) fell be-
tween these two extremes and did not differ significantly from
either of the other groups. These mixed findings confound the con-
ventional belief that the juvenile court removed African-American
youths from their homes more frequently than delinquents of other
races. However, they suggest that African-American delinquents
may receive less access to the treatment resources available in the
juvenile justice system than other youths, or that the juvenile court
may certify them without exhausting all the available options.
184. The same pattern of significance held for prior offense as well as present of-
fenses; significant differences in presumptive adjudications by racial groups
(p=.009), significant differences in the percent of past person felony adjudications
(p=.004), and no significant racial differences in the number of total felony adjudica-
tions when type of crime is disregarded.
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3. Judicial Administration of Waiver
Despite the number of waiver studies analyzing decision out-
comes, virtually none examine the processes by which courts reach
those decisions.18 5 We examined the impact of the presiding juve-
nile court judge on reference decisions, the time expended on the
reference process, the role of clinical and psychological evaluations
on decisions, and other procedural issues related to the most impor-
tant sentencing decision of juvenile courts.
a. Judge and Case Processing
In Hennepin County, serving as juvenile court judge is not a
career assignment. Although one judge presided over the juvenile
court for about half of the period covered by our study, several other
judges rotated through juvenile court for shorter tenures of one or
two years.' 8 6 Thus, the judicial and administrative philosophy of
the presiding judge may be an important variable affecting the ref-
erence process.
Table 7 below lists the judges who heard 85% of all the first
reference motions filed and the years of their tenure. It presents
the number and percentage of cases that each judge decided, and
the percentage of cases they referred to adult court or retained in
juvenile court. For example, Judge #1 referred to adult court about
three quarters (75%) of the youths against whom prosecutors fied a
reference motion as compared with Judge #4 who referred only
about half (54%) of the cases he decided.
The apparent variability of judicial outcomes prompts several
observations. First, there is no agreed upon standard rate at which
to refer juveniles to adult criminal court. Research in other juris-
dictions indicates substantial variation in waiver rates.' 8 7 Other
factors besides the particular judge's personal predilections affect
transfer rates. The seriousness and prevalence of youth crime,
County Attorney charging policies that affect the characteristics of
youths, defense attorney plea negotiation strategies, and the avail-
ability of juvenile placement options could all affect judicial waiver
rates. For example, prosecutors filed reference motions alleging
185. Another study that reviews the system process for violent youths was Jeffrey
A. Fagan et al., System Processing of Violent Juvenile Offenders: An Empirical As-
sessment, in VioLENT JUVENILS OFFENDERS: AN ANTHOLOGY (Robert Mathias et al.
eds., 1984).
186. Hennepin County judges now serve a three year rotating schedule in juvenile
court that allows each judge to handle approximately 35 to 50 reference motions.
During his last year in juvenile court (1993), Judge #4 heard another 23 motions, not
included in this study, bringing his total cases to 49.
187. See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 4, at 112 (transfer rates in other cities ranges




Reference Decision by Juvenile Court Judge
Juvenile Court Bench
and Years on
Judge Judge Judge Judge Other
#1 #2 #3 #4 Judges
1986-90 1990-92 1990-92 1991-92 1986-92 Total
All Cases
Number 179 35 38 26 52 330
Percent 54% 11% 12% 8% 16% 100%
Retained
Number 45 11 15 12 32 115
Percent 25% 31% 39% 46% 62% 35%
Referred
Number 134 24 23 14 20 215




Number 83 28 24 20 28 183




Number 63 18 19 11 12 123
Percent 76% 64% 79% 55% 43% 67%
presumptive commitment to prison offenses against only 46% of the
juveniles whose cases Judge #1 decided, compared with 74% of
those Judge #2 decided, 69% that Judge #3 heard, and 77% of those
before Judge #4. Because juveniles charged with presumptive com-
mitment offenses often are younger offenders with less extensive
delinquent histories and fewer previous attempts at treatment, the
decision whether to waive them to criminal court may be more
difficult.
Despite these caveats, however, discrepancies remain in the
referral rates which reflect the philosophy and policies of the pre-
siding judge. For example, if we control for the seriousness of the
offense for which the prosecutor filed the reference motion, Judge
#1 referred 76% of those youths charged with presumptive commit-
ment to prison offenses, while Judge #2 referred 64% of the youths
charged with presumptive offenses, Judge #3 referred 79%, and
Judge #4 waived 55%. Recall, however, that juveniles in the latter
years had less extensive prior records of adjudication.1 8 8 Finally, a
188. In addition, these three judges (#2, #3, and #4) decided a relatively smaller
number of cases compared with Judge #1. Thus, their reference rates could change
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reference decision is only part of the overall sentencing process. In
many cases, after the juvenile court judge refers a youth for adult
criminal prosecution, he or she will simply "switch hats" and pre-
side as criminal court judge over the adult component of the same
case. While the juvenile or the defense attorney may request a dif-
ferent judge, as will be seen, often the waiver decision is part of a
plea-bargained "package deal." Thus, judicial reference decisions
cannot be viewed in isolation from the subsequent sentences a
youth receives as a juvenile or adult. 189
b. Length of Time of Reference Process
Because certification proceedings tend to be the lengthiest and
most labor-intensive decision in the juvenile system, we analyzed
the amount of time required to decide these cases and some of the
factors that contributed to the prolongation of the process. We di-
vided the process into three separate stages: (1) from the time the
county attorney filed a reference motion until the juvenile court
made the final reference decision; (2) from the time the court made
the reference decision until the youth was adjudicated as a delin-
quent or convicted as an adult; and (3) from the time the youth was
adjudicated or convicted until a court imposed a juvenile disposition
or adult sentence. Finally, we calculated the total length of time for
the entire process from the initial filing of the motion to ultimate
sentence or disposition.
Table 8 displays the three decision points involved in the ref-
erence process by year. On average, it took the court about two
months to make a reference decision. It took an additional seven-
teen days to conduct a hearing or trial to determine guilt or inno-
cence, although this average length of time increased during the
period of our study, from thirteen or fourteen days in the late 1980s
to twenty-seven days in 1992. Once the court decided a youth's
guilt or innocence, it required an additional seven days to sentence
or dispose of the case, although again the average length of time
increased from three days in 1986 to fourteen days in 1992.
The differences in average time periods for the three separate
decision segments did not differ significantly across years. How-
drastically if they each decided a few additional reference cases all in the same
direction.
189. For example, although Judge #1 certified a larger proportion (75%) of
juveniles and more chronic property offenders, when he sentenced these youths as
adults, he committed 78% to a county jail (where the sentence is one year or less)
and sentenced only 16% to prison. By contrast, Judges #3 and #4 initially referred a
lower proportion of youths to criminal court (61% and 54% respectively), but sen-
tenced a much larger proportioa of those that they did certify to prison (50% and 64%
respectively), rather than to shorter term jail sentences (38% and 29%).
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ever, the overall length of the process from the filing of the refer-
ence motion to the final sentencing or disposition decision did
change in a statistically significant way over the period of the study
(p=.O1). While the overall average length of time for the reference
process is eighty days or slightly more than two and one-half
months, the average length of time increased from 62 days (about
two months) in 1986 to 106 days (almost three and one-half
months) in 1992.
c. Litigated Reference Hearings
Although appellate opinions such as Kent and Breed may cre-
ate an impression that juvenile court judges decide most waiver
cases in an adversary hearing, it appears in Hennepin County that
contested proceedings seldom occur; the juvenile court decided most
reference motions without holding a full hearing. In the seven-year
period of our study, the juvenile courts conducted only twenty-seven
full reference hearings, or only about 8% of the motions filed.
Whether or not the court held a reference hearing did not signifi-
cantly affect its reference decisions. Courts waived to adult court
63% of those juveniles for whom they conducted full reference hear-
ings, compared with 65% of those juveniles whose fate they decided
without conducting full reference hearings.
The characteristics of juveniles whose cases were decided in
contested reference hearings differed from the overall population of
youths against whom prosecutors filed reference motions. The con-
tested cases typically involved younger offenders, charged with very
serious crimes, and who had very little prior exposure to juvenile
treatment resources. Recall from Table 3 that prosecutors filed ref-
erence motions against only about 10% of juveniles aged fourteen or
fifteen. However, more than twice that proportion (22%) of younger
juveniles had contested reference hearings. Prosecutors charged
with presumptive offenses virtually all (96%) of the juveniles who
requested contested hearings and charged more than two-thirds
(70%) of them with homicide. These juveniles also faced more crim-
inal charges. For example, prosecutors charged more than half
(59%) of these youths with three or more felony offenses as com-
pared with only 40% of youths who waived their right to a reference
hearing. Because most of these juveniles had less extensive prior
records, they also experienced less juvenile court treatment inter-
vention. Slightly more than one-quarter (26%) had been adjudi-
cated for two or more felonies compared with about half (49%) of
those youths who relinquished their right to a waiver hearing. As a
result, juvenile courts had not previously removed most (56%) of









Age at Present Offense
14 Years Old 7% 3%
15 Years Old 15% 7%
16 Years Old 41% 29%
17 Years Old 37% 62%
Prior Out-Of-Home Placements
None 56% 32%
One to Three Placements 26% 35%
Four or More Placements 18% 33%
Prior Adjudications
One Felony or Less 74% 51%
Two Felonies or More 26% 49%
Present Offense - Number of
Charges
Two or Fewer Felony Charges 41% 60%
Three or More Felony Charges 59% 40%
Severity of Present Offense
Presumptive Offenses 96%* 52%
Non-Presumptive Offenses 4% 48%
Reference Decision
Referred to Adult Court 63% 65%
Retained in Juvenile Court 37% 35%
* Eighteen of these cases were for homicide and another one for vehicular homicide.
had committed only 7% to the Department of Corrections. The
juveniles who received contested hearings confronted juvenile court
judges with the most difficult of the "hard" cases, as did the youths
in the Dahl and Brom cases. 190
The prosecutor, defense counsel, and the juvenile court judge
negotiated informally the outcomes of more than 90% of all refer-
ence motions filed. In these negotiations, the judges often indicated
both their likely resolution of the reference motion and the juvenile
or adult sentence that would ensue. Although differences in judi-
cial philosophies affect the rates of waiver, the types of cases
waived, and the lengths of sentences imposed, except for the "hard"
cases, whether a youth was tried as a juvenile or an adult was nego-
tiated rather than litigated. Because f the plea-bargained nature
190. See Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 13, at 46-47; Violent Youth and
Public Policy, supra note 35, at 1015.
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of most reference motions, formal challenges to waiver decisions
seldom occurred. Juveniles appealed only nine reference decisions
made during the entire seven-year period of this study.19 1
d. Clinical Assessments in Reference Decisions
Two different divisions within the Hennepin County Depart-
ment of Community Corrections-Juvenile Probation and Psycho-
logical Services-provide the juvenile court with clinical insights
about juveniles facing reference motions. At the request of the ju-
venile court, either or both of these divisions may complete evalua-
tions of the personal or psychological characteristics of the offender,
family background, education, and delinquency background.
Table 10
Additional Court Services Completed By Year Motioned
for Adult Reference
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 TOTAL
Probation Studies
Done
Number 21 18 25 16 23 20 18 141
Percent 40% 44% 41% 35% 43% 50% 51% 43%
Not Done
Number 32 23 36 30 31 20 17 189




Number 23 18 25 17 25 25 20 153
Percent 43% 44% 41% 37% 46% 63% 57% 46%
Not Done
Number 30 23 36 29 29 15 15 177
Percent 57% 56% 59% 63% 54% 37% 43% 54%
Probation Department: The juvenile court may request the
Juvenile Probation department to provide a detailed social report,
called a reference study, about a youth against whom the prosecu-
tor files a reference motion. Courts do not request reference studies
automatically, and did so in only 43% of the cases of youths facing
possible prosecution in criminal court. As Table 10 indicates, the
number of reference study requests increased to about 50% in the
final two years of our study, the period during which the length of
191. Two of the cases were withdrawn prior to hearing before the appellate court.
The remaining seven cases heard by the appellate court were not reversed.
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time to complete the -reference process also increased. As Table 11
indicates, whether or not the court requested a reference study did
not significantly affect the outcomes of cases. The court retained
jurisdiction over 34% of those youths for whom it requested refer-
ence studies, and over 37% of those juveniles for whom it did not
request a study.
Table 11
Additional Court Services by the Reference Decision
Psychological
Probation Study Evaluation
Done Not Done Done Not Done
N=141 N=189 N=153 N=177
Retained in Juvenile
Court 34% 37% 37% 33%
Referred to Adult Court 67% 64% 63% 67%
When probation officers conducted reference studies, they col-
lected and summarized the available social, behavioral, and clinical
information about the subject, and recommended to the court
Table 12
Referral Rates by Court Services Recommendation
Probation Psychologist
Recommends* Recommends**
Juvenile Adult Juvenile Adult
N=47 N=89 N=54 N=65
Retained in Juvenile
Court 87% 6% 80% 6%
Referred to Adult Court 13% 94% 20% 94%
* There were 5 probation studies where a recommendation could not be
determined.
** There were 34 psychological evaluations where a recommendation could not be
determined.
whether the youth should be tried as a juvenile or adult. As ap-
pears in Table 12, the probation officer's recommendation exerted a
statistically significant influence on juvenile court judges' decisions
(p=.0001). The court retained jurisdiction in 87% of the cases in
which the probation officer recommended that the juvenile be re-
tained, and waived jurisdiction in 94% of the cases in which the
probation officer recommended the court refer the juvenile to adult
court. These consistencies may reflect either heavy judicial reliance
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on the probation staff's recommendations, or the probation staff's
familiarity with and anticipation of judicial expectations and
practices. 192
Psychological Evaluations: As Table 10 indicates, the juvenile
court ordered a few more youths to undergo psychological evalua-
tions than reference studies (153 versus 141), although the two
groups of juveniles overlapped substantially. Overall, the courts re-
quested psychological evaluations of 46% of the juveniles against
whom prosecutors filed reference motions, and the percentage of
cases increased in the latter years of our study (63% in 1991 and
57% in 1992). As was the case for reference studies, Table 11 sug-
gests that a request for a psychological evaluation was not a statis-
tically significant factor affecting the reference decision. Juvenile
courts retained jurisdiction over 37% of the youths whom a court
psychologist examined and 33% of those who did not see a clinician.
Unlike probation officers, psychological services staff members
reported uncertainty as to whether the court expected them to
make a definitive recommendation whether to refer a youth to
criminal court or retain him in juvenile court. In thirty-four of the
153 psychological examinations (22%), the data coders could not as-
certain any specific reference recommendation. Of the remaining
cases in which psychologists made clear-cut recommendations, the
court retained jurisdiction in 80% of the cases in which psycholo-
gists recommended a youth's retention in juvenile court, and certi-
fied juveniles in 94% of the cases in which the psychologist
recommended a youth's transfer to criminal court.
When probation officers recommended in their reference study
that the court transfer a youth to criminal court, psychological serv-
ices staff concurred 63% of the time. When probation staff recom-
mended that the juvenile court retain jurisdiction over a youth,
the psychologists agreed 77% of the time. The instances of non-
concurrence almost all occurred when probation staff made either
recommendation and the psychologists declined to make any
recommendation.
e. Court Processing and Race
African-American juveniles constituted the largest group of
youths for whom the juvenile court requested reference studies and
psychological evaluations. Probation officers completed signifi-
192. See, e.g., Robert M. Emerson, Role Determinants in Juvenile Court, in HAND-
BOOK OF CR MnNOLOGY 612, 644-47 (Daniel Glaser ed., 1974) (documenting a clinical
anticipation of the court's likely disposition and organizational pressures to "conform
to prevailing court standards of what is reasonable and to eschew risk-taking..
MATZA, supra note 24.
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cantly more reference studies in the cases of African-American
(52%) juveniles than they did for cases involving white (31%), or
other minority (33%) youths (p=.001). Similarly, juvenile courts
also requested significantly more psychological evaluations to assist
them with the cases of African-American (55%) juveniles, than they
did in the cases for white (34%), or other minority (38%) juveniles
(p=.002). These results contradict another common belief that juve-
nile courts refer minority youths hastily and without extending sys-
tem resources, and white youths more carefully and therefore over
a longer period of time. Rather, the court expended extra evalua-
tive resources on minority youths compared to white youths be-
cause of the greater seriousness of their present offenses.
Table 13
Additional Court Services by Racial Background
African- Other
Whites American Minority Total
N=93 N=182 N=55 N=330
Probation Studies
Done 31% 52% 33% 141
Not Done 69% 48% 67% 189
Psychological
Evaluations
Done 34% 55% 38% 153
Not Done 66% 45% 62% 177
Courts requested reference studies and psychological evalua-
tions more often when prosecutors charged a youth with a crime of
violence, regardless of race. However, because prosecutors filed far
more reference motions against African-American and other minor-
ity juveniles for crimes against the person than they did against
white juveniles, court staff prepared more reference studies and
psychological evaluations for minority youths than they did for
white juveniles. When we controlled for whether or not the refer-
ence motion alleged a felony against the person, the differences be-
tween the races disappeared. Clinicians examined white youths
with the same frequency as minority youths if prosecutors charged
them with a crime against the person.
Probation officers often require additional time to complete
reference studies, and the juvenile court generally grants an addi-
tional thirty to sixty days to complete a requested study. Earlier, in
Table 8, we examined the length of time the court required to make
several decisions in the reference process-reference decision, adju-




Average Length of Reference Process in Days + by Racial
Background (Number of Juveniles)
African- Other
Whites Americans Minorities Total
From Reference Motion to 44 danys 68 days 65 days 1K) days
Reference Decision* (88) (170) (52) (310)
From Decision to 15 days 19 days 13 days 17 days
Adjudication/Conviction (88) (170) (52) (310)
From Adjudication/ 5 days 8 days 6 days 7 days
Conviction to Disposition/ (85) (156) (48) (289)
Sentence
Overall Average Length of 65 days 90 days 78 days 80 days
Reference Process** (85) (156) (48) (289)
+ We removed some cases from this analysis so that a picture of the "true average"
could be drawn. For example, nine cases involved an appealed reference decision
that would have greatly exaggerated the average length of time for the remaining
cases. In addition, cases that were three standard deviations away from the mean
were considered statistical outhers. Sixeen cases were identified using this raethod
and were also removed from the averages given in this table. Finally, sixteen cases
were dismissed at the adjudication or conviction decision point and were excluded
from the final two rows of this table.
* p<.001 The statistical difference in the length of time between the filing of the
reference motion and the reference decision is between whites when compared with
African Americans and when compared with other minorities. The difference
between African Americans and other minorities is not statistically significant.
** p=.01 The statistical difference is between whites compared with African
Americans. The other two comparisons (whites with other minorities and African
Americans compared with other minorities) are not significant.
length of time it took the court to decide the cases of youths of dif-
ferent racial backgrounds. The court took significantly longer to de-
cide whether to refer cases involving African-American and other
minority youths than it did to refer the cases of white juveniles
(p=.001). The court decided whether to certify or retain white
youths in about forty-four days, as contrasted with sixty-eight days
for African-American youths, and sixty-five days for other minority
juveniles. Similarly, the overall length of the reference process dif-
fered for youths of different races. The only statistically significant
difference in processing time, however, is between African-Ameri-
can juveniles (ninety days or three months) and white youths
(sixty-five days or slightly over two months).193 Other minority
youths fall between these two groups (seventy-eight days or two
and one-half months) ard do not differ significantly either from




The difference in the length of time for each racial group oc-
curs mainly during the first segment of the reference process, from
the time the County Attorney files its reference motion to the time
the juvenile court makes its reference decision. This is also the pe-
riod during which the court obtains proportionally larger numbers
of probation studies and clinical evaluations for African-Americans
than for the other two racial groups.
In general, the Department of Community Corrections ex-
pended more evaluative resources on those youths charged with a
felony against the person, regardless of race. The additional serv-
ices requested by the court for youths charged with a serious crime
against the person, most of whom were African-Americans, also ac-
counted for the significantly greater length of time the court needed
to make its reference decisions in cases involving African-American
youths as opposed to those of white or other minority youths.
f Court Processing and Case Outcomes
Overall, the juvenile courts certified about two-thirds (65%) of
the youths against whom prosecutors filed reference motions. Ta-
ble 15 reports the relationships between many of the variables pre-
viously analyzed and the reference outcomes. For example, a
juvenile's age at the time the prosecutor filed a reference motion
significantly affected the court's decision whether to waive jurisdic-
tion (p=.001) and refer the case to adult court. Indeed, the likeli-
hood of certification increased for older juveniles even though
younger juveniles often faced more serious charges. Courts re-
ferred 24% of the fourteen- or fifteen-year-old juveniles, as com-
pared with 70% of those aged sixteen or seventeen. When we
refined age further, its relationship to the reference decision be-
came even clearer. Courts referred to adult court only 10% of the
fourteen-year-old juveniles, as compared with 29% of the fifteen-
year-olds, 61% of the sixteen-year-old youths and 74% of the seven-
teen-year-old juveniles.
Courts certified as adults 62% of the juveniles charged with
non-presumptive offenses compared to 67% of the juveniles charged
with presumptive offenses, a statistically insignificant difference in
waiver rates. We analyzed the relative importance of seriousness
and persistence further because we were somewhat surprised to
discover that the gravity of the present offense alone was not a sig-
nificant determinant of certification decisions. Unlike the serious-
ness of the offense alone, the number of present offenses alleged did
affect judicial waiver decisions. As the number of charges in-
creased, so too did the likelihood of adult reference. For example,
the courts certified to criminal court 56% of those juveniles charged
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only with misdemeanor offenses, 58% of those charged with only
one felony, 60% of those with two felony charges, 73% of those with
three felony charges and 75% of those with four or more felony
charges. 194
Finally, we examined the relationship between the court's cer-
tification decision and the specific types of offenses alleged. Recall
from Table 3 that prosecutors charged most of the youths against
whom they filed reference motions with a felony against the person,
either alone (42.4%), or in conjunction with some other felony of-
fenses (20.9%), or for property felonies (24.8%). Courts referred
seventy percent of the juveniles charged only with a felony against
the person, and two-thirds of juveniles charged with felony property
offenses (66%), or with a combination of crimes against the person
and other types of felony offenses (67%). By contrast, the courts
referred only 40% of youths charged with drug felonies, and only
one-third of those charged with some other type of felony. Interest-
ingly, the court also certified five of the nine offenders (56%)
charged with misdemeanor level offenses.
Recall in Table 4 that relatively few youths (15%) had prior
convictions for presumptive commitment offenses before the filing
of the reference motion; this "qualitative" aspect of the prior record
did not significantly affect the courts' decision whether or not to cer-
tify a youth. As demonstrated in Table 15, courts waived jurisdic-
tion in 65% of cases of youths with no prior history of presumptive
offenses, as compared with 69% of those with a presumptive
background.
While the "quality" of a juvenile's prior record did not affect
the court's certification decisions in a statistically significant man-
ner, the "quantity" did. A significant relationship appears between
the number of past felony adjudications and the courtes decision to
certify a juvenile. The court transferred to adult court only about
half of the youths with no prior adjudication history (51%) or only a
misdemeanor conviction in their background (54%). Once a juve-
nile acquired a prior felony record, however, the court's rate of certi-
fication increased sharply. The court waived about two-thirds
(66%) of those having at least one felony adjudication, and this rate
increased to nearly three-quarters (74%) of those with multiple fel-
ony adjudications (three or more prior felonies). This relationship
between prior adjudications and certification was only significant (p
< .001) for juveniles sixteen or seventeen years of age. For juveniles
only fourteen or fifteen years of age, prior adjudications were not
significant. These results reflect the importance of age as an in-




Variables Influencing Outcome of Reference Decision
Referred Retained
Age at Present Offense*
14-15 Years (N=34) 24% 76%
16-17 Years (N=296) 70% 30%
Racial Background
White (N=93) 71% 29%
African-American (N=182) 63% 37%
Other Minority (N=55) 64% 36%
Present Offense Severity
Presumptive (N=183) 67% 33%
Non-Presumptive (N=147) 62% 37%
Number of Present Offense Charges*
Misdemeanor (N=9) 56% 44%
One Felony (N=103) 58% 42%
Two Felonies (N=80) 60% 40%
Three Felonies (N=51) 73% 27%
Four or More Felonies (N=87) 75% 25%
Type of Present Offense Charges
Misdemeanor (N=9) 56% 44%
Other Felonies (N=3) 33% 67%
Drug Felonies (N=27) 41% 59%
Property Felonies (N=82) 66% 34%
Person Felonies Only (N=140) 70% 30%
Person and Other Felonies (N=69) 67% 33%
Prior Offense Severity
Presumptive Adjudication (N=48) 69% 31%
No Presumptive Adjudications (N=282) 65% 35%
Number of Prior Adjudications*
No Priors (N=51) 51% 49%
Misdemeanors Only (N=54) 54% 46%
One Felony (N=71) 66% 34%
Two Felonies (N=65) 72% 28%
Three or More Felonies (N=89) 74% 26%
Type of Prior Adjudications
No Priors (N=51) 51% 49%
Misdemeanors Only (N=54) 54% 46%
Other Felonies (N=3) 100% -
Drug Felonies (N=13) 62% 38%
Property Felonies (N=117) 74% 26%
Person Felonies Only (N=29) 59% 41%
Person and Other Felonies (N=63) 71% 29%
Prior Parole*
Yes (N=117) 81% 19%
No (N=213) 56% 44%
Prior Probation
Yes (N=244) 68% 32%
No (N=86) 58% 42%
Combined Present Offense Severity
and Extent of Prior Adjudications*
Presumptive-Little History (N=122) 63% 37%
Presumptive-Large History (N=61) 75% 25%
Non-Presumptive-Little History (N=54) 46% 54%
Non-Presumptive-Large History (N=93) 72% 28%
* Significant relationship, p < .01
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dependent determinant of the reference decision. For those few
younger offenders (fourteen or fifteen years old) who accumulated a
higher felony history (two or more), their youthful status appar-
ently mitigated their delinquency history.
The courts certified to adult court significantly more juveniles
(81%) who had been committed previously to the Commissioner of
Corrections than it did those youths (56%) who had not been com-
mitted to the state training schools. This relationship remained
statistically significant even when we controlled for the prior delin-
quency history as well. Because the training schools represent the
"final step" in juvenile corrections, exhaustion of those resources
leaves the juvenile courts with few "treatment" options. By con-
trast, the relationship between a youth's prior probation status and
certification is not significant. Courts certified 68% of youths on
probation compared with 58% of those who had never been on
probation.
Present Offense, Prior Record, and Reference Decision: We did
not observe a statistically significant relationship between the pros-
ecutor's decision to charge a youth with a presumptive or non-pre-
sumptive offense and the court's decision of whether to certify the
youth. Similarly, courts certified youths charged with more serious
offenses against the person (70%) at about the same rate as they did
those charged with property crimes (66%). Although this lack of
significance of the present offense was surprising, a more straight-
forward pattern emerged when analyzed in conjunction with the
prior record. We categorized juveniles on the basis of their present
offense-presumptive and non-presumptive charges-and their
prior records, which we dichotomized-a large delinquency history
with two or more prior felonies, or a small history of one felony,
misdemeanor only, or no priors-and examined the relationship be-
tween these four combinations of cases and the certification
decisions.
The last four rows of Table 15 report the percentages of youths
whom courts referred based on combinations of the present offense
and prior history. Juvenile courts referred to adult court 75% of the
juveniles charged with a presumptive offense who had an extensive
prior record of adjudications, as compared with 63% of those serious
offenders with a less extensive adjudication history. Similarly, the
court certified 72% of those juveniles whom prosecutors charged
with a non-presumptive offense and who had a lengthy prior delin-
quency history, compared with only 46% of those with a small his-
tory of adjudications. The prior record, rather than just the
seriousness of the present offense, appears to most strongly influ-
ence the waiver decision,
1995]
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Juveniles charged with a presumptive offense but with a small
adjudication history constitute more than one-third (37%) of all the
youths in our sample. Youths charged with a non-presumptive
present offense but with extensive prior delinquency records com-
prised nearly the same proportion (28%) of our sample. The two
extreme categories, youths charged with presumptive offenses with
extensive criminal records accounted for about one-fifth (18%) of
the referred juveniles, and the remainder (16%) consisted of
juveniles charged with less serious non-presumptive offenses and
meager prior records. Interestingly, the number of "presumptive of-
fense and small history" cases pulled down the certification rate of
the presumptive offense group, while the number of "non-presump-
tive offense and large history" cases raised the reference rate for the
non-presumptive category as a whole. These patterns confirm court
practitioners' descriptions of bimodal populations of certified youths
as both serious and chronic.
Clearly, an extensive adjudication history affected reference
decisions more than the seriousness of the present offense. As a
youth acquired a lengthier delinquency history, prosecutors re-
quired a less serious present offense to file a motion for adult refer-
ence. Conversely, if the present offense was a very serious one,
then prosecutors filed reference motions even if the juvenile pos-
sessed a relatively minor prior delinquency record. The "trade-off"
between seriousness and persistence produced some interesting ra-
cial patterns in reference decisions. Recall from Table 1 that most
property offenders were white juveniles and most violent offenders
were minority juveniles. Because the juvenile court appeared to
emphasize cumulative persistence rather than just present serious-
ness, and racial groups did not differ in the lengths of their prior
records (Table 6), the court certified 71% of white juveniles against
whom prosecutors fied a motion for referral to adult court, as com-
pared with 63% of African-American, and 64% of other minority
juveniles. The racial difference in referral rates was not statisti-
cally significant.
4. Multivariate Analysis
Multivariate analyses assess the relative impact of each in-
dependent variable (for example, the seriousness of the present of-
fenses, level of prior delinquency history, age, prior out-of-home
placements, and the like) on the dependent variable (certification)
while holding all other independent variables constant. In addi-
tion, multivariate regression techniques allowed us to estimate and
evaluate the relative strength and significance of the independent
contributions of a number of factors to the dependent variable's ex-
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planation or prediction. Because the outcome of the reference deci-
sion was a dichotomous variable, either to retain a youth in juvenile
court or to refer him to criminal court, we used a logistic regression
technique to model the determinants of the decision.195 Table 16
summarizes the significant independent variables included in the
logistic regression analyses of the reference decision.
Table 16






PO & Psychologist - Adult (N=87) 97% 3%
PO & Psychologist - Juvenile (N=54) 11% 89%
PO & Psychologist disagree (N=11) 64% 36%
No Recommendations (N=17B)* 66% a4%
Reference Decision Judge
Judge #1 (N=179) 75% 25%
Other Judge (N=151)* 54% 46%
Age at Present Offense
14 Years Old (N=10) 10% 90%
15 Years Old (N=24) 29% 71%
16 Years Old (N=98) 61% 39%
17 Years Old (N=198)* 74% 26%
Prior Delinquency Placements
None (N=111) 54% 46%
One to Three Placements (N=113) 62% 38%
Four or More (N=106)* 80% 20%
Present Offense Charges
Two Felony Charges or Less (N=192)* 59% 41%
Three Felony Charges or More (N=138) 74% 26%
Present Offense Characteristics
Person Felony - Weapon (N=155) 72% 28%
Person Felony - No Weapon (N=54) 61% 39%
Non-Person Felony (N=121)* 59% 41%
* Reference category
In constructing our model, we exercised care to maintain con-
sistency in the excluded categories of our independent variables.
195. In the case of dichotomous variables, linear or ordinary least squares regres-
sion can lead to incorrect analyses of the effects of the independent variables upon
the dependent variable. See JoHN ALDRICH & FoRURsT NELSON, LINEAR
PROBABILITY, LOGIT, AND PROBIT MODELS 9-10 (1984).
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For example, within the age variable we chose seventeen-year-old
youths as the excluded category. Because older juveniles were
more likely to have had four or more prior out-of-home placements,
the higher number of prior placements became the excluded cate-
gory on that variable. In general, youths with these two character-
istics were more often property offenders and property offenders
generally had fewer charges pending on the current offense alleged
in the reference motion. Therefore, the excluded category on the
number of current offense charges was two or fewer charges, and
the excluded category for the type of current offense was non-person
offense. Finally, because older property offenders with significant
delinquency histories were less likely to be evaluated by either
court services department, the excluded category for court service
recommendations was no recommendation. Because the coefficient
for each variable represents a contrast with the omitted category,
this consistency allowed for a clearer interpretation of the relation-
ships in our model.
The interpretation of logistic regression can be described
within the framework of the odds of an event occurring. This is dif-
ferent from the informal usage of the term "odds" which generally is
used to indicate probability. For our purposes "odds" is used to in-
dicate the ratio of the probability of an event occurring (a juvenile
being referred to adult court) compared with the probability of the
event not occurring. Under this interpretation, the logistic coeffi-
cients can be seen as the change in log odds with one unit change in
an independent variable. A positive logistic coefficient indicates
greater odds while negative coefficients indicate reduced odds. For
categorical variables, the coefficients must be interpreted in rela-
tion to the excluded category. Using categorical variables in logistic
regression not only allowed us to determine whether the variable as
a whole was significant but also if and how each of the included
categories differs from the excluded category.
a. Significant Variables
Court Services Recommendations: The recommendation that
court services personnel gave to the court constituted one of the
most powerful variables in our model. As noted earlier, the proba-
tion department and psychological services completed evaluations
of about half of the juveniles with reference motions filed against
them. 196 These professionals provided the court with a portrait of
196. Recall from Table 11 that whether or not the court requested a reference
study or a psychological evaluation did not significantly affect the court's decision to
refer a youth to adult court. Courts were neither more nor less likely to certify
youths because they received additional clinical evaluation services. Thus, a judicial
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Table 17
Logit Regression Analysis of Reference Decision By Court
Process, Offender and Offense Characteristics
Independent Variable Beta S.E.
Court Services Recommendations'
P.O. & Psychologist Agree Adult 4.7 1.3**
P.O. & Psychologist Agree Juvenile -2.7 .6****
P.O. & Psychologist Disagree .8 1.0
Dummy Code of Judge # 1 b 1.4 .3****
Age at Present Offensec
14 Years Old -4.1 1.6*
15 Years Old -4.7 1.3**
16 Years Old -. 8 4*
Number of Prior Program Placementsd
No Prior Delinquency Placements -1.1 .4**
One to Three Prior Placements -1.0 .5*
Dummy Code for Present Offense Charges' .9 A*
(Three or more charges)
Present Offense Characteristics
Person Felony - Weapon Involved 1.0 .4**




Base Rate - Percent Referred 65%
Selection Ratio - Percent the Model
Predicts to be Referred 70%
Percent Random Accuracy 56%
Percent Observed Accuracy
(Correctty claasifed 95
Improvement Over Chance 29%
Percent False Positive 7%
Percent True Positive 93%
Percent False Negative 28%
Percent True Negative 72%
Percentage of Total Variation
(log-likelihood) Explained 40%
Reference category is No Recommendation
b Reference category is Judge other than #1
'Reference category is Juveniles 17 Years Old
d Reference category is 4 or More Prior Placements
' Reference category is Two or Fewer Felony Charges
f Reference category is Non-Person Offense
* Significant at .05
** Significant at .01
*** Significant at .001
**** Significant at .0001
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each youth-his or her social background, the alleged crime and
delinquency history, clinical assessments, and possible treatment
available within the juvenile system-and recommended whether
the court should refer or retain the youth. 197
Although probation and psychological services personnel con-
ducted their assessments separately, members of each department
often shared information. For example, if a probation officer re-
viewed possible treatment programs for the offender and did not
find any options available, he or she could communicate that infor-
mation to the psychologist. We could not determine how often or to
what extent probation and psychological personnel shared informa-
tion, nor how much the shared information influenced.their respec-
tive recommendations. Because they did not conduct their
evaluations in a completely independent manner, we combined
their appraisals in our model to capture agreement or disagreement
between court services personnel. We constructed the categories as
follows: (1) both the probation officer and the psychologist agreed
that the juvenile should be referred to adult court; (2) both agreed
the youth should remain in juvenile court; (3) the probation officer
and the psychologist disagreed on the reference recommenda-
tion;198 and finally, (4) neither conducted an assessment. The third
category in this variable, disagreement between the probation and
clinical evaluators, contained a very small number of juveniles
(eleven). The high level of congruence reinforced our conclusion
that the probation and psychological staff did not conduct their
evaluations entirely independently. Keeping this disagreement cat-
egory separate from the other categories allowed for a more exact
interpretation of each.
When the probation officer and psychologist agreed on an out-
come recommendation, either to retain juvenile court jurisdiction or
to refer the youth to adult court, there was a statistically significant
probability that the court would follow that advice. In particular, if
both the probation officer and the court psychologist recommended
that a juvenile be tried as an adult, the highly significant logistic
request for a clinical evaluation did not constitute a de facto waiver decision. Courts
requested clinical evaluations more often for younger juveniles charged with violent
offenses who had less extensive prior records.
197. For a comprehensive description of the types of clinical information available
to Minnesota juvenile court judges in reference hearings, see Bad Law Makes Hard
Cases, supra note 13, at 54-69.
198. A few cases exist where one assessor gave a recommendation and the other
did not provide a recommendation even though they completed an evaluation (5 of
the probation studies and 34 of the psychological evaluations had this result). In
these cases, we assigned the recommendation we had to an agreement category ac-
cording to the recommendation that was provided.
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coefficient (4.7, p<.001) indicates that transfer of the juvenile was a
near certainty. When both court personnel recommended that the
juvenile court retain jurisdiction over the youth, the odds of trans-
fer to adult criminal court decreased significantly (p < .0001). The
negative sign accompanying the logistic coefficient (-2.7) indicates
reduced odds that the court would certify this group of youths as
compared with the no recommendation group.
When court services personnel agreed either to refer or retain
a juvenile, their concurrence produced dramatically different odds
when compared to cases in which they made no recommendations.
Where court officials disagreed about a youth's disposition, they did
not significantly affect the likelihood of certification. The outcomes
in the disagreement category did not differ significantly from those
cases in which court services personnel did not evaluate a juvenile
or make any recommendation. 19 9
Juvenile Court Judge: The juvenile court judge who decided
the case constituted another important process variable that pro-
duced significant results.20 0 During the course of our study, Judge
#1 decided about half (54%) of the reference cases, and certified
youths at a higher rate than did the other judges. Because none of
the other judges heard enough cases to constitute a separate varia-
ble category, we created a dummy code for Judge #1. Holding other
variables constant, juveniles appearing before Judge #I had signifi-
cantly increased odds of being referred when compared with youths
appearing before the other judges (1.4, p<.0001). This finding is
consistent with our contention that judicial waiver practices reflect
an individualized, discretionary juvenile court sentencing "point of
view." If an adult criminal court "point of view" prevailed, then
standardized decisional rules or presumptive sentencing guidelines
would produce greater consistency and reduce the influence of the
presiding judge as a dispositional variable. Instead, it matters who
the judge is; after we controlled for all other variables, the outcomes
of certification motions depended significantly upon which judge de-
cided the case.
199. Categories with a small number of cases do not automatically produce insig-
nificant effects. For example, in our data, the variable of age at present offense in-
cluded only ten 14-year-old juveniles, and yet produced a significant negative effect
on certification when compared to 17-year-old youths. Thus, a small number of cases
can produce significant effects if the strength of the relationship is meaningful.
200. Waiver decisions reflect the judicial philosophy of the presiding juvenile
court judge. Since we did not collect direct information about their varying policies
to transfer juveniles to adult court, their decisions themselves provide the best indi-
cator of differences in orientation. See Table 7 supra and accompanying text for
further analyses of judicial differences in sentencing referred youths. It would be
interesting to determine whether a judge's explanation of his or her waiver philoso-
phy would enable us to predict certification practices or outcomes in specific cases.
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Age at Present Offense: A youth's age at the time the prosecu-
tor filed the reference motion constituted a powerful variable influ-
encing the juvenile court's reference decisions. The older the youth,
the greater the likelihood that the court would refer the case to
criminal court. However, several possible explanations exist for the
salience of age as a determinant of waiver. First, a youth's age may
act as a proxy for prior delinquency. Older juveniles have a longer
opportunity to acquire a more extensive prior record. Second, a
youth's age determines the length of time remaining for treatment
in the juvenile system. The longer the length of time remaining
within juvenile jurisdiction, the more likely the court will find the
youth amenable to treatment. Finally, the court may use age as a
surrogate for culpability, view younger offenders as less blamewor-
thy or responsible even for serious crimes, and decline to certify
them as readily.
The excluded category for this variable is seventeen-year-old
juveniles. Each of the other three age groups (youths fourteen, fif-
teen, and sixteen years of age) had significantly lower likelihoods of
being transferred to adult court than the seventeen-year-olds. The
negative coefficients are particularly large for juveniles fourteen
and fifteen years of age (-4.1 and -4.7, respectively) indicating a
lower likelihood of certification for these two groups when compared
to seventeen-year-old youths. This is particularly salient for the
fourteen-year-old juveniles because that category included only ten
youths. The negative coefficient was also statistically significant for
the sixteen-year-olds (-.79) compared to the excluded category but
not nearly as strongly as the two younger age groups. 2 0 1
Prior Program Placements: We had full use of all prior delin-
quency history and analyzed a number of different alternative
measures. Prior analyses of juvenile court sentencing practices in
Minnesota indicated that the previous dispositions imposed on
juveniles explained the greatest variance in their subsequent
sentences as well. 20 2 Because a youth's amenability to treatment is
a crucial issue in the waiver decision, the extent of previous disposi-
201. For 14-year-olds, p=.01; for 15-year-olds, p=.001; for 16-year-olds, p=.0 5 .
202. See Right to Counsel, supra note 134, at 1305-06. "Of the independent vari-
ables, a previous disposition of removal from the home is the most powerful determi-
nant of the present decision to remove a juvenile from the home .... Similarly, a
previous disposition of secure confinement is the most powerful determinant of the
present decision to incarcerate a youth." Id. See also Terence P. Thornberry & R. L.
Christianson, Juvenile Justice Decision-Making as Longitudinal Process, 63 Soc.
FORCES 433, 437 (1984) (asserting that prior dispositions strongly influence current
dispositions); John C. Henretta et al., The Effect of Prior Case Outcomes on Juvenile
Justice Decision-Making, 65 Soc. FORCES 554, 561 (1986) (escalating progression in
disposition severity with current sentence more severe than previous ones).
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tions provides an indicator of a juvenile's exhaustion of rehabilita-
tive resources as well as a rationale to transfer a youth to adult
criminal court. We found that prior program placement was the
most robust indicator of prior juvenile court involvement and was
highly correlated with prior delinquency record (r=-.7). Notably,
when we included both variables in the model, we gained no addi-
tional information from prior delinquency history. In our model, we
included only prior program placements as the single indicator of
past juvenile justice involvement because it provided a stronger
predictor of judicial decision-making, served as a parsimonious
proxy for prior delinquency, and simplified analyses.
In our study, we categorized prior out-of-home placements in
three groupings; (1) no prior delinquency placements; (2) one to
three prior placements; and (3) four or more prior placements (the
excluded category). We found that both of the first two categories
differed significantly from the final category (logistic coefficients of
-1.1 and -. 98, respectively). 20 3 Prior placements did not become a
meaningful factor in the certification decision until a youth
achieved a threshold of four or more placements. Because we could
have constructed this variable in several ways, the actual number
of placements for this threshold is somewhat arbitrary. The impor-
tant point is that youths with no prior placements and only a few
(one to three) prior placements experienced significantly lower odds
of being certified to adult court than did those youths in the alterna-
tive category of four or more program placements.
Number of Present Offense Charges: We constructed this vari-
able by dichotornizing the number of present offenses alleged in the
reference motion into two or fewer felony charges (the excluded cat-
egory), and three or more felony charges. The number of felony
charges that the prosecutor alleged in the reference motion signifi-
cantly affected whether or not the court certified a juvenile (.9,
p<.05). The more charges, the greater the likelihood the court
would transfer the youth. Multiple charges likely provided an addi-
tional indicator of the seriousness of the case pending against a
youth.20 4 If the prosecutor alleged three or more felony charges in
the reference motions, it significantly increased the odds that the
juvenile court would refer the youth to criminal court.
Present Offense Characteristics: We constructed and analyzed
several different configurations to gauge the seriousness of the
present offense. We ultimately differentiated three categories of al-
203. For no prior placement, p=.01; for one to three prior placements, p=.0 5 .
204. See Right to Counsel, supra note 134, at 1280-82 (finding multiple charges as
indicator of greater seriousness of case).
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leged offenders: (1) committed a felony offense against the person
and used a weapon in the offense; (2) committed a felony offense
against the person but did not use a weapon; or (3) committed some
type of felony (e.g., property or drug) other than a crime against the
person.20 5 As discussed earlier, prosecutors charged nearly two-
thirds (63%) of the juveniles in this study with some type of felony
against the person. Our model shows that in Hennepin County,
charging a youth with a crime against the person did not necessar-
ily increase the likelihood of transfer. Indeed, when we controlled
for the other variables, the juvenile court was no more likely to cer-
tify youths charged with a felony offense against the person than it
was to waive those charged with property offenses, provided that
the juvenile did not use a weapon (.3, not significant). If the prose-
cutor alleged that the youth committed a crime against the person
and used a weapon in the commission of the offense, however, then
the court was significantly more likely (1.0, p<.01) to waive the
youth to criminal court.
Variables Not Found To Be Significant: Contrary to our ex-
pectations, we noted several variables that were not statistically
significant in our multivariate analyses. In particular, the category
of crime did not significantly affect the certification process. This
finding differs from some previous studies reporting that courts cer-
tified most juveniles for property offenses.206 One explanation is
that other jurisdictions use certification more often for chronic
property offenders than Hennepin County. Alternatively, they
might have fewer violent offenders in their serious offender mix.
Finally, aggregated statewide data might obscure the substantial
contextual variation in crime characteristics and justice system re-
sponses. 20 7 In an urban setting, where prosecutors file reference
motions most often for violent offenses and courts certify youths on
the basis of their cumulative delinquency records, the seriousness
of the present offense alone may be a secondary consideration.
Although a juvenile's use of a weapon to commit a felony
against the person added to the predictive strength of the regres-
sion model, we did not find the extent of injury to the victim that
resulted from the weapons use to be significant. Further, neither
age at first court appearance nor age at first finding of delinquency
contributed to our understanding of which juveniles the court re-
205. Four youths possessed a weapon, but were not charged with a crime against
the person. We coded them with the other non-person offenders.
206. See, e.g., Bortner, supra note 40, at 59; BETWEEN Two WoPnDs, supra note 2,
at 109, 298.
207. See Justice by Geography, supra note 130, at 208-09; Sampson & Laub,
supra note 129, at 286.
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ferred or retained. Of course, prior delinquency history and prior
placements accounted for most of the variance associated with ear-
lier age of onset of a delinquent career.
In view of the disproportionate overrepresentation of minority
youths against whom prosecutors filed reference motions, the fact
that we did not find a positive effect for racial minorities is an im-
portant finding.208 Our result is consistent with another mul-
tivariate analysis reporting that race did not appear to influence
the reference decision, but which cautioned that the homogeneous
violent offender population in their study may have obscured the
independent significance of race.2 09 Our research sample included
a more heterogeneous group of offenders, and, like another recent
multivariate analyses,210 we did not find racial bias in waiver deci-
sions. Further research is necessary to determine whether dispa-
rate racial selectivity occurs in the prosecutor's initial decisions to
file reference.
b. Predictive Strength of the Statistical Model
We can demonstrate the strength of our model in several dif-
ferent ways. One method commonly used for logit regression is the
percentage of correctly classified cases. This model correctly classi-
fied 85% of the cases. This means that we could correctly predict
the reference decision of more than eight out of ten juveniles simply
by knowing the information included in the variables in the
model. 2 11 This represents a considerable improvement in our abil-
ity to correctly predict which youths the court will certify. If we
possessed no information about individual youths and their back-
grounds, we would base our predictions on the percentage of past
referrals. We would expect random accuracy of 56% in the absence
of individual information.2 12 By using the information contained in
the significant variables, our model accurately predicts about 85%
208. Because this study used three racial categories, we dummy coded for African-
Americans and other minorities, and entered each into the equation using whites as
the reference category. The overall race effect was not significant. However, we did
find that African-Americans were significantly less likely to be referred when com-
pared with whites. Other minority youth were not significantly different from either
African-Americans or whites. Because the overall effect was not significant and the
findings did not improve the explanatory power of the model, we did not include race.
209. See Fagan et al., supra note 3, at 271.
210. Tammy M. Poulos & Stan Orchowsky, Serious Juvenile Offenders: Predicting
the Probability of Transfer to Criminal Court, 40 CRME & DELiNQ. 3, 7, 15 (1994).
211. The model does a better job of correctly predicting which youths the court
referred (93% accuracy), than it does which youths the court retained in the juvenile
system (70%).
212. See Rolf Loeber & T. Dishion, Early Predictors of Male Delinquency: A Re-
view, 94 PSYCHOL. BuLrLETrn 68-99 (1983).
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of cases, a substantial improvement of 29% more youths (about
ninety-six juveniles) correctly predicted over random accuracy.
Another method used by researchers to test the strength of a
multivariate model is to assess the amount of variance (R2 ) that the
variables in the equation can explain. For logistic regression, we
can calculate a pseudo R2, a conservative proxy for the multiple re-
gression R2.213 Our model explains 40% of the variance in reference
decisions. This is a substantial improvement over the approxi-
mately 3% explained variance reported in an earlier analysis of ref-
erence decisions for all of Minnesota in 1986.214 The earlier study
provided a one-year snapshot of reference decision-making for the
entire state, but possessed fewer details about each waiver decision.
By contrast, our model used a larger sample of certification mo-
tions, spanned a longer time period, examined a specific locale, and
included more complete information about offenders, offenses, and
the decision-making process.
5. Post-Waiver Juvenile or Criminal Court Sentencing of
Young Offenders
Once the juvenile court decides whether or not to transfer a
juvenile, what happens to the case? Because most states lack inte-
grated, offender-based data systems to track youths between juve-
CALCULATIONS FOR MODEL IMPROVEMENT OVER CHANCE
Observed
Referred' Retained
Referred 199 32 231
Valid Positives False Positives
Predicted
Retained 16 83 99
False Negatives Valid Negatives
215 115 330
Base rate = referral rate over the 7 years = 215/330 = 65%
Selection ratio = number of youths predicted to be referred by the model = 233/330 =
70%
To calculate random accuracy:
215/330 x 231/330 = .46 (random correct values (RCV) for valid positives)
115/330 x 99/330 = .10 (random correct values (RCV) for valid negatives)
RCV valid positives + RCV valid negatives = random accuracy
(.46 + .10) = .56
To calculate observed accuracy:
Model valid positives + model valid negatives
199 + 83 = 282/330 = .85
Improvement Over Chance = Observed Accuracy - Random Accuracy
.85 - .56 = .29 x 100 = 29%
213. ALDICH & NELSON, supra note 195, at 12-15. See also ALFRED DEMARS,
LOGrr MODELING: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 56-60 (1992).
214. Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 13, at 37-40 (regression equation
explained only 3.1% of sentencing variance).
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nile and criminal courts, most waiver studies do not report the
subsequent dispositions of transferred youths. We followed the
subsequent justice system careers of each youth to determine
whether a conviction ensued in juvenile or criminal court, and what
sentence the judges imposed. Finally, we analyzed the post-waiver
recidivism of youths in both systems to assess the impact of juvenile
or adult sentences on the progress of a criminal career.
Dismissal and Charge Reduction: We examined the rates of
dismissal in juvenile and criminal court, and the rates of charge
reduction to determine whether the rates differed for referred or
retained juveniles, for youths of different racial groups, or for differ-
ent types of offenses. As reported in Table 18, the overall rate of
cases dismissed or unproved at this point in the process was very
low, only 6%. The courts dismissed charges against 14% of the
youth retained in the juvenile system, but only 3% of those referred
to adult criminal court. 2 15 Clearly, prosecutors experienced less
difficulty establishing the guilt of those youths referred to criminal
court. This suggests either that juvenile courts implicitly screen
waiver cases for their prosecutive merits, or that prosecutors pur-
sue less vigorously the juvenile cases in which they anticipate less
penal pay-off for their efforts.
If the original reference motion alleged only one offense, then
both retained and referred youths enjoyed a greater likelihood of
dismissal. Conversely, the greater the number of charges originally
alleged, the greater the likelihood that the youth would be adjudi-
cated or convicted of some offense. Rates of dismissal did not vary
significantly for juveniles of different races.2 16
Although youths charged originally with a larger number of
offenses experienced a lower overall dismissal rate, they enjoyed a
greater reduction in charges at their adjudications or convictions.
As Table 18 indicates, prosecutors or courts reduced the level of the
offense at conviction for about 10% of those youths originally
charged with only one felony offense. By contrast, for those
juveniles charged with more than one felony offense, the likelihood
of reduction in charges at plea or conviction increased sharply: only
one-fifth (20%) of youths charged with two felonies, one-third (31%)
of youths charged with three felonies, and one-half (50%) of youths
charged with four or more felonies were convicted of offenses at the
same level of seriousness. Overall, half (50%) of all juveniles pled
or were convicted of offenses of the same gravity as those with
215. Fagan, supra note 4, at 114 (finding twice as high dismissal rates in juvenile
court than in criminal court).
216. Juvenile and criminal courts dismissed charges against 4% of the white




Rate Of Reduction or Dismissals By Present Offense
Charges
Adjudication Adjudication
or Conviction or Conviction Dismissed
Charge On Number at Same at Lower or
Present Offense of Cases Level Level Unproved
Misdemeanor (s) 9 89% 0% 11%
One Felony 103 77% 10% 13%
Two Felonies 80 20% 78% 2%
Three Felonies 51 31% 67% 2%
Four or More
Felonies 87 50% 47% 3%
TOTAL 330 50% 44% 6%
which prosecutors charged them in the reference motion; the re-
mainder were adjudicated or convicted of less serious offenses
(44%), or had their cases dismissed or unproved (6%). Feld's analy-
ses of juvenile court sentencing practices reported a similar pattern
of charge reductions and dismissals, and suggested that juveniles
charged with more serious offenses or multiple counts enjoy greater
opportunities to plea bargain to lesser included offenses or for dis-
missal of some charges.2 17 On the other hand, where prosecutors
charge juveniles with several serious offenses, even with some
charge reductions or dismissals, they still may be convicted of at
least one offense at the original level of severity.
For those juveniles originally charged with a presumptive of-
fense, about one-fifth (21%) ultimately were adjudicated or con-
victed for a non-presumptive offense. As with outright dismissals,
the rate of reduction from presumptive to non-presumptive pleas or
convictions was greater for youths retained in juvenile courts (28%)
than for those referred to criminal court (19%). There were no sta-
tistically significant differences in the rates of dismissals or charge
reductions for retained or referred youths of different racial
backgrounds.218
217. See Right to Counsel, supra note 134, at 1282-85.
218. Table 5 demonstrated that prosecutors charged only 31% of 93 white youths,
67% of 182 African-American youths, and 60% of 55 other minority juveniles with
presumptive charges. Prosecutors or courts reduced the level of conviction from pre-
sumptive to non-presumptive offenses for 19% of African-American and other minor-
ity youths as compared with 35% of white youths. This racial difference is not
statistically significant, and is most likely attributable to there being much fewer
white juveniles that originally faced presumptive commitment offenses.
The racial groups did not differ significantly in the average number of felony
charges (2.60 for whites, 2.91 for African-Americans, and 2.91 for other minority
youths), nor in the average number of offenses for which courts adjudicated or con-
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a. Dispositions and Sentences of Youth in Juvenile and
Criminal Court
A primary rationale to transfer some youths to criminal court
is for them to receive longer sentences as adults than are available
in the juvenile justice system. However, several studies report a
"punishment gap" and question whether criminal courts in fact im-
pose more severe sanctions on waived youths than juvenile courts
could if they retained jurisdiction.219 Some research reports that
chronic property offenders who constitute the bulk of waived
juveniles in most states receive shorter sentences as adults than do
young property offenders retained in juvenile court.220 Other stud-
ies, however, report that youths convicted for violent offenses in
criminal courts receive dramatically longer sentences as adults
than do their juvenile counterparts. 221 For juveniles and adults
convicted of comparable crimes, both types of disparities-shorter
sentences for waived youths than for juveniles convicted of property
offenses, and substantially longer sentences for youths convicted of
violent crimes as adults-raise difficult issues of penal policy and
justice. Is there a social control justification for either type of
disparate outcome? Is there any waiver policy rationale for the
disjunction?
Our research attempted to answer these questions by examin-
ing the types of sentences that juvenile and criminal courts imposed
on retained and referred youth. What types of sentences did courts
levy? What proportion of offenders did they incarcerate in correc-
tional facilities? Of those confined, what length of sentence did they
receive? By comparing the commitment rates and the lengths of
sentences, we can assess the efficacy of social control and the equal-
ity in outcomes between the two systems.
Juvenile and Adult Sentences: Recall from Table 7 that the
Hennepin County juvenile court retained 115 of 330 youths in the
juvenile system. Although the juvenile court subsequently dis-
missed the cases of about one-seventh of these retained juveniles
(14%), as Table 19 indicates, it sentenced most (54%) of the remain-
ing youths to some type of long-term juvenile correctional facil-
victed them (1.26 for whites, 1.18 for African-Americans, and 1.29 for those in the
other minority group).
219. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (regarding the "punishment
gap").
220. See, e.g., Bortner, supra note 40, at 56-59; HEUSER, supra note 40, at 19-21.
221. See, e.g., Rudman et al., supra note 51; Marilyn Houghtalin & G. Larry
Mays, Criminal Dispositions of New Mexico Juveniles Transferred to Adult Court, 37
CRnun & DELINQ. 393, 402-03 (1991).
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ity.222 The court sentenced an additional one-fifth (20%) of the
retained juveniles to some type of short-term local programs, in-pa-
tient treatment facilities, work camps, or ranches. The court placed
on probation the remaining 12% of youths who did not receive
sentences that resulted in out-of-home placement or correctional
confinement, and imposed conditions such as a fine, a letter of apol-
ogy, work squad, day treatment programs, or a stayed sentence to a
correctional facility. After we controlled for the seriousness of the
present offense, no statistically significant differences existed in the
correctional sentences that the juvenile court imposed on youths of
different racial backgrounds.
Table 19
Comparison of Sentences and Dispositions
Adult Referred Retained Juvenile
Sentences N=215 N=115 Dispositions
Dismissals 3% 14% Dismissals
Stayed Prison Term +
Conditions of Probation 7% 12% Conditions of Probation
Short Term or Residential
Jail Only 8% 20% Treatment Center
Stayed Prison Term +
Jail 57%
risn 57% 54% Correctional
Prison 25%
Recall that the juvenile court transferred about two-thirds
(65%) of the youths against whom prosecutors filed reference mo-
tions. Of these 215 certified youths, the criminal courts sentenced
82% to a local or state correctional facility. The courts sentenced
about one-quarter of the certified youths to the state prison where
the minimum sentence length is one year or longer. The courts sen-
tenced the remaining incarcerated youths to county jails where the
maximum sentence length is one year. The criminal courts, how-
ever, also ordered stayed prison terms for virtually all of the youths
confined in local jails. If those young offenders violated the terms of
their probation following release from jail, their stayed prison
222. The court committed virtually all (51%) of these youths to long-term juvenile
institutions such as the Hennepin County Home School-Alpha program, County
Home School-Sex Offender program, the State Training Schools at Red Wing or Sauk
Center, or to out-of-state long-term placements, such as Glen Mills in Pennsylvania.
The court sentenced the remaining 2% to one of these facilities, and included an




terms could be executed to extend their confinement. Seven percent
of the juveniles received stayed sentences of confinement coupled
with other conditions of probation such as restitution, community
service, random urinalysis, chemical dependency treatment or psy-
chological treatment. When we controlled for the offenses for which
criminal courts sentenced these youths, no statistically significant
differences between racial groups appeared. 223
Table 20




Adult Presumptive Presumptive Presumptive Presumptive Juvenile
Sentence N=98 N=111 N=40 N=59 Disposition
Stayed
Prison Term Conditions of








Prison Term 42% 74%
+ Jail 65% 61% Correctional
Prison 51% 4%
The adult criminal courts incarcerated 93% of the youth con-
victed of a presumptive offense. By comparison, the juvenile court
imposed long-term confinement on 65% of the youth retained in ju-
venile court and adjudicated delinquents for a presumptive offense.
For youths convicted of non-presumptive offenses, the adult crimi-
nal courts confined 78% in jail or prison, whereas the juvenile court
committed only 61% of those adjudicated delinquent to a correc-
tional facility. Thus, for both presumptive and non-presumptive of-
223. Recall from Table 6 that the types of present offenses for which juvenile
courts certified youths differed significantly by race. Because criminal courts sen-
tenced youths on the basis of their present offenses, racial difference in patterns of
offenses resulted in variations in sentences. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § V
(Offense Severity Reference Table). For example, courts sentenced to prison 15% of
white youths, 32% of African-Asnerican youths and 23% of other minority youths,
but none of these differences were statistically significant. Criminal courts sen-
tenced most youths to jail time and a stayed prison sentence. Courts imposed this
type of sentence on 62% of white offenders, 52% of African-Americn youths, and
66% of other minority youths.
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fenses, criminal courts incarcerated youths convicted as adults
significantly more often than did the juvenile court. Even allowing
for the selection for seriousness inherent in the waiver process, the
differences in rates of dismissal, conviction and incarceration be-
tween the two systems are striking.224
Length of Sentence: We also examined the actual lengths of
sentences 225 imposed on those youths whom the court incarcerated.
The amount of time an offender actually serves in a correctional
institution may differ considerably from that which the court orders
due to "good time" reductions or releases to reduce overcrowding in
adult facilities, and for a myriad of reasons in juvenile facilities,
such as escape, termination, assault against a staff member, non-
compliance with treatment goals, and the like. Moreover, it is diffi-
cult to collect information about both length of time sentenced and
time actually served because most of this information is either not
automated or is automated within each particular institution and
not in a single central repository. The least complicated and most
complete information available about the largest group of offenders
consisted of the length of placement ordered by the court. We gath-
ered information on the lengths of criminal sentences from the
adult court system.226 We obtained information on the length of
juvenile placements from the juvenile court files or from the auto-
mated Hennepin County Juvenile Family Tracking System (JFTS).
For any outside delinquency or criminal information sought, we
specifically requested commitment length, that is, length of time
sentenced by the court and not actual time served.
Because juvenile sentences are indeterminate,227 it is difficult
to obtain information about the length of time juvenile courts order
youths to stay in particular facilities. For example, when the juve-
nile court commits juveniles to a residential treatment facility, the
program personnel and probation officers assess the juvenile's
224. The sentencing disparities that we report are more pronounced than those
found in Fagan's comparison of sentencing of violent youths in both systems. See
Fagan, supra note 4, at 116 ("Violent youths waived to and convicted in criminal
court received more severe sanctions [89%] than youths whose cases remained in
juvenile court [84%] . . .').
225. We defined the sentence length as the amount of time a court ordered an
offender committed or confined for the offense(s) for which the prosecutor filed the
reference motion.
226. We gathered adult sentence length information by using queries of a Henne-
pin County court system called Subject in Process (SIP). The sentence ordered by
the presiding district court judge is part of the entire set of information related to
criminal offenses.
227. See Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 35, at 1067-96 (discussing
juvenile court sentencing law and practice in Minnesota); Feld, supra note 11, at
847-50 (discussing indeterminate sentencing practices in juvenile courts).
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treatment progress and determine the length of time to be
served. 22 8 We encountered fewer difficulties establishing the
length of time juveniles spent at the state correctional facilities in
Red Wing and Sauk Center. When the juvenile court sentences a
juvenile to one of the state facilities, staff members at the training
school, rather than the court, determine the youth's institutional
length of stay. The Minnesota Department of Corrections uses de-
terminate release guidelines which enabled us to establish
equivalent lengths of sentences to those ordered by a judge.2 2 9
When the juvenile court judge sentenced a juvenile to the Hennepin
County Home School, the placement order included a proposed
length of commitment which we retrieved from the court files and
juvenile tracking system.
We encountered similar analytic difficulties when attempting
to compare the lengths of confinement in juvenile institutions with
those in adult facilities, because the two justice systems pursue dif-
ferent goals and use different rationales to impose sentences. Juve-
nile courts theoretically impose indeterminate sentences to better
rehabilitate offenders;230 thus, a youth's progress in a program may
affect the length of time served. By contrast, criminal courts im-
pose determinate, presumptive sentences on adult offenders for
specified periods of time, although offenders often see their
sentences reduced for "good behavior." Because the Minnesota De-
partment of Corrections employs juvenile release guidelines, we es-
228. We were unable to obtain information about eighteen juveniles sentenced to
several residential treatment centers.
229. The Minnesota Department of Corrections uses juvenile release guidelines to
determine the length of a juvenile's stay in the training schools. See Violent Youth
and Public Policy, supra note 35, at 1084-85 n.522 and accompanying text (summa-
rizing the Department of Corrections sentencing scheme).
In 1980, the Minnesota Department of Corrections administratively im-
plemented a determinate sentencing plan for youths committed to the
state's juvenile institutions. Based on a juvenile's present offense and
prior record, the plan "provide[s] a more definite and distinct relation-
ship between offenses and the amount of time required to bring about
positive behavior change." Under the Minnesota Department of Correc-
tions institutional release guidelines, a juvenile's length of stay is based
on the seriousness of the offense and "risk of failure factors" that are
.predictive to some degree of future delinquent behavior."
Id. at n.522 (citations omitted). "The Department sets a juvenile's projected mini-
mum length of stay based upon the present offense and prior record within seven
weeks after admission to an institution." MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORREoTIONS, OFFICE
OF JUvENmLE RELEASE § 5-204.4(a) (June 1985). It determines the actual parole re-
lease within the minimum and maximum range based upon both the presumptive
sentence, which reflects aggravating and mitigating factors associated with the com-
mitment offense, and subsequent institutional conduct, including the completion of
an agreed upon treatment plan. Id. § 5-204.2.




timated the approximate length of time ordered to serve in juvenile
institutions, and established equivalency between adult and juve-
nile sentence lengths. A further constraint on comparing adult and
juvenile sentence length concerned credits for "time served." In the
adult system, the amount of time an offender spends in pre-trial
custody while the criminal justice system decides the case is usu-
ally applied toward his or her sentence as jail credit days. The juve-
nile court held virtually all youths in secure detention during the
pendency of reference proceedings, yet juveniles sentenced in the
juvenile system do not receive credit for the time they spend in pre-
trial confinement. Recall from Table 8 that the juvenile court re-
quired about two months to make its reference decision. While
waived youths receive credit against their sentences for the pre-ref-
erence period in secure detention, retained juveniles do not. Thus,
adding two months to the lengths of juvenile commitments provided
greater equivalency with the adult sentence to better compare how
long each of these groups is incarcerated.
Our analyses of juvenile and criminal court sentences repli-
cated the inconsistent and disparate sentences reported in other
studies. Table 21 reports the median sentences imposed on youths
convicted as juveniles or adults for presumptive and non-presump-
tive offenses.231 Those youths convicted as adults of presumptive
offenses received sentences substantially longer than those imposed
on juveniles convicted of comparable offenses. By contrast, the ju-
venile court sentenced youths found delinquent for non-presump-
tive, property offenses for terms longer than their adult
counterparts.
Because the adult and juvenile systems differ, it is difficult to
compare directly sentence lengths in custodial facilities. Criminal
courts have two correctional confinement options (prison or jail)
while juvenile courts have only one incarceration option, long-term
correctional facilities. Criminal courts sentenced most youths
(60%) convicted of presumptive offenses to prison, and they imposed
a median sentence length of 1459 days, or about four years. If crim-
inal court judges made a mitigated downward departure from the
presumptive guidelines and sentenced these youths only to jail,
they imposed a median sentence of one year, the maximum allowed
for jail confinement. By contrast, the juvenile court sentenced
231. We used the sentence median rather than the mean because the median is
tess sensitive to extreme values than the average. The criminal courts sentenced a
few of these youths to life in prison, thus, we employed a statistic less affected by
these extreme values. Another method would be to remove cases with extreme val-
ues, known as statistical outliers. We did not choose this option, however, because of




Median Number of Commitment Days: Comparison of
Adult and Juvenile Length of Sentence
Referred Retained
Convicted or Youths Median Median Youths
Adjudicated Cases Days Days Cases
PRESUMPTIVE 266 23 Correctional
Jail* 33 365
Prison 4 411
NON- 182 32 Correctional
PRESUMPTIVE
Jail* 79 120
* Recall that adult incarceration options included jail time with a corresponding
stayed prison commitment and a few individuals with only a commitment of jail
time. Only the former is included here. This excludes 17 juveniles whose only
sentence included a short jail stay and no stayed prison time.
youth retained in the juvenile system and convicted of presumptive
offenses to median terms of incarceration of 266 days, or about nine
months. Thus, youths sentenced as adults to either prison or jail
served substantially longer terms than their counterparts convicted
of comparable offenses in the juvenile system.
For youths convicted of non-presumptive offenses, criminal
courts sentenced the vast majority (95%) to local jails for median
terms of 120 days or about four months, and made aggravated, up-
ward departures in only four cases (5%) to send youths convicted of
non-presumptive offenses to prison. By contrast, the juvenile court
incarcerated the thirty-one juveniles adjudicated delinquent for
non-presumptive offenses to median terms of 182 days, or about six
months. The juvenile court imposed significantly longer sentences
on less serious property offenders than did adult criminal court.
This anomalous disparity between juvenile and criminal court sen-
tencing practice perpetuates the "punishment gap." It makes no pe-
nological sense for juvenile court judges to send youths to adult
court to receive longer sentences, and then to have those criminal
court judges impose shorter sentences than those meted out in juve-
nile court.
b. Recidivism
A fundamental question of penal policy is "what works"? Do
any juvenile treatment programs, waiver policies, or criminal sen-
tencing strategies reduce subsequent recidivism by offenders? We
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constructed an accurate record of the subsequent official delinquent
and criminal justice responses to the group of serious young offend-
ers. We coded as recidivism all offenses for which courts adjudi-
cated or convicted youths that occurred after the offense for which
the prosecutor filed the initial reference motion.23 2 The juvenile
court heard some youths' subsequent offenses as prosecutors fied
additional reference motions after the initial motion that placed
them in our sample. The criminal courts heard most youths' subse-
quent offenses, because the youths had exceeded the age limit of
juvenile court jurisdiction by that time.
Table 22
Number of Total Reference Motions Filed on Juveniles by
Year the Juvenile was First Motioned*
Percent
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total Referred
One Motion 35 28 46 30 46 37 32 254 64%
Only** 66% 68% 75% 65% 85% 93% 91% 77%
Two Motions 10 7 8 8 3 2 3 41 81%
Filed*** 19% 17% 13% 17% 6% 5% 9% 12%
Three to Five 8 6 7 8 5 1 0 35
Motions Filed*** 15% 15% 12% 17% 9% 2% 0 11% 100%
Total Juveniles 53 41 61 46 54 40 35 330
* Each juvenile appears in the year of their first reference motion. For example, if
prosecutors filed a first motion for a juvenile in 1987 and a subsequent reference
motion in 1988, this youth would appear in the column for 1987 but in the row for
two reference motions.
** One Motion only: Juveniles with only a first motion filed against them.
*** Two (or more) Motions Filed: Juveniles with a first motion filed as well as a
second motion filed that is based on a separate behavioral incident and that is
unrelated, dispositionally, to the first motion.
Subsequent Reference Motions: Table 22 reports the number
of times that prosecutors fied reference motions in juvenile court
against the 330 youths in our sample. Prosecutors filed a new refer-
ence motion if the subsequent offense was serious and the juvenile
remained under age eighteen at the time the new alleged offense
occurred regardless of the result of the first reference decision. The
232. We used actual adjudications or convictions in our conservative definition of
recidivisim because we worked from juvenile and criminal court records. Other
studies have used rearrests as an indicator of recidivism. See, e.g., ALLEN J. BECK &
BERNARD E. SHwLEY, REcmDVSM OF YOUNG PAROLEES (1987); LYNN GOODSTEMIN &
HENRY SONTHERMER, A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF 10 PENNSYLVANIA RESIDENTIAL
PLACEMENTS ON JUVENILE RECmviSM (1987); PATRICIA A. STEELE ET AL., UNLOCKING




first row of Table 22 reports the number of youth against whom
prosecutors only filed one reference motion; the juvenile court certi-
fied 64% of those youths on that initial motion. The second and
third rows summarize the subsequent waiver experience of youths
against whom prosecutors filed additional, subsequent reference
motions. Prosecutors fied second reference motions against 12% of
these youths based on a second, separate behavioral incident that
occurred after the first motion. Whether or not the court had certi-
fied a youth on the first motion, it certified 81% of those against
whom the prosecutors filed a second reference motion. The prosecu-
tors fied three, four, or five motions against a small subset of these
youths (6%, 3%, and 2%, respectively). The juvenile court trans-
ferred all youths against whom prosecutors filed three or more cer-
tification motions. This table indicates the total number of
reference motions filed on separate behavioral incidents per juve-
nile.23 3 From 1986 through 1992, prosecutors filed 463 reference
motions, 330 of which were first motions. Although the county at-
torney fied only one reference motion against approximately three-
quarters (77%) of the youth in our sample, further recidivism fol-
lowing an unsuccessful waiver motion or subsequent serioug crimi-
nality while still a chronological juvenile caused the prosecutor to
file additional reference motions against seventy-six juveniles
(23%).
Recidivism - New Adjudications and Convictions: After the
prosecutors fied the initial reference motions against these youths,
juvenile or criminal courts convicted 55% of them for new offenses
they committed during the period of our data collection (through
December 31, 1993). Table 23 displays the information about these
youths' subsequent recidivism. Of the 55% of youths convicted of
new offenses, as few as 7% committed only misdemeanors; the re-
mainder committed at least one felony offense.234 Courts subse-
quently convicted 20% of these youths for three or more felonies
after the prosecutor filed the initial reference motion. Of those who
re-offended, courts convicted 6% for drug felonies, 21% for property
felony offenses, and another 21% for at least one felony against the
person. Of the latter group, 11% committed multiple felonies that
included one person felony as well. Because courts imposed signifi-
233. The second and third rows indicate the number of juveniles who had two
through five separate motions filed. We collapsed into one row those youths with
three, four, or five reference motions for presentation here.
234. Because we classified offenders on the basis of their most serious subsequent
convictions, some of the youths in the felony categories had misdemeanors convic-
tions as well. In addition, the source for criminal offenses outside Hennepin County
systematically collected data only for felony convictions; thus, our data may under-
state the number of misdemeanor convictions in the adult system.
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cant sentences on many of these youths, some remained confined
and did not have an opportunity to commit new offenses during the
period of our data collection follow-up.
Table 23
Recidivism - New Adjudications or Convictions - N=330
Percent
Number and Level of New Crime





Four or More Felonies 11%
Type of New Crime





Person + Other Felonies 11%
Two Years 'Street Time' *
No New Conviction or Adjudication 48%
New Conviction or Adjudication 52%
• N=266 This excludes juveniles from 1992 and those incarcerated for two years
following their Present Offense.
New Convictions Within Two Years of "Street Time": To assess
the recidivism of those youths who actually had an opportunity to
commit new crimes, we analyzed only those juveniles who had a full
two years in which they could have committed a new offense and
excluded the youth against whom prosecutors filed reference mo-
tions in 1992 (thirty-five individuals). In addition, we excluded
from our "street time" calculus the 10% of youths in our sample who
remained in prison for the two years following their initial convic-
tion. For each of the remaining 266 youths, we then calculated
their recidivism within a two-year "window of opportunity" follow-
ing their sentence and release for the offense for which the prosecu-
tors originally filed the reference motion. This method
standardized the length of time available for all remaining
juveniles. In this analysis, subsequent conviction or adjudication
for any offense constituted recidivism. Using our conservative defi-
nition of recidivism, over half (52%) of the youths who had an op-
portunity to commit additional crimes did so. These reconviction
recidivism rates fall within the broad range of reconviction recidi-
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vism rates reported in other studies of juvenile reoffending.235
Within the two year window following the initial reference motion
offense, there were no statistically significant differences in recidi-
vism rates between members of different racial groups. Fifty per-
cent of the African-American youth recidivated, as did 52% of the
white youth, and 60% of the youth of other minority groups.
Table 24
Percent Recidivism by Offender Characteristics - New
Adjudication or Convictions within Two Years 'Street
Time' - N=266
No New Crimes New Crimes
Racial Background
White (N=85) 48% 52%
African-American (N=134) 50% 50%
Other Minority (N=47) 40% 60%
Year of First Motion*
1986 (N=50) 44% 56%
1987 (N=39) 41% 59%
1988 (N=56) 46% 54%
1989 (N=41) 32% 68%
1990 (N=46) 54% 46%
1991 (N=34) 73% 27%
First Reference Motion Decision*
Retained (N=102) 58% 42%
Referred (N=164) 42% 58%
* Significant beyond .01
When we compared recidivism rates across the years of our
study, we found a statistically significant difference (p=.01). The
235. See, e.g., BECK & SHILEY, supra note 232 (national study completed in 1987
found a rearrest recidivism rate of 47% in the two years following prison incarcera-
tion for 17-22 year olds); JOHN C. STErIGER & CARY DIZoN, REHABILrrATION, RELEASE
AND REOFFENDING: A REPORT ON THE CRnIMNAL CAREERS OF TBE DrvzsioN OF JUVE-
NILE REHABLrIATION "CLASS OF 1982" (1991) (documenting that 68% of 926 males
released from Washington state division of juvenile rehabilitation in 1982 were
reconvicted within two years, and 53% committed at least one violent offense); Ted
Palmer & Robert Wedge, California's Juvenile Probation Camps: Findings and Im-
plications, 35 CRIE & DELINQ. 234, 238 (1989) (reporting that 65% of 2835 youths
released from "probation camps" reconvicted within two years); OFFICE OF THE LEGiS-
LATrvE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., RESmENTIAL FACILrrIEs FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
64 (Feb. 1995) (assessing recidivism rates in Minnesota's juvenile correctional insti-
tutions and reporting that "between 53 and 77 percent of male juveniles... received
new delinquency petitions or were arrested as adults within two years. The percent-
age of juveniles who were adjudicated as delinquent or convicted as adults ranged
from 38 to 62 percent for programs serving males.. . ."); Id. at 113-15 (summarizing
juvenile recidivism studies in other jurisdictions).
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youths against whom prosecutors filed reference motions in the ear-
lier years committed new offenses at a much higher rate than those
charged in the later years. This probably resulted from the differ-
ences in the types of offenders against whom prosecutors filed refer-
ence motions. In the earlier years, prosecutors fied more reference
motions against chronic property offenders than they did in the
later years when they charged more youths who had less extensive
delinquent histories with presumptive offenses. A focus on chronic
offending, or "quantity," is more likely to identify high base-rate ca-
reer offenders than is an emphasis primarily on the gravity of the
present offense, or "quality."
Finally, we compared the recidivism rates of youths waived to
adult criminal court with youths over whom the juvenile court re-
tained jurisdiction. A larger proportion of certified youths commit-
ted new offenses within two years than did those who remained in
the juvenile justice system. Nearly three-fifths (58%) of the youths
whom juvenile court judges referred for criminal prosecution as
adults committed an additional crime, as compared with 42% of
those who remained in juvenile court.
There are several possible explanations of the differences in
recidivism rates in the two systems. First, because juvenile courts
emphasized youths' prior records of offending to make certification
decisions, they used a valid and reliable tool with which to identify
high base-rate career criminals who possessed a greater probability
of subsequent recidivism. Thus, the discretionary certification pro-
cess did a reasonably good job of identifying the most chronic and
prolific offenders even within the population of serious offenders.
Second, some might attribute the lower recidivism rates among the
retained juvenile population to the "effectiveness of treatment"
within the juvenile correctional system. However, the population
selection biases inherent in the waiver process and the absence of a
control group make it difficult to attribute the differences in recidi-
vism rates between the juvenile and adult groups to "treatment"
effects. On the other hand, if the legislature and courts intended to
deter youths from committing additional offenses by subjecting
those who have not desisted from delinquency to the more severe
punishment of the adult criminal justice system, our data indicate
that they are not achieving that goal.
M. Discussion
Courts only can decide the cases presented to them. A signifi-
cant finding of this study, and one which is consistent with national
data, is that police arrested and prosecutors charged African-Amer-
[Vol. 14:73
JUDICIAL WAIVER POLICY
ican youths with different types of crimes than their white counter-
parts. Prosecutors' charging decisions determine which cases the
juvenile court considers in waiver proceedings. The racial charac-
teristics of youths arrested for serious violent and property crimes
differed significantly from those against whom prosecutors eventu-
ally filed reference motions. 2 36 Moreover, during the period of our
study, 1986-1992, the Hennepin County Attorney's Office changed
its charging policies, which subsequently affected the characteris-
tics of youths who appeared before the courts for waiver decisions.
In filing reference motions, Hennepin County prosecutors increas-
ingly emphasized the seriousness of a youth's present offense rather
than the prior record of offending. The proportion of youths
charged with crimes against the person increased from about 60%
to 80%, and those charged with the most serious, presumptive com-
mitment to prison offenses, increased from about half to nearly
three quarters of juveniles over the period of our study,2 3 7 with a
corresponding decrease in the lengths of their prior records.23 8
The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports indicate that nationally po-
lice arrest minority juveniles for a disproportionately larger
amount of violent crime than white juveniles. In our study as well,
we found a strong relationship between juveniles' race and the type
of crime with which the prosecutors charged them.2 3 9 Although Af-
rican-American juveniles comprised less than 10% of the Hennepin
County youth population, police arrested them for more than half of
the violent crimes, and prosecutors filed reference motions against
two-thirds (67%) of them for violent presumptive commitment of-
fenses. 240 By contrast, police arrested and prosecutors charged the
bulk of white juveniles with serious property offenses. The race-
and-offense charging pattern is stark: prosecutors charge propor-
tionally twice as many AMrican-Axmerean juvemiles as whites with
presumptive commitment offenses, and more than three times as
many white juveniles as African-Americans with property of-
fenses.241 Because prosecutors increasingly emphasized violent
crime in their charging decisions, the proportion of white juveniles
facing waiver decisions declined and that of African-American
juveniles enlarged.242
236. See Table 1.
237. See Table 2.
238. See Table 2.
239. See Table 6.
240. See Table 6. Prosecutors charged 60% of other minority youths with viotent
presumptive commitment offenses, compared with 31% of white juveniles.
241. See Table 6.
242. See Table 2.
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Although we analyzed the racial differences in judicial waiver
administration closely for evidence of discrimination, we attribute
the differences in the juvenile courts' processing of minority and
white juveniles to the types of offenses with which prosecutors
charged them, rather than to racial bias in the system. For exam-
ple, prosecutors charged more African-American juveniles with vio-
lent offenses. All youths charged with violent offenses were more
likely to receive court evaluative services, and clinical evaluations
slowed waiver administration.243 Similarly, after controlling for
other variables such as age, person offense and weapons use, prior
placements, clinical recommendations, and the like, a youth's mi-
nority racial status did not exert any additional positive effect on
waiver decisions.
This study provides the most complete assessment available of
judicial administration and the effects of the process itself on
waiver decisions. For example, we explored the ways in which the
"judicial philosophies" of the presiding juvenile court judges af-
fected waiver decisions. Critics of judicial waiver contend that sub-
jective and idiosyncratic judicial discretion yields disparate results.
Our data clearly indicates that the various judges within the same
urban county and court applied the same law and decided cases of
similarly-situated offenders significantly differently. These judicial
differences influenced both the characteristics of youths waived or
retained and the subsequent sentences imposed upon them as
juveniles or as adults.
Despite judicial variability, however, certain consistent com-
monalities affected waiver decisions. A youth's age and prior record
of program placements significantly affected waiver decisions. 244
All other things being equal, the court transferred older youths and
those with several prior program placements. Both of these vari-
ables provide a rational judicial operationalization of "amenability
to treatment." A youth's age determines the amount of time re-
maining within juvenile court jurisdiction and thus the "length" of
the court's intervention. In our logistic analyses, we examined both
a youth's prior record of offending and prior record of program
placements, and concluded that the latter better explained waiver
decisions. Clearly, exhaustion of treatment resources, as indicated
by prior program placements, provides a rational indicator of non-
responsiveness to treatment.
Initially, we were somewhat surprised to discover that the se-
riousness of the present offense, apart from whether the juvenile
243. See Tables 6, 13, and 14.
244. See Table 17.
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used a weapon, did not significantly affect judicial waiver deci-
sions.245 However, further analyses indicated that youths against
whom prosecutors filed reference motions for offenses against the
person and who used a weapon had increased odds of being referred
when compared with youths motioned for offenses other than
against a person. No difference existed in the odds of being referred
for those youths motioned on person offenses who did not use a
weapon when compared with non-person offenders.
The evaluations and recommendations of court services per-
sonnel-psychologists and probation officers-strongly influenced
waiver outcomes.24 6 The significant impact of clinical assessments
on the court process is consistent with the individualized "treat-
ment" decision that waiver entails. Although we attempted to col-
lect extensive "social" data about these youths' family background,
social circumstances, education and work experiences, we found
substantial gaps in the recording of this information in the court's
files. Court services recommendations carried considerable weight
despite the apparent absence of some type of standardized family
and social information.24 7 The juvenile court sought probation
studies and psychological evaluations in about half of the cases it
decided.248 The judicial request for a clinical evaluation was not a
de facto waiver decision, because whether or not court services eval-
uated a youth did not itself affect rates of referral or retention.2 49
Whether the court requested a court services evaluation af-
fected the rapidity with which it made its waiver decision. This was
due to the extensive time needed to complete a reference social
study. Over the period of our study, the length of time the court
required to finally dispose of waiver cases nearly doubled.2 50 Sig-
nificantly, because the court requested clinical evaluations more
frequently for violent offenders than for property offenders, and
prosecutors charged many more minority youths with violent
crimes, African-American youths received more extensive clinical
assessments.2 5 1 Because clinical evaluations slowed the timing of
the waiver process, and violent offenders, most of whom were Afri-
245. See Table 17.
246. See Table 17.
247. This does not mean that the court acted without necessary information or
that there was an absence of family history information in the files. On the contrary,
the fies contained volumes of critical assessments at different points in the juve-
nile's delinquent career. However, the format of the information was not standard-
ized among juveniles, because their particular situations were unique to them.
248. See Table 10.
249. See Table 11.
250. See Table 8.
251. See Table 13.
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can-American, received more clinical assessments, the overall
length of the reference process differed for youths of different racial
backgrounds.252 However, after controlling for offenses, the differ-
ences between the races in the length of the reference process
disappeared.
Although the Supreme Court decisions in Kent and Breed and
appellate court opinions implied that waiver decisions were liti-
gated, adversarial proceedings, the Hennepin County juvenile court
decided most waiver cases without a hearing.253 Our research indi-
cated that the vast majority of reference cases (over 90%) are plea-
bargained "package deals" in which the prosecutor, defense attor-
ney, and judge informally negotiated and decided whether or not to
waive, and the subsequent juvenile and adult sentences. In part,
these negotiations take place under the shadow of the courtroom
working group's understanding of the "going rate" for different pat-
terns of age, offense, and prior record. The litigated reference hear-
ings, by contrast, occur in instances in which the "going rate" is less
clear. Because age and prior program placements established the
"going rate," litigated waiver hearings more often involved younger
juveniles with fewer prior adjudications or program placements
who were charged with a very serious offense.254 Of the twenty-
seven litigated reference hearings, two-thirds involved charges of
homicide, two-thirds involved juveniles sixteen or younger, three-
quarters had no prior felony adjudications, and more than half had
no prior program placements.
Following the juvenile court's waiver decision, we tracked the
youths to determine their subsequent convictions and sentences in
juvenile or criminal court. The 115 youths retained in juvenile
court experienced a higher rate of dismissal (14%) than did their
counterparts in criminal court (3%), suggesting either that waiver
decisions provide a qualitative case screening or that prosecutors
are disinclined to pursue cases in which they anticipate less penal
"bang for their buck."25s For presumptive and non-presumptive of-
fenses, criminal courts incarcerated youths significantly more often
than did juvenile courts. 256
When we compared the types of sentences imposed on youths
sentenced as juveniles or adults, a dichotomous pattern
emerged.257 On the one hand, youths tried and convicted as adults
252. See Table 14.
253. See Table 9.
254. See Table 9.
255. See Table 19.
256. See Table 19.
257. See Table 20.
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for violent crimes for which the Sentencing Guidelines presume
commitment to prison received criminal sentences substantially
longer than did their counterparts convicted and sentenced for sim-
ilar offenses as juveniles. Even waived juveniles whose presump-
tive sentence was a mitigated downward departure received longer
sentences than juveniles retained and sentenced in juvenile court
for presumptive offenses. Thus, for violent youths, waiver results
in higher probabilities of conviction and incarceration for longer pe-
riods of time.258 By contrast, the juvenile court imposed substan-
tially longer sentences on youths convicted of property offenses
than the criminal courts imposed on young adult property offend-
ers.2 59 In part, this pattern reflects the adult Sentencing Guide-
lines constraints on sentences of non-violent felony offenders.
Thus, for non-violent offenders, the lack of integration between ju-
venile waiver criteria and criminal court sentencing practices per-
petuate the "punishment gap" and allows chronic adult property
offenders to "fall between the cracks" as they make the transition
from the one system to the other.
Both types of disparities for similarly-situated offenders-
longer adult sentences for violent offenders and longer juvenile
sentences for property offenders-occurred because the two sys-
tems lack a coherent sentencing policy that spans both. Although
we observed no evidence of racial discrimination in the waiver pro-
cess, because prosecutors charged and the court waived most Afri-
can-American youths for presumptive offenses and most white
juveniles for property offenses, the interaction of present offense
and sentences consigns most violent African-American youths to
prison and most adult white property offenders to shorter periods of
confinement in jail.
The 1994 amendments of Minnesota's certification statute
used the Sentencing Guidelines' presumptive offense criteria to cre-
ate a consistent sentencing jurisprudence in both systems. Both
the criminal and juvenile justice systems now employ a congruent
definition of serious offenses to rationalize social control, reduce the
role of judicial subjectivity and idiosyncracy, and improve the fit be-
tween juvenile court waiver decisions and criminal court sentencing
practices. Explicitly linking presumptive certification and EJJ
prosecutions to the Sentencing Guidelines' presumptive commit-
ment offenses and "public safety" criteria integrates certification
with adult sentencing practices, maximizes juvenile court sanctions
for the most serious and chronic juvenile offenders, and reinforces
258. See Tables 21 and 22.
259. See Table 22.
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the public policy that incarcerating violent offenders is Minnesota's
penal priority.
We used the presumptive commitment-presumptive certifica-
tion offense criteria in our data analyses to assess the likely im-
pacts of the significant legislative reforms. We emphasized the
retributive or utilitarian sentencing policy trade-offs between
stressing seriousness and persistence. Under the former "prima fa-
cie case" discretionary reference statute, unless the juvenile used a
weapon, the juvenile court primarily waived older chronic offenders
with less regard to whether their present offense was a property
felony or a crime of violence. The new presumptive certification
statute accentuates "public safety," violent offenses, and weapons
use, and shifts the waiver decision's focus from the cumulative rec-
ord of persistent offending to the seriousness of the present offense.
Although a legislative policy that maximizes sanctions for se-
rious violent offenders is jurisprudentially defensible as a retribu-
tive value choice, the likely impact of these policy changes on racial
minorities is troubling. The Hennepin County Attorney's Office's
change in charging policies anticipated this jurisprudential shift.
By the end of our waiver study, it charged about three-quarters
(74%) of the youths against whom it filed waiver motions with pre-
sumptive offenses. Over the course of our study, the proportion of
white youths against whom prosecutors filed waiver motions de-
creased from about one-third of all youths in the earlier years to
less than one-fifth of all youths in the later years. Because minor-
ity, especially African-American, youths commit violent crimes at
significantly higher rates than do white juveniles, proportionally
even more minority juveniles will be eligible for and presumptively
certified under the new law than under the previous discretionary
system in which judges emphasized persistence rather than seri-
ousness., Conversely, because Minnesota's Adult Sentencing Guide-
lines reserve scarce prison bed-space for violent offenders, juvenile
courts likely will certify proportionally fewer property offenders
than they did previously. Under the extended jurisdiction (EJJ)
provisions, juvenile courts can impose even longer probationary
sentences on these youths as juveniles than they could if they sen-
tenced the same offenders as adults. Thus, the new law provides an
additional incentive to bifurcate between serious violent offenders,
predominantly African-American, and property offenders, who are
predominantly white. The wide disparity between the sentences
that violent offenders receive as adults or as juveniles likely will
decrease, because most juveniles who are not waived but who are
convicted of crimes against the person in juvenile court will be sen-
tenced to enhanced terms under the extended jurisdiction provi-
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sions. By contrast, the gap between juveniles and adults convicted
of property crimes likely will widen further because the extended
jurisdiction allows the juvenile court to impose even longer
sentences on property offenders than are available in criminal
court. Indeed, a rational young chronic property offender concerned
only with sentence length and "doing time" would probably prefer to
be sentenced as an adult rather than as an EJJ in juvenile court.
Although most serious delinquents in Minnesota are white,
patterns of offending differ by race. Because police arrest minority
juveniles disproportionately for violent crimes, the demographic
projections and new legislation will amplify sentencing differences
by race. African-American juveniles prosecuted for violent crimes
will comprise the vast majority of urban youths presumptively cer-
tified and imprisoned as adults. By contrast, property offenders
and very young violent offenders will comprise the bulk of youths
sentenced under the enhanced EJJ juvenile court status. After we
controlled for the relevant variables, we did not find racial dispari-
ties in judicial waiver decisions even though minority offenders con-
stituted the majority of youths prosecuted as adults. Under the
new certification legislation, because of racial differences in pat-
terns of offending, we anticipate even starker disparities, again
without a discriminatory component.
Conclusion
This study improves on previous analyses of judicial waiver
administration in two important ways. First, it provides a complete
and comprehensive analysis of the judicial waiver process from the
prosecutor's initial filing of the reference motion to the eventual ju-
venile or criminal court sentences and youths' subsequent recidi-
vism. It identifies the factors that influence waiver decisions and
how those factors affect the administration of the waiver process
itself. Second, it provides a sophisticated assessment of the role a
youth's race plays in the most important sentencing decision juve-
nile courts make. The analyses indicate that the apparent racial
disparities in judicial waiver administration stem from significant
differences in the types of offenses with which prosecutors charge
minority and white youths, rather than from discriminatory deci-
sion-making once they are charged. Prosecutors charge most mi-
nority juveniles with violent crimes and more white offenders with
property offenses; most differences in waiver administration result
from the way the juvenile court processes violent and property of-
fenses, regardless of race.
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The differences in racial patterns of offending raise issues of
social justice that extend well beyond juvenile court reforms that
tinker with the boundaries of youth or adulthood. Because the rela-
tionship between race and violence is rooted in social structure and
public policies, sentencing policies that emphasize seriousness
rather than persistence will inevitably create a disparate impact.
Moreover, many demographic features exist that tbreaten to com-
pound racial divisions and amplify youth violence: increasing num-
bers of children growing up in single-parent families, living in
social isolation and concentrated poverty, and without hope for the
future.26o In the prophetic words of the Kerner Commission nearly
three decades ago, "Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one
black, one white - separate and unequal."261 Racial divisions and
youth crime and violence will cumulate unless and until our society
makes a commitment to social justice and social welfare that ad-
dresses the family, health, housing, nutrition, and educational
needs of all young people, especially those at greatest risk of pov-
erty and of crime.
260. See, e.g., LOSING GENERATIONS, supra note 122; MASsEY & DENTON, supra
note 126; WLSON, supra note 128.
261. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIvIL DisoRDERs 1 (1968)
(Kerner Commission Report).
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